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Topics in experimental and tournament design
Abstract
We examine three topics related to experimental design in this dissertation. Two
are related to the analysis of experimental data and the other focuses on the de-
sign of paired comparison experiments, in this case knockout tournaments. The two
analysis topics are motivated by how to estimate and test causal e↵ects when the
assignment mechanism fails to create balanced treatment groups. In Chapter 2, we
apply conditional randomization tests to experiments where, through random chance,
the treatment groups di↵er in their covariate distributions. In Chapter 4, we apply
principal stratiﬁcation to factorial experiments where the subjects fail to comply with
their assigned treatment. The sources of imbalance di↵er, but, in both cases, ignoring
the imbalance can lead to incorrect conclusions.
In Chapter 3, we consider designing knockout tournaments to maximize di↵erent
objectives given a prior distribution on the strengths of the players. These objec-
tives include maximizing the probability the best player wins the tournament. Our
emphasis on balance in the other two chapters comes from a desire to create a fair
comparison between treatments. However, in this case, the design uses the prior
information to intentionally bias the tournament in favor of the better players.
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Introduction
We examine three topics related to experimental design in this dissertation. Two
are related to the analysis of experimental data and the other focuses on the de-
sign of paired comparison experiments, in this case knockout tournaments. The two
analysis topics are motivated by how to estimate and test causal e↵ects when the
assignment mechanism fails to create balanced treatment groups. In Chapter 2, we
apply conditional randomization tests to experiments where, through random chance,
the treatment groups di↵er in their covariate distributions. In Chapter 4, we apply
principal stratiﬁcation to factorial experiments where the subjects fail to comply with
their assigned treatment. The sources of imbalance di↵er, but, in both cases, ignoring
the imbalance can lead to incorrect conclusions. We next review the following three
chapters in more detail.
In Chapter 2, we ﬁrst review the history of the conditional randomization test,
which was introduced by Cox (1982) in the context of sequential designs. Then, fol-
lowing Rosenbaum (2002) and Zheng and Zelen (2008), we use the test as a simple
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but ﬂexible form of covariate adjustment by conditioning on the observed covariate
balance. We introduce new notation to describe covariate balance and prove that the
conditional test has the correct signiﬁcance level. We consider a variety of sampling
approaches to sample alternative treatment assignments and explore connections to
rerandomization (Morgan and Rubin, 2012). Through simulation, we evaluate the
properties of the conditional test and, ﬁnally, apply it to data from a product mar-
keting experiment.
In Chapter 3, we present a methodology for ﬁnding optimal knockout tourna-
ment designs when the strengths of the players, ✓,a r eu n c e r t a i n . F o l l o w i n gG l i c k -
man (2008), we model player strengths using a multivariate normal distribution,
✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃). We consider 4, 8, and 16 player knockout tournaments and ﬁnd the
tournament brackets that maximize a variety of utility functions, for instance, the
probability the best player wins the tournament and the probability the two best
players meet in the ﬁnal. Our emphasis on balance in the other chapters comes from
a desire to create a fair comparison between treatments. However, in this case, the
design uses the prior information to intentionally bias the tournament in favor of the
better players. We apply Bayesian optimal design approaches, including Monte Carlo
integration and simulated annealing, to identify the optimal tournament bracket. We
also compare the optimal brackets to other knockout tournament designs, including
brackets following the standard seeding.
In Chapter 4, we consider 22 factorial experiments when one of the factors is
subject to all-or-nothing compliance. We use the principal stratiﬁcation framework
to deﬁne the ﬁnite-population and super-population factorial e↵ects for the di↵erent
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strata and use a Bayesian model to estimate the e↵ects. We also carry out a simulation
study to compare di↵erent approximations of the posterior distributions and discuss
how di↵erent assumptions can be relaxed and the computational consequences.
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Conditional randomization tests in
randomized experiments
2.1 Introduction
Randomized experiments are the “gold standard” for assessing causal e↵ects.
Randomization removes experimental bias, allows for unbiased estimation of average
causal e↵ects, and gives a “reasoned basis for inference” (Fisher, 1935). Covariates
are often collected in randomized experiments and while randomization ensures that
these covariates will be balanced on average, chance imbalances do occur. To quote
Senn (1989),
Af r e q u e n ts o u r c eo fa n x i e t yf o rc l i n i c a lr e s e a r c h e r si st h ep r o c e s so fr a n -
domization, and a commonly expressed worry, despite the care taken in
randomization, is that the treatment groups will di↵er with respect to
some important prognostic covariate whose inﬂuence it has proved impos-
sible to control by design alone.
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For the imbalance to be an issue, the covariate needs to be prognostic (i.e. related to
the outcome) but the covariate imbalance does not need to be statistically signiﬁcant
in order to a↵ect the results of the trial (Altman, 1985). Also, Senn (1989) argued
that in hypothesis testing “covariate imbalance is of as much concern in large studies
as in small ones” because “it is not the absolute imbalance which is important but
the standardized imbalance and this is independent of sample size.”
Restricted randomization and blocking are well-established strategies to ensure
balance on key covariates. More recently, Morgan and Rubin (2012) introduced
rerandomization as a way to ensure balance on many covariates. However, restricted
randomization, blocking, and rerandomization are not always feasible. In the prod-
uct marketing example that motivated this work, the covariate information was not
collected until after the units were assigned to treatment levels. The experiment in-
volved roughly 2000 experimental subjects and each subject randomly received by
mail one of eleven versions of a particular product. Each subject used the product
and returned a survey regarding the product’s performance. The outcome of interest
was an ordinal variable with three levels, 1, 2, and 3, and the goal was to identify
which product version the subjects preferred. The survey also collected covariate
information, including income and ethnicity and the experimenters were concerned
about the e↵ect of covariate imbalance on their conclusions.
While several methods exist to analyze ordinal data, including the proportional
odds model, randomization tests are a natural choice because they require no as-
sumptions about the distribution of the outcome. Randomization tests are unique
in statistics in that inference is completely derived from the physical act of random-
5Chapter 2: Conditional randomization tests in randomized experiments
ization. However, historically, randomization tests have not been used to adjust for
covariate imbalance. To quote Rubin (1980),
More complicated questions, such as those arising from the need to adjust
for covariates brought to attention after the conduct of the experiment ...
require statistical tools more ﬂexible than FRTED (Fisher randomization
test for experimental data).
In what follows, we explore conditioning as a way to adjust randomization tests for
covariate imbalance. Conditional randomization tests have traditionally been used
in the sequential design literature and only occassionally for covariate adjustment
(Rosenbaum, 2002; Zheng and Zelen, 2008). In Section 2.2, we review the notation
and basic mechanics of randomization tests. In Section 2.3, we introduce conditional
randomization tests and prove that the test has the correct signiﬁcance level. In Sec-
tion 2.4, we apply the conditional randomization test to experiments with covariates.
In Section 2.5, we evaluate the properties of the conditional randomization test via
simulation and, in Section 2.6, we apply the test to the product marketing example.
In Section 2.7, we summarize our ﬁndings and lay out steps for future work.
2.2 Randomization tests
As mentioned earlier, Fisher (1935) introduced the randomization tests for ran-
domized experiments and the tests have played a fundamental role in the theory
and practice of statistics. The early theory was developed by Pitman (1938) and
Kempthorne (1952). In fact, Kempthorne (1952) showed that many statistical pro-
cedures can be viewed as approximations of randomization tests. To quote Bradley
(1968),
6Chapter 2: Conditional randomization tests in randomized experiments
Eminent statisticians have stated that the randomization test is the truly
correct one and that the corresponding parametric test is valid only to
the extent that it results in the same statistical decision.
We introduce the notation and brieﬂy review the mechanics of randomization tests.
We then prove that the test has signiﬁcance level ↵.
2.2.1 Notation
Let N be the number of experimental units and let K be the number of treatment
levels. Each experimental unit is assigned to one level of the treatment and let
W =( W1,...,W N)b et h et r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n tv e c t o r .W ei n i t i a l l yc o n s i d e rc a s e s
where K =2a n dw er e f e rt ot h et w ot r e a t m e n tl e v e l sa st r e a t m e n ta n dc o n t r o l .T h i s
assumption though is not critical to our discussion. If Wi =1 ,u n i ti is assigned
to treatment and if Wi = 0, unit i is assigned to control. Let NT =
PN
i=1 Wi be
the number of treated units and NC = N   NT the number of control units. Let
⌦b et h es e to fa l lp o s s i b l et r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n t s . I nt h ec a s eo ft w ot r e a t m e n t
levels, |⌦| =2 N.I nt h ec a s eo fK treatment levels, |⌦| = KN.I ns e l e c t i n gt h ea c t u a l
treatment assignment, we typically consider a restricted set of treatment assignments,
which we deem acceptable. For instance, a completely randomized design restricts the
set to treatment assignments where NT is ﬁxed. We call the set of acceptable treatment
assignments S,w h e r eS ✓ ⌦. Let p(W) be the probability treatment assignment
W is selected. We implicitly condition on W 2 S such that p(W) = p(W|W 2 S).
Traditionally, all treatment assignments in S are equally likely. For instance, in the
completely randomized design, p(W)=
  N
NT
  1
.T h i sa s s u m p t i o n ,t h o u g h ,i sa l s on o t
critical.
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2.2.2 Randomization test mechanics
The randomization test tests the Fisher sharp null hypothesis of no treatment
e↵ect, which can be written as H0 : Yi(1) = Yi(0) for i =1 ,...,N.T h et e s tr e q u i r e s
the experimenter to make two choices. The ﬁrst is the choice of the test statistic,
t(W,Y
obs,X), a function of the treatment assignment, the observed potential out-
comes, and the covariates. The second is the deﬁnition of extremeness. The test
statistic and deﬁnition of extremeness should be chosen to discriminate between the
sharp null and alternative hypotheses. An extreme observed value of the test statistic
is taken as evidence against the sharp null. As an example, we often let
t(W,Y
obs,X)=¯ Y
obs
T   ¯ Y
obs
C (2.1)
where ¯ Y obs
T and ¯ Y obs
C are the average observed outcomes in the treated and control
groups. We can then deﬁne extremeness in terms of the absolute value of the test
statistic, where larger absolute values correspond to more extreme.
After the units are assigned to treatment and control, the outcomes are recorded
and the data analysis begins. In randomization tests, the observed data is re-analyzed
for every treatment assignment vector in S.M o r e p r e c i s e l y , t h e t e s t s t a t i s t i c i s
computed for every treatment assignment vector in S and the distribution of these
test statistic values is called the reference or null distribution of the test statistic. The
observed value is compared to this reference distribution. Let Sref be the reference
set of treatment assignments used to form the reference distribution. The idea of a
reference set is due to Fisher (1956) and will be discussed in more detail later. At
this point, we note that Sref = S.
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The observed potential outcomes and the sharp null hypothesis are used to im-
pute the complete potential outcomes table and the reference distribution is cre-
ated by applying every possible treatment assignment in S to the complete im-
puted potential outcomes table. Let Y
imp =( Y
imp(1),Y
imp(0)), where Y
imp(1) =
(Y
imp
1 (1),...,Y
imp
N (1)) and Y
imp(0) = (Y
imp
1 (0),...,Y
imp
N (0)), be the complete im-
puted potential outcomes table, where p(Y
imp |W,Y
obs,X,M)g i v e st h ep r o b a b i l i t y
of di↵erent imputed potential outcomes tables. The distribution of Y
imp depends on
W, Y
obs, X,a n dt h ei m p u t a t i o nm o d e l ,M.I nar a n d o m i z a t i o nt e s t ,t h ei m p u t a t i o n
model is the sharp null hypothesis, where Y
imp
i (1) = Y obs
i and Y
imp
i (0) = Y obs
i .I n
this case, Y
imp is a deterministic function of Y
obs. However, more generally, M can
take on a variety of models and plays a key role in connecting randomization tests to
posterior predictive checks (Rubin, 1984).
We lay out the randomization test in a series of ﬁve steps.
1. Select treatment assignment, W = w,f r o mS and observe Y
obs = yobs.
2. Calculate observed test statistic, t(w,yobs,X).
3. Using w, yobs and the sharp null hypothesis, impute the potential outcomes
table, Y
imp = yimp.
4. Using yimp and p(W), ﬁnd the reference distribution
p(t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X)). (2.2)
Using the reference distribution, ﬁnd the rejection region,t h es e to f“ e x t r e m e ”
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values of the test statistic. Let Ryimp be the rejection region where
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X) 2 Ryimp)  ↵ (2.3)
Based on the deﬁnition of extremeness, we can also deﬁne the p-value. Using
the absolute value as the deﬁnition of extremeness, the p-value is
p =P r ( |t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X)| | t(w,y
obs,X)|). (2.4)
5. Reject the sharp null if t(w,yobs,X) 2 Ryimp.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,r e j e c tt h es h a r pn u l l
if p  ↵.
Because S and p(W)a r eu s e db o t ht or a n d o m i z et h eu n i t st ot r e a t m e n ta n dc o n t r o l
and to test the sharp null hypothesis, randomization tests follow the “analyze as you
randomize” principle due to Fisher (1935).
Note that S can be very large. For instance, in a completely randomized design,
if N =1 0 0a n dNT =5 0 ,t h e nS =
 100
50
 
⇡ 1029.I t c a n b e c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y p r o -
hibitive to exactly calculate the p-value (or to exactly ﬁnd the region Ryobs). To quote
Bradley (1968), randomization tests are “stunningly e cient tests that are dismally
impractical.” In response, Tukey (1993) deﬁned S to be a much smaller set of treat-
ment assignments, say |S| = 1000. Then the randomization test requires minimal
computational e↵ort to compute the p-value but the validity of the test is preserved.
However, today it is common to use Monte Carlo simulation (i.e. sampling from S
according to p(W)) to approximate the p-value or Ryobs and the impracticality of
randomization tests no longer applies.
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2.2.3 Proving randomization tests have signiﬁcance level ↵
To prove that the randomization test has signiﬁcance level ↵, we need to show that
when the sharp null is true, the test rejects the sharp null with probability  ↵.
Under the sharp null hypothesis, H0 : Yi(1) = Yi(0) for all i =1 ,...,N,t h e
imputed potential outcomes table is equal to the true potential outcomes table, yimp =
Y.T h u s ,t h ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft h et e s ts t a t i s t i cu s i n gyimp as the potential outcomes
table, p(t(W,Y
obs(W,yimp),X)), is equal to the distribution of the test statistic
using the true potential outcome table, p(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X)). Let R be the set of
extreme values of the test statistic such that
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X) 2 R)  ↵. (2.5)
Thus, under the sharp null, Ryimp = R. Finally, we can then ﬁnd the unconditional
probability we reject the sharp null when the sharp null is true
Pr(Reject H0)=P r ( t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 RYimp)
=P r ( t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 R)
 ↵ (2.6)
where the last line follows from the deﬁnition of R. Also, note that in the ﬁrst line the
random variable Y
imp is in the subscript of RYimp because we are not conditioning
on a particular treatment assignment, W = w.T h u s , t h e r a n d o m i z a t i o n t e s t h a s
unconditional signiﬁcance level ↵.
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2.2.4 Additive treatment e↵ects and conﬁdence intervals
We can generalize the derivation to show that the randomization test also has
the correct signiﬁcance level for testing an additive null hypothesis, H0 : Yi(1) =
Yi(0)+c for all i =1 ,...,N. Only the imputation model, M, changes. For instance,
Yi(1)imp = Y obs
i if Wi =1a n dYi(1)imp = Y obs
i + c if Wi =0 . T h u s ,s t e p3o ft h e
randomization test changes but the remaining steps stay the same. The proof applies
directly because under the sharp null hypothesis, it is still the case that yimp = Y.
We can invert the randomization test to create a conﬁdence interval of plausible
additive e↵ects as well. The conﬁdence interval would consist of all c⇤ss u c ht h a tw e
fail to reject the sharp null H0 : Yi(1) = Yi(0) + c⇤ for all i =1 ,...,N.
2.3 Conditional randomization tests
Cox (1982) introduced the conditional randomization test but the idea of condi-
tional inference can be traced back to Fisher and his notion of relevant subsets. At
ac o n c e p t u a ll e v e l ,s t a t i s t i c a li n f e r e n c e sa b o u tap a r a m e t e r✓ are made by comparing
the observed data to hypothetical observations that might have been observed for
di↵erent values of ✓.D i ↵ e r e n tv a l u e so f✓ place di↵erent probabilities on these hypo-
thetical observations and these probabilities lead directly to p-values and conﬁdence
intervals. For instance, if for a particular value of ✓,t h eo b s e r v e dd a t ai sf a rl e s sl i k e l y
than some hypothetical observations, then that value of ✓ would not be included in
the conﬁdence interval. Fisher argued that the set of hypothetical observations used
for statistical inference should not necessarily include all hypothetical observations
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and should be chosen carefully. He called this set the relevant subset of hypothetical
observations. To quote, Cox (1958), relevant subsets
should be taken to consist, so far as is possible, of observations similar to
the observed set in all respects which do not give a basis for discrimination
between possible values of the unknown parameter of interest.
The idea of “observations similar to the observed set” is admittedly vague, and it is
not immediately obvious why a subset of the hypothetical observations should lead
to better inferences. The idea and its implications have been extensively studied and
debated in the statistics literature. However, certain principles have become well
established and we focus on those.
Relevant subsets are closely related to ancillary statistics. By deﬁnition, the dis-
tribution of ancillary statistics do not depend on the unknown parameter of interest.
Also, observations with the same value of the ancillary statistic share some similarity
to each other. Because the statistics do not depend on the parameter of interest, as
a whole, the observations should not favor one parameter value over another. Thus,
observations with the same value of the ancillary statistic form a relevant subset.
Cox (1958) gave perhaps the best known example of this idea. Say, we are in-
terested in testing whether the temperature, µ, is less than some constant c.L e t
the null hypothesis be H0 : µ<c .W e c a n u s e o n e o f t w o u n b i a s e d t h e r m o m e -
ters. Thermometer 1 is known to be very imprecise and thermometer 2 is known to
be very precise. Let X1 ⇠ N(µ, 2
1) be the temperature reading from thermometer
1a n dl e tX2 ⇠ N(µ, 2
2)b et h et e m p e r a t u r er e a d i n gf r o mt h e r m o m e t e r2 ,w h e r e
 2
1 >>  2
2. We randomly decide which thermometer to use by ﬂipping a coin, where
U is the thermometer selected and P(U =1 )=P(U =2 )=0 .5. The tempera-
13Chapter 2: Conditional randomization tests in randomized experiments
ture reading, X, is thus drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions, where
X ⇠ 1U=1 · X1 +( 1  1U=1) · X2 and (U,X)=( u,x)i st h eo b s e r v e dd a t a .
We consider two ways of testing the null hypothesis, H0 : µ<c . First, we can
recognize that which thermometer was selected is an ancillary statistic because the
distribution of U does not depend on µ.W e c a n t h e n o n l y c o n s i d e r h y p o t h e t i c a l
observations where U = u.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oc o n d i t i o n i n go nU = u.T h u s ,w h e n
u =1 ,t h et e s ts t a t i s t i ci sz = x c
 1 and we reject the null hypothesis when z>1.68
at the conventional 5% level. When u =2 ,t h et e s ts t a t i s t i ci sz = x c
 2 and again
we reject the null hypothesis when z>1.68. This approach is called the conditional
test and is entirely consistent with Fisher’s argument. It is also intuitive. If you
know you used the precise thermometer, the variance of the imprecise thermometer
is irrelevant.
However, Cox (1958) showed that the conditional test is actually not the most
powerful test when the alternative of interest is µ0 ⇡ c+ 1.T h em o s tp o w e r f u lt e s t ,
called the unconditional test, is the one that rejects the null when x c
 1 > 1.28 when
u =1a n dw h e nx c
 2 > 5w h e nu =2 .T h et e s ti n c r e a s e sp o w e rw h i l eh o l d i n gt h eT y p e
1e r r o rp r o b a b i l i t ya t5 %b yt r a d i n go ↵t h ec o n d i t i o n a lT y p e1e r r o rp r o b a b i l i t i e s .
The most powerful test has a dramatically larger Type 1 error probability when u =1
compared to the conditional test. To again quote Cox (1958)
The unconditional test says that we can assign a higher signiﬁcance than
we ordinarily do, because if we were to repeat the experiment, we might
sample some quite di↵erent distribution. But this fact seems irrelevant to
the interpretation of an observation which we know came from a distribu-
tion with variance  2
1. That is, our calculation of power, etc. should be
made conditionally within the distribution known to have been sampled,
i.e. if we are using tests of the conventional type, the conditional test
should be chosen.
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To sum up, if we are to use statistical power of the conventional type, the
sample space ... must not be determined solely by considerations of power,
or by what would happen if the experiment were repeated indeﬁnitely.
Birnbaum (1962) formalized this notion and called it the conditionality principle.
The conditionality prinicple applies when an experiment, E, is a random mixture of
component experiments, E1,...,E m.T h i sm e a n st h a tr u n n i n ge x p e r i m e n tE involves,
ﬁrst, randomly selecting one of the component experiments and, second, running the
component experiment. The conditionality principle says that the evidential meaning
of the experiment is the same as the meaning of the randomly selected component
experiment. More colloquially, “any experiment not performed is irrelevant” (Helland,
1995). That is, we can ignore the component experiments that were not selected.
Cox’s example ﬁts directly into this context because the two thermometers represent
two component experiments. Kalbﬂeisch (1975) called the selected experiment an
experimentally ancillary statistic.
2.3.1 Conditional randomization test mechanics
Our development of the conditional randomization test parallels Kiefer (1977)’s
development of the conditional conﬁdence methodology, especially the notion of par-
titions. Let S1,...,Sm partition the set of acceptable treatment assignments, S,
such that Si \ Sj = ; for all i 6= j and [m
i=1Si = S.W es h o r t l yd i s c u s sd i ↵ e r e n t
ways in which S1,...,Sm are constructed, but for now, treat the partitions as given.
Let ⇡i =P r ( W 2 Si) be the probability of selecting a treatment assignment from
the ith partition. Selecting the treatment assignment according to p(W)i se q u i v a l e n t
to ﬁrst selecting one of the partitions using the probabilities (⇡1,...,⇡ m)a n dt h e n
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selecting the treatment assignment from the partition according to p(W|W 2 Si),
where
Pr(W = ! |W 2 Si)=
Pr(W = !)
P
!02Si Pr(W = !0)
1!2Si. (2.7)
Thus, we can frame this experiment as a mixture of component experiments, where
each partition corresponds to a component experiment. Following the conditionality
principle, we should only consider the selected partition of treatment assignments
when carrying out the test.
In the randomization test, it was the case that Sref = S. However, in a condi-
tional randomization test, Sref is the partition that contains the observed treatment
assignment. To emphasize the fact that the reference set depends on the observed
treatment assignment, we write Sref = Sref(w). To reiterate, in a conditional ran-
domization test, Sref(w) 2{ S1,...,Sm} and w 2 Sref(w). Consequently, the con-
ditional randomization test does not follow the “analyze as you randomize” principle.
As we did for randomization tests, we lay out the steps of the conditional ran-
domization test.
1. Select treatment assignment, W = w,f r o mS and observe Y
obs = yobs.
2. Calculate observed test statistic, t(w,yobs,X).
3. Using w, yobs, and the sharp null hypothesis, impute the potential outcomes
table, Y
imp = yimp.
4. Using yimp and p(W|W 2 Sref(w)), ﬁnd the reference distribution
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p(t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X)|W 2 Sref(w)). (2.8)
Using the reference distribution, ﬁnd the rejection region, Ryimp,Sref(w),w h e r e
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X) 2 Ryimp,Sref(w) |W 2 Sref(w))  ↵, (2.9)
and the p-value, where
p =P r ( |t(W,Y
obs(W,y
imp),X)| | t(w,y
obs,X)||W 2 Sref(w)). (2.10)
5. Reject the sharp null if t(w,yobs,X) 2 Ryimp,Sref(w).E q u i v a l e n t l y , r e j e c t t h e
sharp null if p  ↵.
2.3.2 Proving conditional randomization tests have signiﬁ-
cance level ↵
To prove that the conditional randomization test has unconditional signiﬁcance
level ↵,w en e e dt os h o wt h a tw h e nt h es h a r pn u l li st r u e ,t h et e s tr e j e c t st h es h a r p
null with probability  ↵.
As before, under the sharp null hypothesis, H0 : Yi(1) = Yi(0) for all i =1 ,...,N,
the imputed potential outcomes table is equal to the true potential outcomes table,
yimp = Y.T h u s , t h e c o n d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e t e s t s t a t i s t i c u s i n g yimp as the
potential outcomes table, p(t(W,Y
obs(W,yimp),X)|W 2 Sref(w)), is equal to the
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conditional distribution of the test statistic using the true potential outcomes table,
p(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X)|W 2 Sref(w)). Let RSref(w) be the rejection region such that
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 RSref(w) |W 2 Sref(w))  ↵. (2.11)
Thus, under the sharp null, Ryimp,Sref(w) = RSref(w). Also, for notational convenience,
let RSi be the rejection region when w 2 Si.T h u s ,
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 RSi |W 2 Si)  ↵ (2.12)
for all i =1 ,...,m,a n dRSref(w) = RSi if w 2 Si.W ec a nt h e nﬁ n dt h ep r o b a b i l i t y
we reject the sharp null when the sharp null is true.
Pr(Reject H0)=P r ( t(W,Y
obs,X) 2 RYimp,Sref(W))
=P r ( t(W,Y
obs,X) 2 RSref(W))
=
m X
i=1
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 RSref(W) |W 2 Si)Pr(W 2 Si)
=
m X
i=1
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 RSi |W 2 Si)Pr(W 2 Si)

m X
i=1
↵Pr(W 2 Si)
= ↵ (2.13)
In the third line of the above equation, we use the law of total probability to sum
over all partitions, S1,...,Sm.T h u s ,t h ec o n d i t i o n a lr a n d o m i z a t i o nt e s th a su n c o n -
18Chapter 2: Conditional randomization tests in randomized experiments
ditional signiﬁcance level ↵.
It is important to keep in mind that there are some restrictions on the partitions,
S1,...,Sm.F o rag i v e np a r t i t i o n ,Si,i no r d e rf o rRSi to exist or equivalently, for
the p-value to ever be  ↵,t h en u m b e ro fe l e m e n t si nSi must be   ↵ 1.O t h e r w i s e ,
even the most extreme value of the test statistic would not lead to the sharp null
being rejected.
Additionally, in order for the test to have signiﬁcance level ↵,t h ep a r t i t i o n sm u s t
be speciﬁed before the experimenter has access to the observed outcomes. Otherwise,
the experimenter could consciously or subconsciously manipulate the inference by
changing the reference distribution. This follows Rubin (2007)’s principle of separat-
ing design from analysis.
2.3.3 Constructing partitions
When Cox (1982) introduced the idea of a conditional randomization test, he was
writing about sequential clinical trials and most of the conditional randomization test
literature has focused on sequential design (Wei et al., 1986; Smythe, 1988; Hollander
and Pe˜ na, 1988; Mehta et al., 1988; Wei et al., 1989). Sequential clinical trials are
unique in that experimental subjects enter the study serially in time and the total
number of patients in the study is rarely known in advance. Additionally, experimen-
tal subjects must be assigned to treatment or control immediately upon arrival and
thus, the ﬁrst subject must be assigned before the second subject is assigned. Popular
sequential designs include Efron’s biased coin design (Efron, 1971) and the urn design
(Wei, 1978). In using these designs, it is possible to end up with di↵erent numbers
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of treated and control units. Cox (1982) suggested that a randomization test should
be carried out conditional on “the numbers of assignments to each treatment and on
any further aspects of the treatment arrangement in which there is reason to think
relevant.” In this setting, the partitions, S,...,Sm,c o n t a i nt r e a t m e n t sa s s i g n m e n t s
with the same value of NT and NC.
In any experiment, the experimenter will likely be faced with several di↵erent
ways to form the partitions. While no general theory exists, according to Berger
and Wolpert (1988), the general idea is to “ﬁnd subsets ... which when conditioned
upon, change the experimental measure.” In our setting, this refers to the conditional
properties of the test di↵ering from the unconditional properties of the test. If the
conditional and unconditional properties di↵er, then the subset should be conditioned
on.
With that in mind, we show why conditioning on NT makes sense. Consider the
following example. An experimenter is interested in comparing two treatments and
the number of experimental units is N =1 0 0 . T h ee x p e r i m e n t e ru s e saB e r n o u l l i
design where experimental units are independently assigned to treatment with prob-
ability Pr(Wi =1 )=0 .5. We assume the sharp null is true and the test statistic
is ˆ ⌧ = ¯ YT   ¯ YC.T h e n , i n o u r e x a m p l e , t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e t e s t
statistic is the black line in Figure 2.1 and the black dotted lines at  2a n d2m a r k
the rejection region for the unconditional test. There is a 5% chance the experimenter
observes a test statisic in the rejection region.
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Figure 2.1: Unconditional and conditional distributions of test statistic: The
unconditional distribution is the black solid line and the black vertical dotted lines
mark the unconditional rejection region. The conditional distribution when NT =1 0
is the solid red line and the red vertical lines mark the conditional rejection region.
The conditional probability of rejecting the test using the unconditional rejection
region is 0.23.
However, say the experimenter observes an unusual treatment assignment where
only 10 units are assigned to the treatment group, NT = 10. At this point, even
before recording the outcomes, the experimenter knows the variance of the conditional
distribution of the test statistic, var(ˆ ⌧ |NT =1 0 ) ,i sm u c hl a r g e rt h a nt h ev a r i a n c eo f
the unconditional distribution, var(ˆ ⌧). At an intuitive level, this is because var(ˆ ⌧)i sa
function of var(¯ YT), var(¯ YC), and a correlation term. When we condition on NT =1 0 ,
var( ¯ YT |NT =1 0 )i n c r e a s e sr e l a t i v et ov a r (¯ YT) because of the small number of treated
units. This increase is greater than the amount var(¯ YC |NT =1 0 )d e c r e a s e sr e l a t i v e
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to var(¯ YC). We examine a similar phenomena more thoroughly in Section 2.5. That
means that the probability of rejecting the sharp null is signiﬁcantly higher than 0.05.
In our case, the distribution of the test statistic conditional on NT =1 0i st h er e dl i n e .
The conditional probability the null is rejected is the conditional probability the test
statistic is less than  2o rg r e a t e rt h a n2 . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ec o n d i t i o n a lp r o b a b i l i t y
is 0.23. By the logic above, this implies NT and NC should be used to create the
reference set.
The red dotted lines in Figure 2.1 mark the conditional rejection region when
NT = 10. Note that the conditional randomization test has the correct conditional
Type I error rate. We address this point again later.
2.4 Covariate adjustment
We now return to our original question of how to adjust randomization tests for
covariate imbalance. We ﬁrst review the literature on two approaches. The more pop-
ular approach adjusts the randomization test by modifying the test statistic. Typ-
ically, the observed outcome is regressed on the covariates and the test statistic is
deﬁned in terms of the regression residuals. The second approach uses the condi-
tional randomization test by conditioning on the covariate balance. We build on the
conditional randomization test literature by introducing new notation to formally
deﬁne covariate balance and explore the challenges regarding implementation.
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2.4.1 Modifying the test statistic
Ap o p u l a rm e t h o do fa d j u s t i n gr a n d o m i z a t i o nt e s t sf o rc o v a r i a t ei m b a l a n c ei st o
ﬁrst regress the observed potential outcomes on the covariates. The residuals from
the regression are treated as the “adjusted outcomes” and the randomization test is
carried out by calculating the test statistic using the adjusted outcomes in place of
the observed potential outcomes. For instance, if Y obs
i is continuous we can let the
residuals be
e
obs
i = Y
obs
i   f(Xi)( 2 . 1 4 )
where f(·)i saﬂ e x i b l e ,p o t e n t i a l l yn o n - p a r a m e t r i c ,f u n c t i o n .T h et e s ts t a t i s t i cc a n
be, for instance, the di↵erence between the mean of the residuals in the treatment
and control group,
t(W,Y
obs,X)=¯ e
obs
T   ¯ e
obs
C . (2.15)
This procedure is described in both Raz (1990) and Rosenbaum (2002). Tukey (1993)
also described a similar procedure but recommended ﬁrst creating “compound covari-
ates,” typically linear combinations of existing covariates, and using the compound
covariates in the regression, which is similar in spirit to principal component regres-
sion. If the outcome is discrete, Gail et al. (1988) proposed using components of the
score function derived from a generalized linear model as the adjusted outcome.
This approach is more robust than ANCOVA, which involves regressing Y
obs on W
and X and testing the treatment e↵ect by carrying out a t or F test for the inclusion
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of W, because it does not assume the model is correctly speciﬁed. For instance, the
nominal size for the randomization test using the residuals is maintained even when
relevant covariates are not included in the regression and the assumed distribution for
the outcome is incorrect. Stephens et al. (2013) carried out an extensive simulation
study to compare such randomization tests to model based regression approaches,
including Zhang et al. (2008)’s semi-parametric estimator. They found that the model
based approaches often inﬂate the probability of Type I error.
2.4.2 Conditioning on covariate balance
Zheng and Zelen (2008) proposed using the conditional randomization test to
analyze multi-center clinical trials by conditioning on the number of treated subjects
in each center. They motivated the test primarily through simulations showing that
the power of the conditional randomization test is greater than the power of the
unconditional test. The emphasis on power, more precisely, unconditional power, is
not surprising given that the usual rationale for covariate adjustment is increased
precision and the results imply that conditioning on the observed covariate balance is
similar to more traditional forms of covariance adjustment. While Zheng and Zelen
(2008) only considered the multi-center clinical trial, they were conﬁdent the idea
could be applied more generally.
The novel idea of conditioning on the ancillary statistics provides an alter-
native method to adjust for covariates in randomization based inference
... For any arbitrary covariate, the number of patients assigned to one
treatment for each level of the covariate is an ancillary statistic. Condi-
tioning on the ancillary statistics in a randomization based analysis is a
way of adjusting for the covariate e↵ect. This idea generalizes when there
are an arbitrary number of covariates. Discretized continuous covariates
can also be adjusted using the same idea.
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Rosenbaum (1984) also proposed a conditional randomization test but in the con-
text of an observational study. We can view an observational study as a randomized
experiment in which the treatment assignment mechanism is unknown. Thus, with-
out knowing the probability of di↵erent assignments, we cannot generally carry out
a randomization test. However, Rosenbaum (1984) identiﬁed two assumptions that
enable a conditional randomization test. The two assumptions are that 1) the treat-
ment assignment is strongly ignorable given X,w h i c hm e a n st h a tX contains all the
covariates that were used to make treatment assignments, and 2) the conditional
probability of treatment assignment, p(W|X), has the following form
p(W|X)=
N Y
i=1
⇡
Wi
i (1   ⇡i)
(1 Wi) (2.16)
and
logit(⇡i)=Xi  (2.17)
where   is an unknown nuisance parameter and ⇡i is the propensity score for the ith
unit (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Under the logistic regression model, W
TX is
as u   c i e n ts t a t i s t i cf o r . If we condition on the su cient statistic, the conditional
probability distribution of W will not depend on  . In fact, the conditional proba-
bility of any treatment assignment with the same value of the su cient statistic is
the same. The conditional probability of any treatment assignment with a di↵erent
value of the su cient statistic is zero.
Given this result, we can then carry out a conditional randomization test by
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ﬁnding the value of the test statistic for all treatment assignments with the same
value of the su cient statistic. The su cient statistic, W
TX,i san a t u r a lm e a s u r e
of covariate imbalance. For instance, if the ﬁrst column of X is the intercept, the
ﬁrst element of W
TX is the number of treated units and the remaining elements are
equivalent to the covariate means in the treated group. Rosenbaum (2002) brieﬂy
noted that this method can be applied to randomized experiments. In a randomized
experiment,   is in fact known, but we can still condition on its su cient statistic. It
is worth noting that the derivation does not rely on the ancillary statistic argument,
but uses the fact that nuisance parameters can be eliminated by conditioning on their
su cient statistics.
Cox and Reid (2000) also addressed conditional randomization tests but viewed
them as a justiﬁcation for ANCOVA rather than as a practical tool. In their notation,
¯ zT and ¯ zC are the covariate means in the treated and control groups.
To be relevant to the inference under discussion the ensemble of hypothet-
ical repetitions should hold ¯ zT  ¯ zC ﬁxed, either exactly or approximately.
It is possible to hold this ancillary ﬁxed exactly only in special cases,
notably when z corresponds to qualitative groupings of the units. Oth-
erwise it can be shown that an appropriate notion of approximate condi-
tioning induces the appropriate randomization properties for the analysis
of covariance estimate ... and in that sense there is no conﬂict between
randomization theory and that based on an assumed linear model.
2.4.3 Modiﬁed example
To illustrate why we should condition on the covariate balance, we modify our
previous example as follows. As before, N =1 0 0 ,b u tn o wa s s i g nt h eu n i t sa s s i g n e d
according to a completely randomized design where NT = NC = 50. Again, the sharp
null is true and the test statistic is ˆ ⌧ = ¯ YT   ¯ YC.T h em a j o rd i ↵ e r e n c ei st h a tn o w
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we know whether each unit is male or female. There are 50 males and 50 females
and we know that males tend to have higher potential outcomes than females. The
unconditional distribution of the test statistic is the solid black line in Figure 2.2 and
the black dotted lines at  2 and 2 mark the rejection region for the unconditional
test. The probability the experimenter observes a test statistic in the rejection region
is 0.05.
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Figure 2.2: Unconditional and conditional distributions of test statistic: The
unconditional distribution is the black solid line and the black vertical dotted lines
mark the unconditional rejection region. The conditional distribution when NT1 =3 5
is the solid red and the red vertical lines mark the conditional rejection region. The
conditional probability of rejecting the test using the unconditional rejection region
is 0.21.
The experimenter assigns units to treatment and control but ends up with an
unbalanced treatment assignment. More men end up in the treated group than in the
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control group. Let NT1 be the number of men in the treated group and NC1 be the
number of men in the control group. In the observed treatment assignment, NT1 =3 5
and NC1 =1 5 .T h i sc o v a r i a t ei m b a l a n c ec r e a t e sc o m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h ee x p e r i m e n t e r
because he knows that males and females have di↵erent potential outcome distribu-
tions. At this point, the experimenter knows that the probability of rejecting the
sharp null is signiﬁcantly higher than 0.05. In fact, the conditional distribution of
the test statistic is the red line in Figure 2.2 and the probability of being less than
 2o rg r e a t e rt h a n2i s0 .2. By the same logic as before, this implies NT1 and NC1
should be used to create a relevant subset. The red dotted lines mark the conditional
rejection region and the conditional randomization test controls the conditional Type
Ie r r o rr a t e .
2.4.4 Covariate balance function
We formalize the notion of covariate balance by introducing the covariate balance
function, B(W,X), a function of W and X.T h ec o v a r i a t eb a l a n c ef u n c t i o nr e p o r t s
ar e l e v a n ts u m m a r yo ft h ec o v a r i a t ed i s t r i b u t i o nf o re a c hl e v e lo ft h et r e a t m e n t .
For instance, if the mean and variance are appropriate summaries of the covariate
distribution, the covariate balance function should report the mean and variance of
each covariate for each treatment level.
The value of the covariate balance function, B(W,X), is an ancillary statistic in
the sense that its distribution does not depend on the treatment e↵ect. We can then
use the covariate balance function to partition the set of treatment assignments. Let
B be the set of all possible values of covariate balance function. For each b 2 B,l e t
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Sb = {! : B(!,X)=b} be the set of treatment assignments with the same value
of the covariate balance function, where [b2BSb = S. We carry out the conditional
randomization test using these partitions.
We provide a few examples of di↵erent covariate balance functions. Consider a
completely randomized design with N units where NT are assigned to the treatment
group and NC = N   NT are assigned to the control group. In the case of one
continuous covariate, X =( X1,...,X N), the covariate balance function might be the
mean of the covariate for each level of the treatment.
B(W,X)=
⇣ 1
NT
X
i:Wi=1
Xi,
1
NC
X
i:Wi=0
Xi
⌘
(2.18)
Actually, because NT, NC,a n d
PN
i=1 Xi are ﬁxed, this is equivalent to
B(W,X)=
X
i:Wi=1
Xi. (2.19)
For the case of K treatment levels, the covariate balance function would be
B(W,X)=
⇣ X
i:Wi=1
Xi,...,
X
i:Wi=K 1
Xi
⌘
. (2.20)
With p continuous covariates, X1,...,Xp,a n dK treatment levels, the covariate
balance function might be the sum of each covariate in the ﬁrst K   1t r e a t m e n t
levels.
B(W,X)=
⇣ X
i:Wi=1
X1i,...,
X
i:Wi=K 1
X1i,...,
X
i:Wi=1
Xpi,...,
X
i:Wi=K 1
Xpi
⌘
(2.21)
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We could also include the variance of the continuous covariates or deﬁne the covariate
balance function on transformations of the covariates, including interactions.
One of the hazards of continuous covariates is that, to quote Rosenbaum (1984),
“the number of treatment assignments ... may be too small to be of practical use.”
As mentioned earlier, if |Sb| <↵  1, the size of the conditional test will be greater
than ↵. One possible remedy is to coarsen (i.e. round) the continuous covariates
such that there are enough treatment assignments with the same covariate balance.
For example, rather than report income in thousand dollar increments, report it in
ten thousand dollar increments. Another approach is to discretize the continuous
covariates by turning each one into a categorical covariate. In the income example,
we would create income buckets, such at $20,000-$40,000. Both approaches destroy
some information but hopefully, not too much if carried out with the help of a subject
matter expert. This is reminiscent of Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus et al., 2012),
in which all covariates are discretized and balance is described by the number of units
in each combination of the categorical covariates for each treatment level. Because
the covariates in our motivating example are all categorical, for the purposes of this
chapter, we will focus on the categorical covariate case and leave the continuous case
for future work.
For categorical covariates, we can deﬁne the covariate balance function in terms
of the cells of a contingency table where the rows are the levels of the covariate and
the columns are the treatment levels. We start with the case of a single cateogorical
covariate with J levels and a treatment with K levels, visualized in Table 2.1. Note
that for a completely randomized design, the row sums and column sums are ﬁxed.
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Table 2.1: Single categorical covariate: For the case of one categorical covariate,
the contingency table summarizes the distribution of the covariate in each level of the
treatment. For a completely randomized design, a natural covariate balance function
is the matrix of internal cells.
W
12 ··· K
X
1 N1,1 N1,2 ··· N1,K N1,·
2 N2,1 N2,2 ··· N2,K N2,·
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
J NJ,1 NJ,2 ··· NJ,K NJ,·
N·,1 N·,2 ··· N·,K N·,·
An a t u r a lc o v a r i a t eb a l a n c ef u n c t i o ni st h ec o n t i n g e n c yt a b l ei t s e l f( i . e .t h em a t r i xo f
internal cells, [Nj,k]). Thus, B(W,X)=[ Nj,k]a n di fB(W,X)=b,t h e nSb is made
up of those treatment assignments that produce contingency table b.
We can also use the contingency table to discuss the covariate balance function
when there are multiple categorical covariates. The combinations of the categori-
cal covariates (i.e. the Cartesian product) can be treated as the levels of a single
cateogorical covariate. As an example, consider the case of two binary categorical
covariates, X1 and X2,a n dab i n a r yt r e a t m e n t . T h ec o n t i n g e n c yt a b l ec o n s i d e r i n g
all combinations of the covariates is shown in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Multiple categorical covariates: For the case of two categorical covari-
ates, the combinations of the two categorical covariates can be treated as the levels
of a single categorical covariate.
W
01
X1 =0 ,X 2 =0 N00,0 N00,1 N00,·
X1 =0 ,X 2 =1 N01,0 N01,1 N01,·
X1 =1 ,X 2 =0 N10,0 N10,1 N10,·
X1 =1 ,X 2 =1 N11,0 N11,1 N11,·
N··,1 N··,2 N··,·
In this case, we could let the covariate balance function be the contingency table.
However, such a covariate balance function implies that the interaction between X1
and X2 is as important as X1 and X2 individually. While plausible in some contexts,
the interaction is generally less prognostic. The number of units with X1 =1a s s i g n e d
to treatment and the number of units with X2 =1a s s i g n e dt ot r e a t m e n ta r et y p i c a l l y
of greater interest. For instance, a more likely covariate balance function would be
B(W,X)=( N10,1 + N11,1,N 01,1 + N11,1). (2.22)
where N10,1 + N11,1 are the number of units assigned to treatment with X1 =1
and N01,1 + N11,1 are the number of units assigned to treatment with X2 =1 . I f
B(W,X)=b, Sb consists of treatment assignments that produce the observed con-
tingency table and treatment assignments that produce di↵erent contingeny tables
consistent with B(W,X)=b.L e t {Cb,1,...,C b,l} be the set of contingency tables
that satisfy B(W,X)=b. Then treatment assignments in Sb can be partitioned ac-
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cording to their associated contingency tables. Let {Cb,1,...,Cb,l} be the partition of
Sb where Cb,i is made up of the treatment assignments that produce contingency table
Cb,i.W ec o m eb a c kt ot h i si d e aw h e nw ed i s c u s ss a m p l i n gt r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n t s .
The covariate balance function could also make use of a cluster analysis or other
methods of dimension reduction. In a cluster analysis, observations are assigned to
clusters such that the observations within each cluster are more similar to each other
than to those observations in other clusters. Popular clustering methods include k-
means for continuous variables and k-modes for categorical variables (Huang, 1997).
Clustering methods also exist for data sets with both continuous and categorical
variables (Wilson and Martinez, 1997; McCane and Albert, 2008). Once the clusters
have been formed, the covariates can be replaced with a single categorical covariate
indicating cluster membership. The covariate balance function would then be the
number of treated units within each cluster.
2.4.5 Sampling treatment assignments
In order to carry out the conditional randomization test, we must be able to draw
treatment assignments from p(W|W 2 Sb). Enumerating all treatment assignment
in Sb was explored by Rosenbaum (1984) using the backtrack algorithm. However,
enumeration is only feasible for small data sets. Another approach is directly sampling
treatment assignments from p(W)a n da c c e p t i n gt h et r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n ti fi ti si n
Sb (i.e. rejection sampling). This too is only feasible for small data sets. For larger
data sets, it is always possible to sample from p(W|W 2 Sb)i nt h ec a s eo fas i n g l e
categorial covariate. Unfortunately, more general sampling methods do not exist.
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However, we discuss sampling methods for related problems that might serve as a
starting point for future work. We also discuss the role of approximate conditioning.
We reiterate the importance of separating design from analysis, which implies that
the experimenter should specify the covariate balance function and sampling method
before having access to the observed outcomes.
Sampling from p(W|W 2 Sb)
We return to the case of a completely randomized design with one categorical
covariate with J levels and K treatment levels, represented in Table 2.1. In a com-
pletely randomized design, all treatment assignments are equally likely, which implies
that p(W|W 2 Sb)=|Sb| 1. As before, let the covariate balance function be the
number of units at each level of the categorical covariate assigned to each treatment
level. The goal is to sample treatment assignments such that the internal cells in
Table 2.1 are held ﬁxed. This is easily accomplished by independently permuting the
treatment assignments of the units at each level of the categorical covariate (i.e. in
each row). In this way, the values of the internal cells remain constant. This method
can be applied to generate treatment assignments from any contingency table. Thus,
whenever Sb is made up of treatment assignments that produce the same contingency
table, sampling treatment assignments is straightforward.
Unfortunately, when Sb is made up of treatment assignments associated with
di↵erent contingency tables, sampling treatment assignments is signiﬁcantly more
complicated. Ideally, we could proceed in two steps. First, sample a contingency
table Cb,i from {Cb,1,...,C b,l},w h e r et h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fs e l e c t i n gCb,i is
|Cb,i|
|Sb| .S e c o n d ,
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sample a treatment assignment from p(W|W 2 Cb,i). We just showed that the second
step is straightforward but the challenge is sampling from the set of contingency tables
{Cb,1,...,C b,l}.R e m e m b e r t h a t {Cb,1,...,C b,l} is a set of contingency tables with
ﬁxed marginals that satisfy additional constaints on certain cells. How to sample
contingency tables with ﬁxed marginals has been extensively studied (Mehta and
Patel, 1983), (Diaconis and Sturmfels, 1998), (Chen et al., 2005), and (Chen et al.,
2006) and those methods could provide a starting point for our problem. At this
point, we leave further examinination for future work but note that the Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method proposed in Diaconis and Sturmfels (1998) could be
useful in sampling contingency tables that satisfy B(W,X)=b. However, designing
the Markov moves such that the constraints are satisﬁed can be di cult and the chain
may fail to be irreducibile.
Approximate conditioning
While sampling treatment assignments from Sb is only feasible in the simplest
case, it is often possible to sample from either a subset or superset of Sb.C o x( 1 9 8 4 )
proposed letting the reference set be a superset of Sb.
One way of ameliorating the e↵ect of discreteness useful in extreme cases
is by approximate conditioning, i.e. by carefully assembling conditional
distributions given ancillary values close to that observed.
We ﬁrst discuss letting the reference set be a superset of Sb.F o re a c hv a l u eo fb,l e t
 (b) ⇢ B be the set of values of the covariate balance function close to b.I n s t e a d
of sampling from p(W|W 2 Sb), we sample from p(W|W 2[ b02 (b) Sb0). For
instance, with continuous covariates, we could sample treatment assignments such
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that blb <
P
i:Wi=1 Xi <b ub.T h i sc a np o t e n t i a l l yi n c r e a s et h en u m b e ro ft r e a t m e n t
assignments enough that we can use rejection sampling to sample treatment assign-
ments. The same idea can be applied to categorical covariates. The disadvantage of
approximate conditioning is that there is no guarantee that the test still has signif-
icance level ↵.T o s e e t h i s , n o t e t h a t t h e r e j e c t i o n r e g i o n i s n o w R (b) and R (b) is
formed using the conditional distribution p(W|W 2[ b02 (b) Sb0). This means that
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 R (b) |W 2[ b02 (b) Sb0)  ↵. (2.23)
However, this does not imply that
Pr(t(W,Y
obs(W,Y),X) 2 R (b) |W 2 Sb)  ↵, (2.24)
which is necessary in order that the test has signiﬁcance level ↵. However, the neces-
sary condition will hold if R (b) = Rb.I ti su n l i k e l yt h a tR (b) = Rb exactly, but, as
long as the set  (b)d o e sn o ti n c l u d ev a l u e st o od i s s i m i l a rf r o mb,i ti sr e a s o n a b l et o
think that R (b) ⇡ Rb. Additionally, we can assess whether R (b) ⇡ Rb by monitor-
ing how R (b) changes for di↵erent speciﬁcations of  (·). If the the rejection region
is relatively constant, we can feel more conﬁdent that the test has signiﬁcance level
approximately ↵.
The story is the same when the reference set is a subset of Sb. When all the covari-
ates are categorical, we can consider the contingency table based on the combination
of categorical covariates. We can then let the reference set consist of the treatment
assignments that produce the observed contingency table since we can easily sample
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those treatment assignments. Similarly, if we were able to obtain a subset of the
contingency tables that satisfy B(W,X)=b,w ec o u l dl e tt h er e f e r e n c es e tb et h o s e
treatment assignments that produce one of the contingency tables in the subset.
2.4.6 Rerandomization
The conditional randomization test conditioning on the observed covariate balance
shares similarities with rerandomization (Morgan and Rubin, 2012). Rerandomization
is a treatment assignment mechanism that restricts S to the set of treatment assign-
ments which satisfy a pre-determined level of covariate balance. A balance criterion,
 (W,X), determines if the treatment assignment is acceptable,  (W,X)=1 ,o ru n -
acceptable,  (W,X)=0 .T h u s ,S = {! :  (!,X)=1 }. As a result, the observed
treatment assignment is guaranteed to be balanced on covariates. The experiment is
analyzed using a randomization test where the reference set is S.R e r a n d o m i z a t i o n
is similar to restriced randomization but what makes rerandomization unique is that
it is designed to balance multiple covariates simultaneously.
The conditional randomization test is like a post-hoc rerandomization test.I n a
conditional randomization test, we observe some treatment assignment, W = w,a n d
covariate balance, B(w,X)=b, and then act as if that treatment assignment were
drawn from some partition with the same covariate balance, Sb.T h er e r a n d o m i z a t i o n
test and conditional randomization test would be identical if, for instance, Sb = {! :
 (!,X)=1 }.
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2.5 Post-stratiﬁcation simulation
We carry out a simulation study to evaluate the unconditional and conditional
properties of the conditional randomization test and compare it to the unconditional
randomization test. For this simulation, the relevant unconditional properties of
the tests are the average rejection rates over repeated runs of the experiment. The
conditional properties of the test are the average rejection rates under repeated runs
of the experiment where the covariate balance is held ﬁxed. For a given experiment,
the conditional rejection rates are arguably more relevant than the unconditional
rejection rates. While the unconditional rejection rates measure the performance of
the test over all treatment assignments, the conditional rejection rates measure the
performance of the test for treatment assignments like the observed one. To again
quote Cox (1958),
Our calculation of power, etc. should be made conditionally within the
distribution known to have been sampled.
We consider the case of a single categorical covariate. Adjusting for such a co-
variate is often called post-stratifcation and we refer to the levels of the covariate as
strata. Pattanayak (2011) and Miratrix et al. (2013) studied post-stratiﬁcation from
the Neymanian perspective and derived the unconditional and conditional distribu-
tions of two estimators. We utilize many of their results in evaluating the properties
of unconditional and conditional randomization tests.
Let X =( X1,...,X N)b et h ev e c t o ro fs t r a t ai n d i c a t o r sa n dl e tJ be the number
of strata. The units in strata j are given by ⌫j = {i : Xi = j}.W e a s s u m e a
completely randomized design with two treatment levels. NT units are assigned to
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treatment and NC = N   NT units are assigned to control. We deﬁne the covariate
balance function to be the number of treated units in the each stratum,
B(W,X)=
⇣X
i2⌫1
Wi,...,
X
i2⌫J
Wi
⌘
=( NT1,...,N TJ). (2.25)
Here, NTj is the number of treated units in the jth stratum and Nj is the number of
units in the jth statum. Note that NT =
PJ
j=1 NTj and NC =
PJ
j=1 NCj.L e t¯ Y obs
j
be the observed mean outcome in the jth stratum,
¯ Y
obs
j =
1
Nj
X
i2⌫j
Y
obs
i (2.26)
and ¯ Y obs = 1
N
PJ
j=1 Nj ¯ Y obs
j .
2.5.1 Test statistics
In the context of post-stratiﬁcaiton, there are two primary test statistics. The
ﬁrst is the simple di↵erence between treated and control means,
ˆ ⌧sd =
1
NT
N X
i=1
WiY
obs
i  
1
NC
N X
i=1
(1   Wi)Y
obs
i
= ¯ Y
obs
T   ¯ Y
obs
C . (2.27)
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The second is the post-stratiﬁed test statistic, ˆ ⌧ps,w h e r eˆ ⌧ps is a weighted average
of within stratum simple di↵erences. It is deﬁned through the strata level estimates,
ˆ ⌧sd,j,w h e r e
ˆ ⌧sd,j =
1
NTj
X
i2⌫j
WiY
obs
i  
1
NCj
X
i2⌫j
(1   Wi)Y
obs
i
= ¯ Y
obs
Tj   ¯ Y
obs
Cj . (2.28)
Then ˆ ⌧ps is deﬁned to be
ˆ ⌧ps =
J X
j=1
Nk
N
ˆ ⌧sd,j. (2.29)
While ˆ ⌧sd ignores the covariate information, ˆ ⌧ps utilizes it. We reviewed earlier that
randomization tests can be adjusted for covariate imbalance through the test statistic
and the post-stratiﬁed test statistic is an example. In fact, we can show that the
post-stratiﬁed test statistic is unchanged if we replace the observed outcomes with
the residuals from regressing the observed outcomes on the covariate. In the case of
as i n g l ec a t e g o r i c a lc o v a r i a t e ,t h er e g r e s s i o nr e s i d u a l ,
e
obs
i = Y
obs
i   f(Xi), (2.30)
takes a simple form. If i 2 ⌫j,t h e nf(Xi)=¯ Y obs
j .T h er e s i d u a lb a s e dp o s t - s t r a t i ﬁ e d
test statistic is ˆ ⌧res
ps ,w h e r et h ew i t h i ns t a t u md i ↵ e r e n c e sa r e
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ˆ ⌧
res
sd,j =
1
NTj
X
i2⌫j
Wie
obs
i  
1
NCj
X
i2⌫j
(1   Wi)e
obs
i . (2.31)
and then
ˆ ⌧
res
ps =
K X
j=1
Nj
N
ˆ ⌧
res
sd,j. (2.32)
However, it turns out that ˆ ⌧res
sd,j =ˆ ⌧sd,j and thus, ˆ ⌧res
ps =ˆ ⌧ps. Note that
ˆ ⌧
res
sd,j =
1
NTj
X
i2⌫j
Wie
obs
i  
1
NCj
X
i2⌫j
(1   Wi)e
obs
i
=
1
NTj
X
i2⌫j
Wi(Y
obs
i   ¯ Y
obs
j )  
1
NCj
X
i2⌫j
(1   Wi)(Y
obs
i   ¯ Y
obs
j )
=
1
NTj
X
i2⌫j
WiY
obs
i  
1
NCj
X
i2⌫j
(1   Wi)Y
obs
i
 
1
NTj
X
i2⌫j
Wi¯ Y
obs
j +
1
NCj
X
i2⌫j
(1   Wi)¯ Y
obs
j
=ˆ ⌧sd,j  
NTj
NTj
¯ Y
obs
j +
NCj
NCj
¯ Y
obs
j
=ˆ ⌧sd,j (2.33)
This implies that the post-stratiﬁed test statistic, ˆ ⌧ps,a d j u s t sf o rc o v a r i a t ei m b a l a n c e .
Conditional equivalence
Another interesting result regarding ˆ ⌧sd and ˆ ⌧ps is that the conditional random-
ization tests using ˆ ⌧sd and ˆ ⌧ps are in fact equivalent. Thus, when conditioning on
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the covariate balance, (NT1,...,N TJ), the test statistic that utilizes the covariate
information performs no better than the test statistic that ignores it. Similarly, this
implies that conditioning on the covariate balance adjustes for covariate imbalance.
We can prove the result by adapting a proof from Rosenbaum (1984). We show that
the conditional randomization tests using ˆ ⌧sd and ˆ ⌧ps are equivalent by showing that,
conditionally, ˆ ⌧ps is monotonic function of ˆ ⌧sd.
Note that ˆ ⌧ps = ˆ  W,w h e r eˆ  W is the estimate of  W from the linear regression
Y
obs
i =  0 +  WWi +
K X
k=2
 kXik +
K X
k=2
 k(Wi · Xik)+✏i (2.34)
where
Xi =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
1: i f t h e ith unit is in the kth stratum
 1: i f t h e ith unit is in the ﬁrst stratum
0: o t h e r w i s e .
(2.35)
Note that Xi follows the sum contrast coding. The next step is to show that, condi-
tioning on the observed balance, ˆ ⌧ps is a monotonic function of ˆ ⌧sd.
Let [W, F] denote the design matrix, where F includes a column of ones and
columns for the categorical indicator variables and interactions. Also, note that
W
TY
obs =( ˆ ⌧sd + 1
NC1TY
obs)/( 1
NT + 1
NC). Let PF = F(F
TF) 1F
T be the projec-
tion matrix onto the columns of F.W e t h e n u s e t h e r e g r e s s i o n a n a t o m y f o r m u l a
(?).
ˆ ⌧ps = ˆ  W =
W
T(I   PF)Y
obs
W
T(I   PF)W
.
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Note that conditioning on the observed balance implies that W
TF is a constant and
thus
ˆ ⌧ps =
W
TY
obs   k1
k2
where k1 = W
TPFY
obs and k2 = W
T(I   PF)W. Finally, since W
TY
obs is a mono-
tonic function of ˆ ⌧sd,ˆ ⌧ps is also a monotonic function of ˆ ⌧sd.
Mean and variance
Before we interpret the results of the simulations, it will be helpful to review the
unconditional and conditional mean and variance of the two test statitics under the
sharp null hypothesis. These results are special cases of the more general results
derived in Pattanayak (2011) and Miratrix et al. (2013).
All means and variances are reported under the sharp null hypothesis, H0 : Yi(1) =
Yi(0) for all i =1 ,...,N.F o r n o t a t i o n a l c o n v e n i e n c e , w e l e t Yi = Yi(1) = Yi(0),
¯ Yj = ¯ Yj(1) = ¯ Yj(0), and ¯ Y = ¯ Y (1) = ¯ Y (0). The unconditional mean and variance for
ˆ ⌧sd are
E(ˆ ⌧sd)=0
var(ˆ ⌧sd)=
Ns2
NTNC
, (2.36)
where s2 = 1
N 1
PN
i=1(Yi   ¯ Y )2.T h eu n c o n d i t i o n a lm e a na n dv a r i a n c ef o rˆ ⌧ps are
43Chapter 2: Conditional randomization tests in randomized experiments
E(ˆ ⌧ps)=0
var(ˆ ⌧ps)=
J X
j=1
s
2
j
Nj
N
⇣
2+
⇣
NTNC +
N2
Nj
  N
⌘⇣ 1
N2
T
+
1
N2
C
⌘⌘
, (2.37)
where s2
j = 1
N 1
PNj
i2⌫j(Yi  ¯ Y )2.T h et w ot e s ts t a t i s t i c sh a v et h es a m ee x p e c t e dv a l u e
but the variances do di↵er. Note that var(ˆ ⌧sd)d e p e n d so ns2,w h e r e( N  1)s2 can be
thought of as the total sum of squares (SST). var(ˆ ⌧ps)d e p e n d so ns2
j, j =1 ,...,J,
where (Nj   1)s2
j are the within stratum sum of squares (SSW). Remember that
SST and SSW are connected by the familiar decomposition,
SST = SSB + SSW
(N   1)s
2 =
J X
j=1
Nj(¯ Yj   ¯ Y )
2 +
J X
j=1
(Nj   1)s
2
j. (2.38)
The more prognostic the strata, the larger SSB =
PJ
j=1 Nj(¯ Yj   ¯ Y )2 and the smaller
the within statum sum of squares. As the strata become more prognostic, var(ˆ ⌧ps)
decreases but if SST is constant, var(ˆ ⌧sd) stays the same.
Conditional on (NT1,...,N TJ), the mean and variance for ˆ ⌧sd are
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E(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1,...,N TJ)=
1
NT
J X
j=1
NTj¯ Yj  
1
NC
J X
j=1
NCj¯ Yj
var(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1,...,N TJ)=
⇣ N
NTNC
⌘2 J X
j=1
s
2
jNj
⇣NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1  
NTj
Nj
⌘
. (2.39)
Note that, in general, ˆ ⌧sd is conditionally biased. For instance, if only the units in
strata j have large potential outcomes and more units in strata j are assigned to the
treatment group, E(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1,...,N TJ) will be positive. However, ˆ ⌧sd is conditionally
unbiased when either ¯ Yj = ¯ Y or
NTj
NT =
NCj
NC .T h eﬁ r s tc o n d i t i o ni m p l i e st h a tt h es t r a t a
are not prognostic and the second condition implies that the treatment assignment
is perfectly balanced. Regarding the conditional variance, note that
⇣
NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1 
NTj
Nj
⌘
is largest when
NTj
Nj =0 .5. As we move further from 0.5, the conditional variance
decreases. We can think of
⇣
NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1 
NTj
Nj
⌘
as inversely related to covariate imbalance.
The smaller
⇣
NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1  
NTj
Nj
⌘
,t h eb i g g e rt h ec o v a r i a t ei m b a l a n c e .
For ˆ ⌧ps, the conditional expectation and variance are
E(ˆ ⌧ps |NT1,...,N TJ)=0
var(ˆ ⌧ps |NT1,...,N TJ)=
J X
j=1
s
2
j
N2
j
N2
⇣ 1
NTj
+
1
NCj
⌘
=
J X
j=1
s
2
j
N2
j
N2
h⇣NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1  
NTj
Nj
⌘i 1
. (2.40)
Again, the term
⇣
NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1 
NTj
Nj
⌘
appears in the conditional variance. However, for ˆ ⌧ps,
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as the covariate imbalance increases,
⇣
NTj
Nj
⌘⇣
1 
NTj
Nj
⌘
decreases, and the conditional
variance increases.
While these means and variances help us interpret the simulation results, they
might be used to obtain asymptotic results for the unconditional and conditional
properties of the tests. Following Ding (2014), we could potentially apply the ﬁnite
population central limit theorem but we leave this for future work.
2.5.2 Simulation set-up
The goal of the simulation study is to evaluate the unconditional and conditional
properties of the conditional randomization test in a simple post-stratiﬁcation set-
ting. We compare the conditional and unconditional randomization tests over sev-
eral simulation settings and both test statistics. We let N =1 0 0 ,NT = 50, and
NC = N   NT =5 0 .W ea l s ol e tt h en u m b e ro fs t r a t ab eJ =2a n d⌫1 = ⌫2 =5 0 .
Table 2.3: Simulation design: We use a completely randomized design where N =
100 and NT =5 0 .
W
10
X
1 NT1 NC1 N1 =5 0
2 NT2 NC2 N2 =5 0
NT =5 0 NC =5 0 N =1 0 0
Because there are only two strata and two treatment levels, the covariate balance
function is completely determined by the top left cell, NT1,i nT a b l e2 . 3 .
We generate the “science”, the complete potential outcomes table, by varying two
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parameters, ⌧ and  . Here, ⌧ is the additive treatment e↵ect and   controls the
association between X and Y (0) (i.e. the prognostic e↵ect).
⌧ = Yi(1)   Yi(0)
  = E(Y (0)|X =2 )  E(Y (0)|X =1 ) ( 2 . 4 1 )
We let ⌧ take on one of 11 values, ⌧ 2{ 0,0.1,0.2,...,1} and   take on one of three
values,   2{ 0,1.5,3}.W eg e n e r a t et h ec o m p l e t ep o t e n t i a lo u t c o m e sb yﬁ r s td r a w i n g
Yi(0)|Xi and then ﬁlling in Yi(1) as follows.
Yi(0)|Xi ⇠ N( Xi,1)
Yi(1) = Yi(0) + ⌧ (2.42)
After generating the potential outcomes, we randomly assign units to treatment and
control and record whether each of the three tests (two unconditional tests and one
conditional test) rejects the sharp null, H0 : Yi(1) = Yi(0) for i =1 ,...,N,a tt h e
0.05 signiﬁcance level. We repeat this 1000 times and record the average rejection
rate for each test.
We randomly assign the units in one of two ways. We either assign them using
the completely randomized assignment mechanism or we assign them holding NT1
ﬁxed at either 25, 30, 35, or 40. Assigning the units using the completely randomized
assignment mechanism allows us to evaluate the unconditional properties of the test
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and holding NT1 ﬁxed allows us to assess the conditional properties of the test (i.e.
how the test performs for particular values of NT1). Since we are implicitly inter-
ested in situations where the covariate is prognostic, when evaluating the conditional
properties, we let   =3 .
2.5.3 Unconditional properties
Figure 2.3 reports the unconditional rejection rates for di↵erent values of ⌧ and
 .T h eu n i t sw e r ea s s i g n e du s i n gt h ec o m p l e t e l yr a n d o m i z e da s s i g n m e n tm e c h a n i s m .
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
.
0
0
.
2
0
.
4
0
.
6
0
.
8
1
.
0
τ
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
R
e
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
uncond. τ ^
sd
uncond. τ ^
ps
cond. τ ^
sd
(a)   =0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
.
0
0
.
2
0
.
4
0
.
6
0
.
8
1
.
0
τ
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
R
e
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
(b)   =1 .5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
.
0
0
.
2
0
.
4
0
.
6
0
.
8
1
.
0
τ
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
R
e
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
(c)   =3
Figure 2.3: Unconditional average rejection rates for di↵erent ⌧ and  
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When   = 0, Figure 2.3(a), the covariate is not prognostic and the three tests are
virtually the same. All reject the null hypothesis with probability 0.05 (the horizontal
dotted line) when the null is true, ⌧ = 0, and, as expected, the power increases as
⌧ increases. In Figure 2.3(b), the covariate is more prognostic,   =1 .5, and the
unconditional test using ˆ ⌧ps and the conditional test appear unchanged but the power
of the unconditional test using ˆ ⌧sd,s h o w ni nt h eb l a c kl i n e ,f a l l s .T h eu n c o n d i t i o n a l
test using ˆ ⌧sd is the one test that ignores the covariate balance. It is more of the same
in Figure 2.3(c), where again the unconditional test using ˆ ⌧ps and the conditional
test appear unchanged. However, the power of the unconditional test using ˆ ⌧sd falls
even lower. In summary, as the covariate becomes more prognostic, the power of the
unconditional test using ˆ ⌧sd decreases while the power of the other two tests remain
the same. The unconditional properties support the notion that we should adjust for
covariate imbalance either by modifying the test statistic or by conditioning but do
not distinguish between the two approaches.
2.5.4 Conditional properties
Figure 2.4 reports the conditional rejection rates for the three tests, varying the
values of ⌧ and NT1,w h e r e  =3 .
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(b) NT1 = 30
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(c) NT1 = 35
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(d) NT1 = 40
Figure 2.4: Conditional average rejection rates for di↵erent ⌧ and NT1: In all
simulations,   =3 .
When NT1 = 25, Figure 2.4(a), the prognostic covariate is perfectly balanced.
When ⌧ =0 ,b o t ht h eu n c o n d i t i o n a lt e s tu s i n gˆ ⌧ps and the conditional test reject the
sharp null with probability 0.05. The unconditional test using ˆ ⌧sd rejects the sharp
null with probability less than 0.05. Remember that E(ˆ ⌧sd)=0a n db e c a u s et h e
covariate is perfectly balanced, E(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1 =2 5 )=0 . B u t ,b e c a u s et h ec o v a r i a t e
is prognostic, var(ˆ ⌧sd) > var(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1 =2 5 ) . T h eu n c o n d i t i o n a lr a n d o m i z a t i o nt e s t
using ˆ ⌧sd compares the test statistic to a reference distribution centered at 0 and
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with variance var(ˆ ⌧sd); however, when NT1 =2 5 ,t h eo b s e r v e dt e s ts t a t i s t i c sh a v ea
smaller variance. Thus, the test statistics rarely end up in the tails of the reference
distribution and the rejection rate is less than 0.05.
As we move from perfect covariate balance to covariate imbalance, Figure 2.4(b),
the unconditional test using ˆ ⌧ps and the conditional test appear unchanged, but the
unconditional test using ˆ ⌧sd begins to break down. When ⌧ =0 ,E(ˆ ⌧sd)=0b u t
because the covariate is prognostic, E(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1 =3 0 )< 0. Thus, the unconditional
test is comparing the observed test statistics, which tend to be negative, to a reference
distribution centered at 0. As seen in Figure 2.4(b), this implies that the rejection rate
should be greater than 0.05 when ⌧ = 0. As ⌧ increases, E(ˆ ⌧sd |NT1 =3 0 )i n c r e a s e s
since the positive treatment e↵ect counteracts the e↵ect of the covariate imbalance.
Thus, the observed test statistics are pushed closer to 0 and the rejection rate falls.
Eventually, the treatment e↵ect overcomes the covariate imbalance and the rejection
rate begins to rise, which we see at ⌧ =1 .
In Figures 2.4(c) and 2.4(d), as the covariate imbalance increases, the uncondi-
tional test using ˆ ⌧sd repeats this pattern. More interestingly, as the covariate imbal-
ance increases, we begin to see di↵erences between the unconditional test using ˆ ⌧ps
and the conditional test. Note that in Figure 2.4(d), the unconditional test using
ˆ ⌧ps rejects the sharp null with probability over 0.05 when ⌧ =0 . T h i si m p l i e st h a t
the test has the wrong conditional signiﬁcance level. In contrast, although the power
of the conditional test has dropped slightly, its conditional signiﬁcance level is still
0.05. The key to understanding why the conditional signiﬁcance level is incorrect for
the unconditional test using ˆ ⌧ps is that the conditional variance of ˆ ⌧ps increases with
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the covariate imbalance. Thus, var(ˆ ⌧ps |NT1 =4 0 )> var(ˆ ⌧ps)a n dt h eo b s e r v e dt e s t
statistics are more spread out than the reference distribution they are being compared
to.
The unconditional properties supported the notion that we should adjust for co-
variate imbalance either by modifying the test statistic or by conditioning. The
conditional properties indicate that modifying the test statistic is inferior to condi-
tioning because unconditional tests with modiﬁed test statistics can have the wrong
conditional signﬁcance level.
2.6 Product marketing example
Finally, we return to the product marketing example that initially motivated this
exploration of conditional randomization tests. Remember that the experiment in-
volved roughly 2000 experimental subjects and K =1 1t r e a t m e n tl e v e l s ,w h i c hw e r e
the eleven versions of a particular product. Each subject randomly received by mail
one of products. Each subject used the product and returned a survey regarding the
product’s performance. The outcome of interest was an ordinal variable with three
levels, 1, 2, and 3 (with 3 being the best), and the goal was to identify which product
version the subjects preferred. The survey also collected covariate information, in-
cluding income and ethnicity and the experimenters were concerned about the e↵ect
of covariate imbalance on their conclusions. Critically, the covariate information was
not collected until after the units were assigned to treatment levels and thus blocking
and rerandomization were not possible.
More precisely, after removing observations with missing values, there were N =
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2256 experimental units. The number of units assigned to each treatment level is
given Table 2.4 (and the percentage below that).
Table 2.4: Number of units assigned to each treatment level: The number of
units assigned to each treatment level was relatively equal.
Treatment
1234567 8 9 1 0 1 1
# of Units 238 266 225 231 237 226 198 135 136 136 228
Percentage 10% 12% 10% 10% 11% 10% 9% 6% 6% 6% 10%
The analysis was broken into an omnibus test and a set of pairwise tests and
all tests were carried out conditionally. In the omnibus test, we test the sharp null
hypothesis that all K unit level potential outcomes are equal, H0 : Yi(1) = ··· =
Yi(11) for all i =1 ,...,N.I fw er e j e c tt h es h a r pn u l l ,w em o v eo nt ot h ep a i r w i s et e s t s ,
where we compare all
 11
2
 
=5 5p a i r so ft r e a t m e n t st od e t e r m i n ew h i c ht r e a t m e n tt h e
subjects preferred.
For this analysis, we consider the following eight covariates, all of which are cate-
gorical.
1. Order of detergent (3 levels)
2. Under stream (2 levels)
3. Care for dishes (5 levels)
4. Water hardness (5 levels)
5. Consumer segment (4 levels)
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6. Household income (11 levels)
7. Age (6 levels)
8. Hispanic (2 levels)
We used these covariates to create clusters of the N observations. Because the co-
variates are categorical, we use the k-modes algorithm introduced by Huang (1997).
This clustering method extends the k-means algorithm to handle categorical vari-
ables. The k-modes algorithm relies on a dissimarity measure, d(·,·), which measures
the dissimilarity between two observations. The dissimarity measure is the num-
ber of categorical variables which are di↵erent between the two obervations. So, if
Xi =( 1 ,2,4,2,1,10,3,1) and Xj =( 2 ,1,4,2,1,10,3,1), then d(Xi,X j)=2 . T h e
smaller the dissimilarity measure the more similar the two observations. This is a
simple dissimilarity measure in the sense that it gives equal weight to all covariates
and completely ignores the ordinal structure of some of the categorical variables. For
instance, an income value of 11 is much closer to an income value of 10 than to 1 but
this aspect is ignored by this measure. Modiﬁcations to the dissimarily measure are
left to future work. The mode of a set of observations, {X1,...,X n},i st h ev e c t o rQ
that minimizes
n X
i=1
d(Q,Xi). (2.43)
The k-modes algorithm follows the familar steps of the k-means algorithm. We start
with k candidate modes. We then assign each observation to the closest mode ac-
cording to the dissimilarity measure. We then re-calculate the modes of each cluster
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and repeat these last two steps until convergence. We can determine an appropriate
number of clusters, k, via an elbow plot, shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Elbow plot: Although somewhat arbitrary, we determined that the
elbow is at k =7 ,t h ev e r t i c a ld a s h e dl i n e .
In this case, we decided to let k =7 .T h ec o n t i n g e n c yt a b l e ,i nT a b l e2 . 5 ,s u m m a r i z e s
the number of units in each cluster assigned to each treatment level.
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Table 2.5: Clusters and treatment levels: The rows are the seven clusters and
the columns are the elevent treatment levels.
Treatment
123456789 1 0 1 1
1 82 93 63 88 83 84 71 39 56 46 78 783
2 35 28 29 26 28 25 21 13 12 16 27 260
3 44 37 41 47 34 37 30 32 22 23 44 391
4 21 29 28 18 22 20 10 17 12 13 21 211
5 14 26 20 20 18 18 14 8 9 11 22 180
6 16 17 22 13 24 17 24 11 10 11 11 176
7 26 36 22 19 28 25 28 15 15 16 25 255
The advantage of the clustering method is that we can replace the eight categorical
covariates with one categorical covariate, the cluster indicator. As we have seen, it is
particularly easy to sample treatment assignment when there is a single categorical
covariate. We consider clustering a simple but useful ﬁrst step in carrying out a
conditional randomization test.
2.6.1 Omnibus Test
With the clusters in hand, we test the sharp null hypothesis that all K unit
level potential outcomes are equal, H0 : Yi(1) = ··· = Yi(11) for all i =1 ,...,N.
We use the Kruskal-Wallis statistic as the test statistic (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952).
The Kruskal-Wallis statistic is used in the Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric test
similar to one-way ANOVA. The statistic is similar to the F-statistic in that it is
ar a t i oo fs u mo fs q u a r e sa n dt h a tl a r g e rv a l u e so ft h es t a t i s t i ci n d i c a t et h a tt h e
treatment levels are di↵erent. The statistic is found by ﬁrst computing the ranks of
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the observed outcomes, robs.T h et e s ts t a t i s t i ci st h e n
(N   1)
PK
k=1 Nk(¯ robs
k   ¯ robs)2
PN
i=1(robs
i   ¯ robs)2 , (2.44)
where ¯ robs
k is mean rank in the kth treatment level and ¯ robs is the mean rank overall.
Note that in this context, k indexes the treatment level and is not the number of
clusters.
We carry out the conditional randomization test by conditioning on the number of
units in each cluster assigned to each treatment level. Figure 2.6 reports the observed
value of the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (red line) and the reference distribution.
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Figure 2.6: Conditional randomization test using Kruskal-Wallis test statis-
tic: The vertical red line is the observed value of the test statistic. The histogram is
the conditional distribution of the test statistic under the sharp null hypothesis.
The 0.95 quantile of the reference distribution is 18.05. The observed test statistic
is 111.4a n dt h ep-value is approximately 0. Thus, we strongly reject the sharp null
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that Yi(1) = ···= Yi(11) for all i =1 ,...,N.
2.6.2 Pairwise Tests
Having rejected the sharp null in the omnibus test, we next test for speciﬁc pair-
wise di↵erences between the treatment levels. The mean outcome in each treatment
level is shown in Table 2.6 and visualized in Figure 2.7 in decreasing order.
Table 2.6: Mean outcome by treatment level: Not adjusting for di↵ernces in co-
variates, treatment 1 appears to be the most preferred treatment by the experimental
subjects.
Treatment
1254 1 1 368 1 0 97
Mean 2.47 2.37 2.33 2.32 2.17 2.16 2.15 2.13 2.11 2.05 1.83
58Chapter 2: Conditional randomization tests in randomized experiments
1 2 5 4 11 3 6 8 10 9 7
Product
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
1
.
6
1
.
8
2
.
0
2
.
2
2
.
4
2
.
6
Figure 2.7: Mean outcome by treatment level: The vertical lines mark the 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
For the pairwise test between between treatment j and l,w et e s tt h es h a r pn u l l
hypothesis that H0 : Yi(j)=Yi(l)f o ra l li =1 ,...,N.T h et w o - s i d e dp-values for the
pairwise tests are shown in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7: p-values for pairwise tests: The 55 p-values show that for instance,
that the di↵erence between treatments 1 and 2 is just barely statistically signiﬁcant.
Treatment
254 1 1 368 1 0 97
1 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.48 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.81 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
4 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
11 0.92 0.91 0.63 0.68 0.18 0.00
3 0.99 0.61 0.50 0.19 0.00
6 0.58 0.66 0.26 0.00
8 0.99 0.61 0.00
10 0.60 0.00
9 0.01
The di↵erence between treatments 1 and 2 is just barely statistically signiﬁcant. We
conclude that product version 1 is the most preferred product and that versions 1, 2,
5, and 4 are clearly preferred to the seven other products.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered conditional randomization tests as a form of covari-
ate adjustment for randomized experiments. Conditional randomization tests have
received relatively little attention in the statistics literature and we built upon Rosen-
baum (2002) and Zheng and Zelen (2008) by introducing original notation to prove
that the conditional randomization test has the correct unconditional signiﬁcance
level and to describe covariate balance more formally. Our simulation results verify
that conditional randomization tests behave like more traditional forms of covariate
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adjustment but have the added beneﬁt of having the correct conditional signiﬁcance
level. While sampling treatment assingments is currently only feasible for the certain
covariate balance functions, there are promising related methods and we feel that this
challenge can be overcome.
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Bayesian optimal design of ﬁxed
knockout tournament brackets
3.1 Introduction
Conceptually, tournaments are a type of experimental design (Kendall, 1955).
They are sequences of games betwen players designed to achieve some objective. The
games are typically between two players and the objectives include, but are not limited
to, identifying the best player. We will focus exclusively on knockout tournaments,
which are among the most commonly used tournament structures. Examples include
the tennis Grand Slam singles championships, the National Basketball Association
(NBA) playo↵s, and the knockout stage of the FIFA World Cup Finals. Perhaps, the
most well-known knockout tournament in the United States is the the annual NCAA
basketball tournament. The 2013 tournament bracket is shown in Figure 3.1.
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CHAMPION
Fill out your brackets on your mobile phone. Go to ESPN.com/bracket on your phone's browser.
Early-Round Sites:  Auburn Hills, Austin, Dayton, Kansas City, Lexington, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, San Jose Regional Sites: Indianapolis, Los Angeles, North Texas, Washington D.C.
NCAA  is a registered trademark of the National Collegiate Athletic Association.
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(1) Louisville (29-5) 
(16) NC A&T (19-16)/Liberty (15-20) 
(8) Colorado State (25-8)
(9) Missouri (23-10)
(5) Oklahoma State (24-8)
(12) Oregon (26-8)
(4) Saint Louis (27-6)
(13) New Mexico State (24-10)
(6) Memphis (30-4)
(11) Mid Tenn (28-5)/St. Mary’s (27-6)
(3) Michigan State (25-8)
(14) Valparaiso (26-7)
(7) Creighton (27-7)
(10) Cincinnati (22-11)
(2) Duke (27-5)
(15) Albany (24-10)
(1) Gonzaga (31-2) 
(16) Southern University (23-9) 
(8) Pittsburgh (24-8)
(9) Wichita State (26-8)
(5) Wisconsin (23-11)
(12) Ole Miss (26-8)
(4) Kansas State (27-7)
(13) Boise St. (21-10)/La Salle (21-9)
(6) Arizona (25-7)
(11) Belmont (26-6)
(3) New Mexico (29-5)
(14) Harvard (19-9)
(7) Notre Dame (25-9)
(10) Iowa State (22-11)
(2) Ohio State (26-7)
(15) Iona (20-13)
(1) Indiana (27-6)
(16) LIU Bkn (20-13)/JMU (20-14)
(8) NC State (24-10)
(9) Temple (23-9)
(5) UNLV (25-9)
(12) California (20-11)
(4) Syracuse (26-9)
(13) Montana (25-6)
(6) Butler (26-8)
(11) Bucknell (28-5)
(3) Marquette (23-8)
(14) Davidson (26-7)
(7) Illinois (22-12)
(10) Colorado (21-11)
(2) Miami (FL) (27-6)
(15) Pacific (22-12) 
(1) Kansas (29-5)
(16) Western Kentucky (20-15)
(8) North Carolina (24-10)
(9) Villanova (20-13)
(5) Virginia Commonwealth (26-8)
(12) Akron (26-6)
(4) Michigan (26-7)
(13) South Dakota State (25-9)
(6) UCLA (25-9)
(11) Minnesota (20-12)
(3) Florida (26-7)
(14) Northwestern State (23-8)
(7) San Diego State (22-10)
(10) Oklahoma (20-11)
(2) Georgetown (25-6)
(15) Florida Gulf Coast (24-10)
(13) Boise State (21-10) 
(13) La Salle (21-9) 
(16) LIU Brooklyn (20-13) 
(16) James Madison (20-14) 
(11) Middle Tennessee (28-5)
(11) St. Mary’s (27-6)
(16) North Carolina A&T (19-16) 
(16) Liberty (15-20)  
NCAA  TOURNAMENT
BRACKET
2013
Figure 3.1: 2013 NCAA tournament bracket: Note the tree structure of the
bracket. For instance in the upper right corner of the bracket. The winners of the
Kansas-Western Kentucky and North Carolina-Villanova games will meet in the next
round regardless of the outcomes of the other games.
The purpose of tournament design is to choose the optimal tournament structure for
as p e c i ﬁ co b j e c t i v ea n dw ep r e s e n tam e t h o d o l o g yf o rﬁ n d i n gt h eo p t i m a lk n o c k o u t
tournament for a number of objectives (David, 1988).
Let N be the number of players in the tournament. Our ﬁrst major assumption
is to represent the strength of player i with a single number, ✓i.L e t✓ =( ✓1,...,✓ N)
be the vector of player strengths for all N players. The larger ✓i,t h es t r o n g e rt h e
ith player and the probability player i defeats player j is a function of ✓i   ✓j. Here,
63Chapter 3: Bayesian optimal design of ﬁxed knockout tournament brackets
we assume the function is  (✓i   ✓j). Most tournament design methods treat ✓ as
a known quantity and ﬁnd the tournament that achieves some objective. This is
reasonable but some objectives are not well justiﬁed in this case. For instance, a
popular tournament objective and one we will explore extensively is identifying the
best player. However, if ✓ is known, then we know before the tournament begins that
the best player is player i⇤,w h e r ei⇤ =a r g m a x i✓i.I n t h a t c a s e , t h e t o u r n a m e n t i s
unnecessary.
Following Glickman (2008), we treat the player strengths as uncertain. We repre-
sent this uncertainty by assuming a prior probability distribution on ✓,p ( ✓). In this
case, we do not know which player is the best and rather than being unncessary, the
tournament is a tool to help us identify the best player. This is also a more realistic
assumption. Even after a long season, player strengths are never known with cer-
tainty. There is always some level of statistical noise. Additionally, player strengths
change over time and it is worth remembering that the notion of player strength is a
simpliﬁcation of a more complicated phenomenon. In this chapter, we introduce new
design methods for knockout tournaments when player strengths are uncertain.
We focus on the cases where N = 4, 8, or 16, but the ideas extend to tournaments
with larger numbers of players. In Section 3.2, we review the knockout tournament
structure and paired comparison models. In Section 3.3, we introduce our Bayesian
optimal design approach for ﬁnding the optimal bracket. In Section 3.4, we apply our
approach to ﬁnd the bracket that maximizes the probability that the best player wins
the tournament and in Section 3.5, we consider other utility functions. In Section
3.6, we conclude.
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3.2 Tournament background
3.2.1 Knockout tournaments
In a knockout tournament, the number of players is a power of 2, N =2 R,w h e r e
R is the number of rounds. In the NCAA tournament in Figure 3.1, there are R =6
rounds and N =2 6 =6 4t e a m s .I nt h eﬁ r s tr o u n d ,t h eN players are matched up in
N/2g a m e s .T h eN/2ﬁ r s tr o u n dw i n n e r sa d v a n c et ot h es e c o n dr o u n da n dt h eN/2
losers are eliminated. Note that ties are not allowed. In the next round, the remaining
N/2p l a y e r sa r em a t c h e du pi nN/4 games and this process continues recursively for
R rounds. After the Rth round, only a single player remains, the tournament winner.
The tournament winner will have won R games and lost 0. Since every player but
the tournament winner loses exactly one game, there are N   1g a m e si nt o t a l .
We often refer to knockout tournaments as brackets and there are two types of
brackets, ﬁxed and adpative. In a ﬁxed bracket, we know the complete structure of
the tournament before it begins. For instance, in the ﬁxed bracket shown in Figure
3.2(a), we know that the winners of the ﬁrst and second games in round 1 will be
matched up together in round 2 regardless of who the remaining players are. A ﬁxed
bracket has the traditional tree-structure shown in Figure 3.1 and is deﬁned by the
vector of ﬁrst round matchups. We represent the ﬁxed bracket in Figure 3.2(a) as
((1,2),(3,5),(4,6),(7,8)). In the adaptive bracket shown in Figure 3.2(b), whether
the winners of the ﬁrst and second games in round 1 are matched up in round 2
does depend on who the remaining players are. The NBA and NCAA basketball
tournaments use a ﬁxed bracket whereas the NFL and NHL playo↵ tournaments use
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an adaptive bracket in which teams are “reseeded” after the ﬁrst round. Reseeding
typically matches up the best remaining team with the worst remaining team, where
best and worst teams could be determined on the basis of the regular season standings.
Glickman (2008) studied the adaptive bracket and his objective was to match up
players to maximize the probability the best player advances to the next round.
While we focus exclusively on the the ﬁxed bracket, the adaptive bracket o↵ers
two potential advantages. The ﬁrst is greater ﬂexibility. For instance, if the goal
is to maximize the probability that the best player wins the tournament, it makes
sense to match the best remaining player with the worst remaining player after every
round. The other advantage of the adaptive bracket is that after each round, we
have the option of using the earlier games to update our prior about each player’s
strength. A weak player that has defeated several stronger opponents is likely stronger
than we initially thought. The adaptive bracket allows the matchups to be adjusted
accordingly.
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(b) Adaptive bracket
Figure 3.2: Fixed vs adaptive bracket: In the ﬁxed bracket, the winner tradition-
ally advances to play the winner of the neighboring game. For instance, the winner
of round 1, game 1 advances to play the winner of round 1, game 2. In the adaptive
bracket, the winners advance and the tournament designer matches up the winners at
the beginning of each round. For instance, depending on who wins in the ﬁrst round,
the winner of round 1, game 1 could play the winner of round 1, game 4.
The NCAA tournament bracket in Figure 3.1, consists of four sub-brackets (this
term will be deﬁned later), labelled Midwest, South, West, and East, of 16 teams
each. Before the tournament, the 16 teams in each sub-bracket are ranked by relative
strength from 1 to 16 by a committee of experts. Team 1 is the best team in the
sub-bracket and team 16 is the worst. Those 16 teams are then paired together in
ab r a c k e tt h a tf o l l o w sw h a ti sc a l l e dt h estandard seeding.T h er e s u l t i n gb r a c k e tf o r
the 16 teams is ((1,16),(8,9),(4,13),(5,12),(2,15),(7,10),(3,14),(6,11)). Note that
team i plays team (16 i+1)intheﬁrstroundandifthebetterteamwinseachﬁrst
round game, team j will plays team (8   j +1 )i nt h es e c o n dr o u n da n ds oo n .
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If the bracket follows the standard seeding, then if the better team wins each ﬁrst
round game game, the best N/2 teams will advance to the second round. Conditional
on the best N/2 teams advancing to the second round, if the better team wins each
second round game, the best N/4t e a m sw i l la d v a n c et ot h i r dr o u n da n ds oo n .
The standard seeding increases the chance that the best teams will meet later in
the tournament, which typically adds greater suspense to the ﬁnal rounds. While
the standard seeding is pervasive it does “not overtly adhere to any clear statistical
principle” (Glickman, 2008).
3.2.2 Paired comparison models
Paired comparison models were developed to infer the preference ordering of N
objects from comparisons of two objects at a time. The results of the comparison
between objects i and j are that either i was preferred to j or j was preferred to
i.I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e t w o o b j e c t s w e r e p r e f e r r e d e q u a l l y ,b u t f o r s i m p l i c i t y ,
we focus on games where results are decisive. The results are recorded and the data
analyzed by ﬁtting a paired comparison model. A preference ordering of the objects,
along with measures of uncertainty, are the output. Thurstone (1927) introduced
the ﬁrst paired comparison model and major contributions include Mosteller (1951),
Bradley and Terry (1952), and Luce (1959).
Paired comparison models can naturally be applied to sports results where a
comparison between objects i and j corresponds to a game between players i and j
and the result of the comparison is the result of the game. The preference ordering
corresponds to a ranking of the players by strength. Let ✓ =( ✓1,...,✓ N)b et h e
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strength parameters for the N players. Then, let Yij =1i fp l a y e ri defeats player
j and Yij =0i fp l a y e rj defeats player i. Also, let P =[ Pij]b et h em a t r i xo ft h e
pairwise probabilities of winning, where Pij =P r ( Yij =1 )r e p r e s e n t st h ep r o b a b i l i t y
team i defeats team j.I nt h eT h u r s t o n e - M o s t e l l e rm o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a t
Pij =P r ( Yij =1|✓)=  ( ✓i   ✓j)( 3 . 1 )
where  (·)i st h es t a n d a r dn o r m a ld i s t r i b u t i o nf u n c t i o n . I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ea s -
sume the Thurstone-Mosteller model to be consistent with Glickman (2008). We also
assume that the games are independent, so that
P(Yij =1 ,Y ik =1|✓)=  ( ✓i   ✓j) (✓i   ✓k). (3.2)
The only di↵erence between the Thurstone-Mosteller and Bradley-Terry models is
that the Bradley-Terry model assumes
Pij =P r ( Yij =1|✓)=
e✓i
e✓i + e✓j . (3.3)
Inference centers on estimating ✓. However, note that in both models ✓ is non-
identiﬁed since, for any value of ✓, L(✓)=L(✓ + c), where L(·)i st h el i k e l i h o o d
function for the model. This is easily solved by imposing a constraint on ✓,s u c ha s
PN
i=1 ✓i =0o r✓N = 0. Additionally, non-identiﬁability is not an issue in a Bayesian
model where a proper prior is assumed on ✓.
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3.3 Optimal bracket methodology
Before describing our approach for ﬁnding the optimal ﬁxed bracket, we ﬁrst
introduce the relevant notation. We then provide a general formula for the expected
utility which we are interested in maximizing. We cover di↵erent approaches to
calculate the expected utility and review simulated annealing, as a way to search
through the many possible tournament brackets.
3.3.1 Notation
Let ⇥ be the set of all possible vectors of ✓.P r i o rt ot h es t a r to ft h et o u r n a m e n t ,
we assume that knowledge about player strengths can be represented as a multivariate
normal distribution,
✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), (3.4)
where µ =( µ1,...,µ N)i st h ev e c t o ro fm e a n s ,a n d⌃ is the positive-deﬁnite co-
variance matrix with diagonal elements  2
i and o↵-diagonal elements  ij.F r o m t h e
data generating process perspecitve, we think of ✓ =( ✓1,...,✓ N)a sb e i n gd r a w n
at the start of the tournament. We assume the player strengths are then constant
throughout the tournament.
We represent a knockout tournament bracket, b =( b1,b 2,...,bN
2 ), as a vector of
ﬁrst round games. Here, bi =( bi1,b i2)i st h eith ﬁrst round game and bi1 and bi2 are
the indices of the two players in the ith game. Using this notation, we can write b as
follows.
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b =( ( b11,b 12),...,(b N
2 1,bN
2 2)) (3.5)
As another example, in the 8-player bracket in Figure 3.3,
b =( ( 1 ,2),(3,5),(4,6),(7,8)). (3.6)
However, note that this notation is not unique. For instance, when N =4 ,t h e
bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) is the same as ((3,4),(1,2)). We propose a canonical form for
each bracket to avoid duplicate representations. We ﬁrst deﬁne a sub-bracket. A
sub-bracket is a vector of g “neighboring” ﬁrst-round games, where g is a power of 2
such that g =1 ,2,4,8,...N/2. There are thus 2g players in the sub-bracket. What
makes the collection of games a sub-bracket is that after round (log2 g +1 ) ,e x a c t l y
one of the players remains in the tournament. For example, in bracket b in Equation
(3.6), ((1,2),(3,5)) is a sub-bracket, but ((3,5),(4,6)) is not. If g =1 ,o n eo ft h et w o
players in the game will be in the tournament after round log2 1+1=1 . I fg =8 ,
one of the 16 players will remain after round log2 g + 1 = 4. For instance, in Figure
3.3, (b3,b 4)f o r m sat w o - g a m es u b - b r a c k e t ,a n da f t e rr o u n d2 ,o n l yp l a y e r6r e m a i n s .
Any g-game sub-bracket where g   2c a nb ed i v i d e di n t ot w og/2-game sub-
brackets. In order to avoid counting the same bracket multiple times, for all sub-
brackets with g   2g a m e s ,t h eg/2-game sub-bracket with the player with the lowest
index must be listed ﬁrst. For a sub-bracket consisting of a single game, the player
with the lowest index must be listed ﬁrst (i.e. (1,2) and not (2,1)) Brackets that
statisfy this criterion are said to be in canonical form.
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For instance, the following bracket b,
b =( ( 1 ,2),(3,5),(7,8),(4,6)). (3.7)
is equivalent to the bracket in Figure 3.3 but b is not written in canonical form.
In the 2-game sub-bracket, ((7,8),(4,6)), the one-game sub-bracket with the player
with the lowest index, (4,6), is listed second rather than ﬁrst. The canonical form
is ((1,2),(3,5),(4,6),(7,8)). Let B be the set of all brackets in canonical form and
let k = |B| be the number of brackets. Searls (1963) showed that for an N player
bracket, k = |B| = N!
2N 1.
Let Wi be the number of games player i wins in the tournament. For instance,
Wi =0i m p l i e sp l a y e ri loses in the ﬁrst round and Wi = R implies player i wins
the tournament. Note that Wi is a random variable. Let W =( W1,...,W N)b et h e
vector of N random variables. We call W the win vector. For the example in Figure
3.3, W =( 1 ,0,0,0,3,2,1,0) and since player 5 wins the tournament, W5 =3 .T h e
win vector, together with b,c o m p l e t e l ys p e c i ﬁ e st h eo u t c o m eo fe v e r yg a m ei nt h e
tournament.
Let Pr(W = w|✓,b)b et h ep r o b a b i l i t yW = w for a given value of ✓ and bracket
b.B e c a u s et h eg a m e sa r ea s s u m e di n d e p e n d e n t ,P r ( W = w|✓,b)i st h ep r o d u c to f
N   1 probabilities, one for each game. For the example in Figure 3.3,
Pr(W = w|✓,b)=  ( ✓1   ✓2) (✓3   ✓5) (✓4   ✓6) (✓7   ✓8)
 (✓1   ✓5) (✓6   ✓7) (✓5   ✓6). (3.8)
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Let Wb be the set of potentially observable win vectors for bracket b. Note that
Wb depends on b since, for example, if players i and j are paired together in the ﬁrst
round, Wi and Wj cannot both be 0.
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Figure 3.3: Example bracket where N =8 : For this bracket b =
((1,2),(3,5),(4,6),(7,8)). And, for this example, W =( 1 ,0,0,0,3,2,1,0).
Because there are N   1g a m e s ,t h en u m b e ro fp o t e n t i a l l yo b s e r v a b l ew i nv e c t o r s
corresponding to bracket b is m = |Wb| =2 N 1.R e m e m b e r t h a t g i v e n b,t h e r e
is a one-to-one mapping between Wb and the set of game outcomes in a knockout
tournament.
The values of R, k,a n dm are shown for a few values of N =2 R in Table 3.1.
Both k and m increase dramatically as N increases and this presents challenges in
identifying the optimal bracket.
73Chapter 3: Bayesian optimal design of ﬁxed knockout tournament brackets
Table 3.1: Number of rounds (R), brackets (k), and win vectors (m): k and
m increase dramatically as number of players (N)i n c r e a s e s .
N Rk = |B| m = |Wb|
4 23 8
8 33 1 5 1 2 8
16 46 .4 ⇥ 108 32,768
32 51 .2 ⇥ 1026 2.1 ⇥ 109
64 61 .4 ⇥ 1070 9.2 ⇥ 1018
3.3.2 Expected utility
Following Lindley (1972), we apply the Bayesian decision-theoretic framework for
optimal designs by specifying a utility function, u(b,w,✓), that is averaged over
the data space (Wb)a n dt h ep a r a m e t e rs p a c e( ⇥ )f o re a c hb r a c k e tb.T h e r e s u l t i s
the expected utility, U(b). We then maximize the expected utility over all possible
brackets, b 2 B. U(b) can be written in any of the following equivalent ways.
U(b)=
X
w2Wb
Z
⇥
u(b,w,✓)p(✓|w,b)d✓p(w)
U(b)=
X
w2Wb
Z
⇥
u(b,w,✓)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓
U(b)=
Z
⇥
X
w2Wb
u(b,w,✓)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓. (3.9)
We introduce a variety of utility functions in Section 3.5, but we focus primarily
on the utility function for the best player winning the tournament. The logic of
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having the best player win the tournament goes back to the idea that the tournament
is a tool and we are using it to help us identify the best player. To deﬁne the
utility function, we ﬁrst re-order the values of ✓ =( ✓1,...,✓ N)i nd e c r e a s i n go r d e r ,
✓(1) >✓ (2) > ···>✓ (N),s u c ht h a tp l a y e r( 1 )i st h eb e s t ,p l a y e r( 2 )i st h es e c o n db e s t ,
and player (N) is the worst. While wi is the number of wins for player i,l e tw(1)(✓)
be the number of wins for the best player, where the dependence on ✓ is emphasized
for readability. Then, the utility function for the best player winning the tournament
is
u(b,w,✓)=I(w(1)(✓)=R). (3.10)
In this case,
X
w2Wb
u(b,w,✓)p(w|✓,b)=
X
w2Wb
I(w(1)(✓)=R)p(w|✓,b)
=p ( w(1)(✓)=R|✓,b)( 3 . 1 1 )
is the probability the best player wins the tournament for a given ✓ and
U(b)=
Z
⇥
p(w(1)(✓)=R|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ (3.12)
is the the probability the best player wins the tournament integrating over p(✓).
Finding the b that maximizes U(b)i st h es a m eam a x i m i z i n gt h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h e
best player wins.
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The overall computation time needed to ﬁnd the optimal bracket is made up of two
components. The ﬁrst is the time needed to calculate U(b). The second is the number
of brackets for which we need to calculate U(b). We next discuss both components.
3.3.3 Direct calculation of U(b)
We show how the expected utility, U(b), can be calculated directly when N =4 .
The same steps apply for larger N, but as we shall see, the computational time become
prohibitively large when N   16.
In Figure 3.4, we show the k =3b r a c k e t sw h e nN =4 .
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(a) ((1,2),(3,4))
1
3
2
4
(b) ((1,3),(2,4))
1
4
2
3
(c) ((1,4),(2,3))
Figure 3.4: Brackets when N =4 : There are only three brackets when N =4 .
Following the formulation in Glickman (2008), we represent U(b)a s
U(b)=
X
w2Wb
Z
⇥
I(w(1)(✓)=R)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓. (3.13)
For each w 2 Wb,w ec a l c u l a t e
R
⇥ I(w(1)(✓)=R)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ and sum over
Wb.
The m =8w i nv e c t o r sf o rb =( ( 1 ,2),(3,4)) are shown in Figure 3.5 and as
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an example, we ﬁnd
R
⇥ I(w(1)(✓)=R)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ for w =( 2 ,0,1,0). The
integrals for the other w 2 Wb follow similarly.
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(c) w =( 0 ,2,1,0)
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(d) w =( 0 ,1,2,0)
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(e) w =( 2 ,0,0,1)
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(f) w =( 1 ,0,0,2)
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2
(g) w =( 0 ,2,0,1)
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2
4
4
(h) w =( 0 ,1,0,2)
Figure 3.5: Win vectors for b =( ( 1 ,2),(3,4))
Since w1 =2w h e nw =( 2 ,0,1,0), player 1 wins the tournament and thus, in order
that I(w(1)(✓)=R)=1 ,p l a y e r1m u s tb et h eb e s tp l a y e r . T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
I(✓1 >✓ 2,✓ 1 >✓ 3,✓ 1 >✓ 4)=1a n dn o t et h a t
I(✓1 >✓ 2,✓ 1 >✓ 3,✓ 1 >✓ 4)=P r ( ✓1 >✓ 2,✓ 1 >✓ 3,✓ 1 >✓ 4 |✓)
=P r ( ✓1   ✓2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3 > 0,✓ 1   ✓4 > 0|✓). (3.14)
Also, remember that since we are assuming a Thurstone-Mosteller model,
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p(w|✓,b)=  ( ✓1   ✓2) (✓3   ✓4) (✓1   ✓3)
=P r ( z1 <✓ 1   ✓2,z 2 <✓ 3   ✓4,z 3 <✓ 1   ✓3 |✓)
=P r ( ✓1   ✓2   z1 > 0,✓ 3   ✓4   z2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3   z3 > 0|✓)( 3 . 1 5 )
where z1, z2,a n dz3 are independent N(0,1) random variables.
We can then show that
R
⇥ I(w(1)(✓)=R)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ equals the following.
Z
⇥
I(w(1)(✓)=R)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ =
Z
⇥
Pr(✓1   ✓2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3 > 0,✓ 1   ✓4 > 0|✓)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓
=
Z
⇥
Pr(✓1   ✓2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3 > 0,✓ 1   ✓4 > 0|✓)
Pr(✓1   ✓2   z1 > 0,✓ 3   ✓4   z2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3   z3 > 0|✓)p(✓)d✓
=
Z
⇥
Pr(✓1   ✓2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3 > 0,✓ 1   ✓4 > 0,
✓1   ✓2   z1 > 0,✓ 3   ✓4   z2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3   z3 > 0|✓)p(✓)d✓
=P r ( ✓1   ✓2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3 > 0,✓ 1   ✓4 > 0,
✓1   ✓2   z1 > 0,✓ 3   ✓4   z2 > 0,✓ 1   ✓3   z3 > 0) (3.16)
The third equality holds because conditional on ✓,f u n c t i o n so f✓ are independent.
We can calculate the last expression exactly by letting   =( ✓,z 1,z 2,z 3), which is a
multivariate normal vector. Then, each component of the last expression is a linear
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transformation of  .I nf a c t ,l e t˜   be
˜   =( ✓1   ✓2,✓ 1   ✓3,✓ 1   ✓4,✓ 1   ✓2   z1,✓ 3   ✓4   z2,✓ 1   ✓3   z3), (3.17)
where ˜   is also multivariate normal. Then,
Z
⇥
I(w(1)(✓)) = R)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ =
Z
˜  >0
p(˜  )d˜  . (3.18)
The integral over the positive orthant can be calculated using the method described in
Genz (1992). These integrals must be carried out for all m win vectors in Wb and the
sum of the probabilities is U(b). On a 3.2GHz quad-core CPU, it takes 0.05 seconds to
calculate U(b)f o ro n eb r a c k e tw h e nN =4a n d6s e c o n d sw h e nN =8 .T h i si m p l i e s
that it takes 30 minutes, a signiﬁcant but not unreasonable amount of time, to ﬁnd
the optimal bracket when N = 8. However, when N = 16, it takes approximately 4.5
hours to calculate U(b)f o ras i n g l eb r a c k e t .S i n c et h e r ea r ek =6 .4 · 108 brackets, it
would be infeasible to calculate the expected utility for every bracket when N =1 6
using the described approach.
3.3.4 Estimating U(b)
We next consider two approaches for estimating U(b)w h e nN =1 6 . T h eﬁ r s t
approach uses a random sample from ⇥ and the second uses a random sample from
Wb.
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Sampling from ⇥
We can estimate U(b)u s i n gE q u a t i o n( 3 . 9 )a n dM o n t eC a r l oi n t e g r a t i o nb ys a m -
pling from ⇥. We represent U(b)a s
U(b)=
Z
⇥
X
w2Wb
u(b,w,✓)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓. (3.19)
Since, ✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), we can easily generate a random sample of L draws, ✓
1,...✓
L.
For many utility functions, we can calculate
P
w2Wb u(b,w,✓
`)p(w|✓
`,b)f o rd r a w
` by ﬁnding the probability each player advances to each round. We then estimate
U(b)w i t h
d U(b)=
1
L
L X
`=1
⇣ X
w2Wb
u(b,w,✓
`)p(w|✓
`,b)
⌘
. (3.20)
The larger the value of L,t h em o r ep r e c i s et h ee s t i m a t eo fU(b)a n da sw es h a l ls e e ,
precision is important because many of the brackets have similar expected utilities.
For a given ✓,w ec a l c u l a t et h ep r o b a b i l i t ye a c hp l a y e ra d v a n c e st oe a c hr o u n d
of the tournament by ﬁrst ﬁnding the probability that each player advances to the
second round. The probability each player advances to the second round is just the
probability that the player wins their ﬁrst round game. The probability that a player
advances to the third round is the probability the player advances to the second round
multiplied by the probability the player wins his second round game. To ﬁnd the
probability of winning the second round game, we multiply the player’s probability
of defeating each possible second round opponent by the probability the opponent
advances to the second round and sum the products over the possible opponents. We
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continue to apply this process to the later rounds. The calculation reduces to a series
of R matrix multiplications, one for each round, that can be quickly carried out for
all L draws simultaneously.
We also found that we can dramatically reduce the number of draws of ✓ neces-
sary to achieve a given precision by utilizing quasi-Monte Carlo integration (Moroko↵
and Caﬂisch, 1995). Quasi-Monte Carlo integration uses a low-discrepancy sequence,
such as the Sobol sequence, to select the ✓ draws. Using the low-discrepancy sequence
means that the draws are deterministically chosen and thus, no longer randomly se-
lected. The draws tend to be more evenly spread over the high probability regions
and thus, the estimates are more precise. It is conceptually similar to space ﬁlling
designs and quadrature methods. However, quadrature methods weight points di↵er-
ently and do not scale to larger dimensions. While the convergence rate for Monte
Carlo integration is O( 1 p
L), the convergence rate for quasi-Monte Carlo is O( 1
L).
Sampling from Wb
We can also estimate U(b) by sampling from Wb.T h i si sv e r ys i m i l a rt oo u rd i r e c t
calculation of U(b)a n dw er e t u r nt or e p r e s e n t i n gU(b)a s
U(b)=
X
w2Wb
Z
⇥
u(b,w,✓)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓. (3.21)
In our direct calculation, we summed over all w 2 Wb but now, we sum over a random
sample of the win vectors, w1,...,wL.O u re s t i m a t eo fU(b)i st h e n
d U(b)=
k
L
L X
`=1
⇣Z
⇥
u(b,w
`,✓)p(w
` |✓,b)p(✓)d✓
⌘
. (3.22)
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We generate w1,...,wL by randomly simulating the result of each game in tourna-
ment with bracket b from a Bernoulli(0.5).
When the utility function is the best player winning the tournament, estimating
U(b)b ys a m p l i n gf r o mWb tends to be slower than estimating U(b)b ys a m p l i n gf r o m
⇥ because the integral
R
⇥ u(b,w`,✓)p(w` |✓,b)p(✓)d✓ must be calculated L times
while calculating
P
w2Wb u(b,w,✓
`)p(w|✓
`,b)f o ra l lL draws requires only R matrix
multiplications. As an example, we estimate the probability that the best player wins
when N =1 6u s i n gb o t ha p p r o a c h e s .L e t✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃)w h e r e
µ =( 0 .75,0.65,0.55,0.45,0.35,0.25,0.15,0.05,
  0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, 0.75)
⌃ =0 .1 · I. (3.23)
Let the bracket follow the standard seeding based on the ordering of µ.T h er e s u l t s
are reported in Table 3.2. Sampling from ⇥ is over 100 times faster and leads to
standard errors over 20 times smaller. Also, the standard error of d U(b), se( d U(b)), for
sampling from Wb is too large to be practically useful. In order to distinguish between
brackets, the standard error needs to be at least as small as the reported standard
error when sampling from ⇥.
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Table 3.2: Comparing two estimates of U(b): We compare one estimate from
each estimation method on a 3.2GHz quad-core CPU. Each method uses 3000 draws
of either ✓ or w.
d U(b)s e ( d U(b)) Time (sec)
Sampling from ⇥ 0.3567 0.0020 0.07
Sampling from Wb 0.3972 0.0558 108
However, sampling from Wb has the potential to be useful because some utility
functions make sampling from ⇥ computationally infeasible. As we discuss later,
some utility functions place severe restrictions on ✓,s u c ht h a tm o s to ft h ed r a w so f
✓ do not satisfy the restrictions. When sampling from ⇥, we then end up estimating
U(b) to be 0 for many brackets, making it di cult to distinguish among brackets.
However, these restrictions are easily handled when sampling from Wb because we
can incorporate the restrictions into ˜   as we did previously.
3.3.5 Simulated annealing
When N =4o r8 ,t h en u m b e ro fb r a c k e t si sk =3o rk =3 1 5 ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n dw e
can ﬁnd the optimal bracket by calculating U(b)f o re v e r yb r a c k e ta n ds e l e c t i n gt h e
maximum. However, when N =1 6 ,t h en u m b e ro fb r a c k e t si sk =6 .4 · 108 and it is
computationally infeasible to calculate U(b)f o re v e r yb r a c k e t .I nt h e s ec a s e s ,t oﬁ n d
the optimal bracket, we use the Markov chain-based optimization method simulated
annealing. Simulated annealing was introduced by Kirkpatrick et al. (1983) and is
am e t h o df o rﬁ n d i n gag o o da p p r o x i m a t i o nt ot h em a x i m u mo faf u n c t i o nw i t h o u t
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evaluating the function at every point.
In simulated annealing, we run a Metropolis algorithm on the bracket space, B.
Let ⇡(b) / exp(U(b)/T)b eap r o b a b i l i t yd i s t r i b u t i o no nB based on U(b), where T
is the temperature parameter and is initialized to a large value, T = T0.W e s t a r t
with an initial bracket b
1 and generate a proposal bracket, b
P,f r o map r e - s p e c i ﬁ e d
neighborhood around b
1,w h i c hi sa c c e p t e do rr e j e c t e da c c o r d i n gt oaM e t r o p o l i s
acceptance probability,
pacc =m i n
⇣
1,
⇡(bP)
⇡(b1)
⌘
=m i n ( 1 ,e
U(bP ) U(b1)
T ). (3.24)
If the proposal is accepted, we let b
2 = b
P.I ft h ep r o p o s a li sr e j e c t e d ,w el e tb
2 = b
1.
This process is repeated iteratively for Kmax steps. The temperature T is lowered
after each step according to an annealing schedule.T h e t e m p e r a t u r e c a n a l s o b e
lowered after a ﬁxed number of steps to give the the chain a chance to converge at a
ﬁxed T. As the temperature is lowered, the chain is less likely to jump to brackets
with lower expected utility. For instance, if at step i,i fU(b
P) <U(b
i 1), then pacc =
e
U(bP ) U(bi 1)
T < 1. As T decreases, so does pacc.T h e l o w e r i n g o f t h e t e m p e r a t u r e
is called slow cooling. As T gets closer to 0, simulated annealing reduces to the
greedy algorithm which only makes moves that increase the expected utility. Once
the algorithm is complete, the bracket with the largest expected utility is selected.
Note that Kmax,t h ei n t i a lt e m p e r a t u r e ,T0,a n dt h ea n n e a l i n gs c h e d u l es h o u l db e
tuned for each utility function and prior distribution on ✓.
To generate a proposal bracket, b
P,w ec o n s i d e ran e i g h b o r h o o do fb r a c k e t st h a t
corresponds to randomly applying one of two types of swaps to the current bracket.
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1. Swap two players: We select and swap two players that are not matched up in
the ﬁrst round. Players that are closer together, in terms of being in the same
sub-brackets, are swapped with higher probability. For instance, each player
has probability 1/N of being selected. Conditional on the ﬁrst player being
selected, we are more likely to select the second player from the same 2-game
sub-bracket than the same 8-game sub-bracket. This ensures that proposals
tend to be similar to the current bracket. Alternatively, we could swap players
with similar strengths, but it is not obvious what measure of strength similarity
would be appropriate. If the proposed bracket is not in canonical form, it is
converted to canonical form.
2. Swap two sub-brackets: First, a sub-bracket size, the number of games
in the sub-bracket, is selected. Let g be the selected sub-bracket size, where
1  g  N/8. Then, two sub-brackets of g-games are selected and swapped.
Smaller values of g are selected with higher probability and thus, we are more
likely to swap two two-game sub-brackets than two four-game sub-brackets.
For instance, when N =1 6 ,w ea r et w i c ea sl i k e l yt os w a pt w oo n e - g a m es u b -
brackets than two two-game sub-brackets. Note that the sub-brackets need to
be non-adjacent, which means that they cannot be combined to form a sub-
bracket. If the proposed bracket is not in canonical form, it is converted to
canonical form.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the two types of swaps. Note that sub-bracket swaps are equiva-
lent to a series of player swaps. However, we found it beneﬁcial to include sub-bracket
swaps because they help the chain jump out of local modes.
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(a) Swap players 5 and 13
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(b) Swap games (3,4) and (11,12)
Figure 3.6: Two types of swaps: In (a), two players, 5 and 13, are swapped and
the resulting bracket is displayed in canonical form. In (b), two games (i.e. two one-
game sub-brackets), (3,4) and (11,12), are swapped and again the resulting bracket
is displayed in canonical form.
To ﬁnd the optimal bracket, we run the simulated annealing algorithm several
times, each time from a di↵erent starting bracket. If we reach the same or nearly the
same optimal bracket from di↵erent starting brackets, we are conﬁdent the algorithm
is ﬁnding approximately optimal brackets. Natural starting brackets are those that
are optimal given a likely orderings of the players. For instance, say a likely ordering
of the player follows the player indices, ✓1 >✓ 2 >. . .>✓ 16.T h e o p t i m a l b r a c k e t
given this ordering is shown in Figure 3.7 and would be a natural starting bracket.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal bracket when ✓1 >✓ 2 >...>✓ 16: This bracket could serve
as a natural starting bracket for the simulated annealing algorithm.
In maximizing the probability of the best player winning when N =1 6 ,w ef o u n d
the following parameter values worked well for a variety of priors. We let Kmax =2 0 0 0
and initially, let T =0 .002. At each iteration, we lowered T by a factor of 0.011/Kmax.
Also, in generating the proposal bracket, we swapped two players with probability 0.9,
swapped two games with probability 0.07, and swapped two two-game sub-brackets
with probability 0.03.
3.4 Maximizing the probability the best player
wins the tournament
We ﬁnd the brackets that maximize the probability of the best player winning the
tournament for tournaments with di↵erent numbers of players and di↵erent prior dis-
tributions. We ﬁrst apply our methodology to ﬁnd the bracket b that maximizes U(b)
when N =4 . W ec o m p a r et h er e s u l tt ot h eo p t i m a la d a p t i v eb r a c k e ti nG l i c k m a n
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(2008) and we brieﬂy compare the N =4c a s et ot h eN =8c a s e . F o rt h eN =1 6
case, we build on the simulation study in Glickman (2008) by comparing the optimal
bracket to popular alternative brackets.
3.4.1 N =4
We consider three prior distributions when N = 4. In all three, the prior mean
is µ =( 0 .09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09) but the variances di↵er. We begin with the two
simplest scenarios. The ﬁrst is when the prior distribution is a point mass prior (i.e.
the prior variance is 0) and the second is when the prior variances are equal. In these
situations, there is a natural ordering of the players based on the prior means and
the bracket that maximizes the probability the best player wins the tournament is
the same in both cases. The player with the largest prior mean is matched up with
the player with the smallest prior mean because the player with the largest prior
mean is most likely the best player and we maximize that player’s probability of
winning the tournament by giving the player an easy ﬁrst round game. This bracket
also maximizes the probability that the best player advances to the next round, the
utility function in Glickman (2008). However, when the prior variances are unequal,
the optimal bracket changes and is no longer the same across di↵erent utility functions.
Point mass prior
We begin with a degenerate point mass prior on ✓.I nt h i sc a s e ,✓ is known with
certainty and ✓ =( 0 .09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09). Thus, player 1 is the best player and for
each of the k = 3 brackets, we ﬁnd the probability that player 1 wins the tournament.
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The results are reported in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Probability best player wins for point mass prior: In this case, we
know that player 1 is the best player and we report the probability that player 1 wins
the tournament for the three di↵erent brackets.
Prob.
Bracket best player wins
((1,2),(3,4)) 0.2929
((1,3),(2,4)) 0.2987
((1,4),(2,3)) 0.3059
In the case of a point mass prior, bracket ((1,4),(2,3)) maximizes the probability
that player 1 wins. Since we know player 1 is the best player it is intuitive that
we should match up player 1 with the weakest possible opponent. Thus, in the ﬁrst
round, player 1 is matched up against player 4.
Equal variances
We next examine the equal variances example from Glickman (2008). Let
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, (3.25)
Note that ✓1, ✓2, ✓3,a n d✓4 are independent, with di↵erent means but the the same
variance. We visualize the prior distribution in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Prior densities: The distributions of ✓1, ✓2, ✓3,a n d✓4 are largely similar
because the prior standard deviation is signiﬁcant compared to the di↵erences in prior
means.
The prior distributions are largely similar and the di↵erences between consecutive
prior means (0.06) are small compared to the prior standard deviations (
p
0.3=0 .55).
When the players have equal variances, the prior means imply a natural ordering of
the players. Player 1 has the largest probability of being the best and the lowest
probability of being the worst. Player 2 has the second highest probability of being
the best and the second lowest probability of being the worst and so on.
The probability that the best player wins for each bracket is shown in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Probability best player wins for equal variance prior: Bracket
((1,4),(2,3)) maximizes the probability that the best player wins.
Prob.
Bracket best player wins
((1,2),(3,4)) 0.5388
((1,3),(2,4)) 0.5394
((1,4),(2,3)) 0.5396
Because the prior distributions are similar, the probability that the best player wins is
similar for the three brackets. Again, the optimal bracket is ((1,4),(2,3)) and player
1, likely the best player, is matched up with player 4, likely the worst player. Also,
bracket ((1,4),(2,3)) remains the optimal bracket when the variances are increased
or decreased, as long as they remain equal. As the prior variance decreases, the prior
approaches the point mass prior discussed previously.
In Glickman (2008), the bracket ((1,4),(2,3)) also maximized the probability that
the best player wins their ﬁrst round game. The same intuition applies. Player 1 is
most likely the best and thus to maximize player 1’s probability of making it to the
second round, we should match up players 1 and 4.
Unequal variances
We next examine an example with unequal variances. The example is similar to
Example 2 from Glickman (2008). Let
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Note that ✓1, ✓2, ✓3,a n d✓4 are still independent and have the same means as before,
but the variances are di↵erent. We visualize the prior distribution in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Prior densities: The prior distributions of ✓1 and ✓2 have much larger
variances than the prior distributions of ✓3 and ✓4.
The prior means are evenly spaced but the prior variances for ✓1 and ✓2 are much
larger than the prior variances for ✓3 and ✓4. We are much more uncertain about
the strength of players 1 and 2 than of players 3 and 4. This could be because, for
instance, players 1 and 2 have played fewer games we have less information about their
performance. In Table 3.5, we report the probability each player is the best and the
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probability each player is the worst. We also report the probability that each of the
four players wins the tournament for each of the k =3b r a c k e t s .T h e s ep r o b a b i l i t i e s
are found by slightly modifying the formulas discussed previously. Because the prior
variances for ✓1 and ✓2 are so large, players 1 and 2 have the highest probabilities of
being the best and also the highest probabilities of being the worst. The notion of the
best player and the worst player is ambiguous when the prior variances are unequal
and the intuition for why certain brackets are optimal is less obvious.
Table 3.5: Bracket statistics for unequal variances example: Note that players
1a n d2h a v eb o t ht h eh i g h e s tp r o b a b i l i t i e so fb e i n gt h eb e s ta n dw o r s tp l a y e r s .
Additionally, bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes both the probabilities that players 1
and 2 win the tournament.
Prob. player Prob. player Prob. player wins
Player is best is worst ((1,2),(3,4)) ((1,3),(2,4)) ((1,4),(2,3))
1 0.401 0.323 0.344 0.322 0.325
2 0.371 0.350 0.321 0.305 0.301
3 0.153 0.108 0.180 0.196 0.198
4 0.075 0.219 0.156 0.178 0.175
Note that bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes both the probabilities that players 1 and
2w i nt h et o u r n a m e n te v e nt h o u g ht h e yp l a ye a c ho t h e ri nt h eﬁ r s tr o u n d .I nT a b l e
3.6, we calculate the probability each player wins the tournament conditional on the
player being the best.
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Table 3.6: Conditional probabilities of winning: Conditional on being the best,
bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes the probabilities that players 1 and 2 win the tour-
nament but minimizes the probabilities that players 3 and 4 win the tournament.
Prob. Conditional prob. player wins
Player player is best ((1,2),(3,4)) ((1,3),(2,4)) ((1,4),(2,3))
1 0.401 0.674 0.637 0.641
2 0.371 0.666 0.634 0.631
3 0.153 0.388 0.439 0.442
4 0.075 0.374 0.430 0.427
We can use Table 3.6 to ﬁnd the probability of the best player winning the tournament
for each bracket by multiplying the probability of each player being the best by
the probability of winning the tournament conditional on being the best. For b =
((1,2),(3,4)),
U(b)=0 .401 · 0.674 + 0.371 · 0.666 + 0.153 · 0.388 + 0.075 · 0.374
=0 .6049 (3.27)
In Table 3.7, we report the probability that the best player wins for each of the three
brackets.
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Table 3.7: Probability best player wins for 3 brackets: Bracket ((1,2),(3,4))
maximizes the probability the best player wins the tournament.
Prob.
Bracket best player wins
((1,2),(3,4)) 0.6049
((1,3),(2,4)) 0.5906
((1,4),(2,3)) 0.5909
While the probability the best player wins the tournament is very close for the three
brackets, the bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes the probability at 0.6049. Given that
players 1 and 2 have the highest probabilities of being the best and that bracket
((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes their probabilities of winning, this is not surprising. However,
having the two players with the highest probabilities of being the best play each other
in the ﬁrst round is somewhat counterintuitive. We attempt to develop some intuition
for the result by comparing it to the optimal adaptive bracket from Glickman (2008),
where we maximize the probability the best player wins their ﬁrst round game.
In Table 3.8, we calculate the probability each player wins their ﬁrst round game
conditional on the player being the best. We also calculate the probability each player
wins their second round game conditional on winning their ﬁrst round game and being
the best player.
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Table 3.8: Conditional probabilities of winning ﬁrst and second round
games: We report the probability of each player winning their ﬁrst round game
conditional on being the best and then the probability of winning their second round
game conditional on winning their ﬁrst round game and being the best player.
Conditional prob. player wins
Prob. ((1,2),(3,4)) ((1,3),(2,4)) ((1,4),(2,3))
Player player is best Rd. 1 Rd. 2 Rd. 1 Rd. 2 Rd. 1 Rd. 2
1 0.401 0.835 0.808 0.794 0.802 0.809 0.794
2 0.371 0.827 0.805 0.805 0.789 0.791 0.798
3 0.153 0.557 0.697 0.745 0.590 0.749 0.590
4 0.075 0.539 0.695 0.747 0.575 0.743 0.575
The bracket ((1,4),(2,3)) maximizes the probability that the best player wins their
ﬁrst round game. This probability can be found by multiplying the probability each
player is the best by the probability they win their ﬁrst round game conditional on
being the best. For ((1,4),(2,3)), this is
0.401 · 0.809 + 0.371 · 0.791 + 0.153 · 0.749 + 0.075 · 0.743 = 0.7882.
However, as we have seen, bracket ((1,4),(2,3)) does not maximize the probability
that the best player wins the tournament. We can rewrite the probability the best
player wins the tournament by multiplying the probability each player is the best by
the probability they win their ﬁrst round game conditional on being the best and by
the probability they win their second round game conditional on winning their ﬁrst
round game and being the best. Again, for ((1,4),(2,3)), this is
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0.401·0.809·0.794+0.371·0.791·0.798+0.153·0.749·0.590+0.075·0.743·0.575 = 0.5909.
Multiplying by the second conditional probability is what makes the ﬁxed bracket
problem di↵erent from the adaptive bracket problem. Note that the second condi-
tional probability involves a Bayesian update of the prior distribution, where the prior
is updated based on the result of the previous game.
The reason bracket ((1,4),(2,3)) does not maximize the probability of winning
the tournament can be understood by again considering the conditional probabilities.
Conditional on player i being the best, the relatively easier opponents are players 1
and 2 because there is a good chance that ✓1 and ✓2 are less than ✓i.T h i sa l s oh o l d s
if i =1o r2 .C o n v e r s e l y ,c o n d i t i o n a lo np l a y e ri being the best, the relatively harder
opponents are players 3 and 4. Thus, in ((1,4),(2,3)), conditional on being the best,
players 3 and 4 likely play an easy opponent in the ﬁrst round and a hard opponent
in the second round. Conditional on being the best, players 1 and 2 likely play a hard
opponent in the ﬁrst round and a hard opponent in the second round.
In bracket ((1,2),(3,4)), again, players 3 and 4 likely play one easy and one hard
opponent, although they play the hard opponent ﬁrst. This means that conditional
on being the best, players 3 and 4 have a lower chance of winning their ﬁrst round
game (0.557 versus 0.749 for player 3 and 0.539 versus 0.743 for player 4) but a
higher probability of winning their second round game conditional on winning their
ﬁrst round game (0.697 versus 0.590 for player 3 and 0.695 versus 0.575 for player
4). Because the probabilities players 3 and 4 win their ﬁrst round games are so
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much lower, it is not suprising that ((1,2),(3,4)) does not maximize the probability
the best player wins their ﬁrst round game. The reason ((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes
the probability that the best player wins the tournament is that players 1 and 2
likely play one easy opponent in the ﬁrst round and one hard opponent in the second
round, as opposed to hard opponents in both rounds. Thus, players 1 and 2 have a
higher probability of winning the tournament in bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) than in bracket
((1,4),(2,3)) and this increase is enough that the probability the best player wins for
bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) is higher than the probability for bracket ((1,4),(2,3)).
3.4.2 N =8
For the case when N =8 ,w ef o c u so nt w op r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o n s ,t h ep o i n tm a s s
prior and equal variance prior, and in both cases
µ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21), (3.28)
corresponding to means that are uniformly spread between  0.21 and 0.21. Inter-
estingly, the optimal brackets for the point mass prior and equal variance prior no
longer agree when N = 8. Additionally, the optimal bracket depends on the size of
the variance.
Point mass prior
For the point mass prior, let
✓ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21). (3.29)
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Again, we know player 1 is the best player. The optimal bracket is displayed in
Figure 3.10 and the probability player 1 wins the tournament is 0.2318. As before,
this bracket only depends on the ordering of the strength parameters and will be
optimal as long as ✓1 >✓ 2 > ···>✓ 8.
Player 1 plays two of the three easiest teams to advance to the ﬁnal and once
there, will play either player 2, 3, 4, or 5. In the ﬁnal, the two biggest threats to
player 1 are players 2 and 3 and the optimal bracket attempts to eliminate those
players before even reaching the ﬁnal. By matching up players 2 and 3 in the ﬁrst
round, it guarantees that one of them will be eliminated in the ﬁrst round. Whichever
one wins will play either player 4 or 5 in the next round. Ideally, player 1 plays one of
the weaker opponents in the ﬁnal, maximizing his chance of winning the tournament.
1"
8"
7"
3"
2"
4"
5"
6"
Figure 3.10: Optimal bracket for point mass prior: We know player 1 is the
best player and the optimal bracket gives player 1 the easiest path to the ﬁnal. The
optimal bracket also gives player 1’s biggest rivals, player 2 and 3, the most di cult
path to the ﬁnals. The probability player 1 wins is 0.2318.
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This optimal bracket would likely strike many tournament organizers and players
as overly biased in favor of player 1. However, if we know player 1 is the best player
and we design the tournament to identify the best player, it is not surprising that we
obtain an extreme design. In settings where we do not deﬁnitively know the identity
of the best player, the optimal brackets are less biased in favor of one player.
Equal variances
We consider two prior distributions, both with equal variance. The optimal brack-
ets di↵er from each other and both di↵er from the optimal bracket for the point mass
prior case. For the ﬁrst example, let ✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), where
µ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21)
⌃ =0 .05 · I. (3.30)
The standard deviation is 0.22 and is signiﬁcantly larger than the di↵erences between
consecutive prior means. The probability each player is the best is reported in Table
3.9.
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Table 3.9: Probability each player is the best: Player 1 has the highest proba-
bility of being the best but there is signiﬁcant probability one of the other players is
the best.
Probability
Player player is best
1 0.345
2 0.241
3 0.163
4 0.106
5 0.067
6 0.041
7 0.024
8 0.013
We calcualte U(b)f o ra l lm =3 1 5b r a c k e t sa n dt h eo p t i m a lb r a c k e ti ss h o w ni n
Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Optimal bracket when N =8and ⌃ =0 .05·I: The optimal bracket
actually follows the standard seeding. The probability the best player wins is 0.2833.
As the mean stays the same but variance increases, for instance when ⌃ =0 .5·I,t h e
optimal bracket continues to follow the standard seeding.
For this bracket, the probability that the best player wins is 0.2833. Note that because
player 1 is no longer guaranteed to be the best player, the optimal bracket does not
maximize the probability player 1 wins the tournament. For instance, since player 2
is the best player with probability 0.241, this optimal bracket gives player 2 an easier
path to win the tournament than the optimal bracket for the point mass prior.
Not all equal variance priors where
µ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21) (3.31)
have the same optimal bracket. If we change ⌃ from 0.05 to 0.005, the optimal
bracket changes to the one in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: Optimal bracket when N =8and ⌃ =0 .005·I: The optimal bracket
is nearly equal to the optimal bracket for the point mass prior, reﬂecting that player
1i st h eb e s tw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y0 . 6 7 .T h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h eb e s tp l a y e rw i n si s0 .2284.
For this bracket, the probability the best player wins is 0.2284. Note that this bracket
is nearly identical to the optimal bracket for the point mass prior. The di↵erence is
that in the optimal bracket for the point mass prior, players 2 and 3 are matched up
in the ﬁrst round. When ⌃ =0 .005·I,p l a y e r2s t i l lh a sp r o b a b i l i t y0 . 2 4o fb e i n gt h e
best and thus, player 2 is given an easier matchup in the ﬁrst round.
3.4.3 N =1 6
When N =1 6 ,t h en u m b e ro fb r a c k e t si sk =6 .4 ⇥ 108 and the number of win
vectors is m = 32768, and we turn to the simulated annealing and quasi-Monte Carlo
methodology we introduced earlier. Recall that in this case, we only generate an
approximately optimal bracket both because simulated annealing is not guaranteed
to ﬁnd the optimum and because quasi-Monte Carlo returns an estimate of U(b). We
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assess the performance of the approximately optimal bracket by comparing it to the
brackets presented Glickman (2008) in terms of the probability that the best player
wins. Overall, the approximately optimal brackets perform very well.
In Glickman (2008), the adaptive bracket that repeatedly maximizes the proba-
bility the best player advances to the next round is compared to three ﬁxed brackets
and one other adaptive bracket. The three ﬁxed brackets are the randomly gener-
ated bracket, the bracket following the standard seeding, and the cohort randomized
seeding bracket from Schwenk (2000). The adaptive bracket is the reseeding bracket
from Hwang (1982). Of those four, all except the random bracket require the players
be ordered and we order them according to their prior means. We brieﬂy review the
six brackets, ﬁve from Glickman (2008) and our optimal ﬁxed bracket.
1. Random bracket: The random bracket is a ﬁxed bracket where the players
are placed randomly. Each of the k brackets is equally likely.
2. Standard seeding: Ab r a c k e tf o l l o w i n gt h es t a n d a r ds e e d i n gf o rN =1 6i s
shown in Figure 3.13 where the order of the player strengths is assumed to
follow the order of the player indices. Thus, player 1 is stronger than player 2,
player 2 is stronger than player 3 and so on.
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Figure 3.13: Bracket following standard seeding: We assume that the player
strengths follow the order of the player indices.
3. Cohort randomized seeding: Schwenk (2000) introduced cohort random-
ized seeding, which uses the standard seeding but permutes the player posi-
tions within particular groups. We again assume that the order of the player
strengths follows the order of the player indices and consider three groups,
{3,4}, {5,6,7,8},a n d{9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16}.T h e b r a c k e t p o s i t i o n s o f
players within each group are randomly permuted. For instance, in group
{5,6,7,8},t h eb r a c k e tp o s i t i o n so fp l a y e r s5a n d6m a yb es w i t c h e d . T h e
resulting bracket is shown in Figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.14: Bracket following cohort randomized seeding: Because players 5
and 6 are in the same cohort, their positions within the bracket following the standard
seeding are permuted.
4. Reseeding: Hwang (1982) proposed reseeding the players after each round.
For instance, say there are n = N/2r players remaining after round r.T h e
players are ordered according to their prior means and the ith best player is
matched up with the (n   i +1 ) t hb e s tp l a y e r . I nt h es t a n d a r db r a c k e ti n
Figure 3.13, if player 16 defeats player 1 and player 2 defeats player 15 in the
ﬁrst round, player 2 would play player 16 in the second round, rather than the
winner of the game between players 7 and 10.
5. Best player (BP) advances: As we have mentioned, Glickman (2008) as-
sumes a multivariate normal prior on ✓ and for each round, ﬁnds the matchups
that maximize the probability the best player advances to the next round. This
is an adaptive bracket and the utility function is local in the sense that we are
maximizing the probability the best player advances to the next round, not the
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probability the best player wins the tournament.
6. BP wins: Finally, we include the ﬁxed bracket that maximizes the probability
the best player wins. We use the simulated annealing parameters discussed pre-
viously with 3000 quasi-Monte Carlo draws. The running time for one simulated
annealing chain is approximately 2 minutes on a 3.2GHz quad-core CPU.
We consider the six di↵erent prior distributions (A-F) from Glickman (2008).
(A) µi =0 .75   0.1(i   1);  2
i =0 .1f o ra l li.
(B) µi =0 .75   0.1(i   1);  2
i =0 .01 for odd i,a n d 2
i =1 .0f o re v e ni.
(C) µi =0 .75   0.1(i   1);  2
i =0 .01 for i  8, and  2
i =1 .0f o re v e ni   9.
(D) µi =0 .75   0.1(i   1);  2
i =1 .0f o ri  8, and  2
i =0 .01 for even i   9.
(E) µi =0 .75   0.1(i   1);  2
i =0 .01 for i  4, and  2
i =1 .0f o re v e ni   5.
(F) µi =0 .75 0.1(i 1) for i =1 ,...,12, µi =  0.60 0.05(i 13) for i =1 3 ,...,16;
 2
i =0 .01 for i  8, and  2
i =1 .0f o re v e ni   9.
We visualize the marginal distribution of ✓i for the six prior distributions in Figure
3.15.
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Figure 3.15: Six marginal prior distributions
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In Table 3.10, we report the probability the best player wins for all combinations
of the six brackets and six prior distributions. We have copied the results from
Glickman (2008) for the ﬁve brackets he considered. See Glickman (2008) for further
details regarding the simulation set-up. For the BP wins bracket and for each prior
distributions, we draw a value of ✓ and then simulate the 15 games of the tournament.
We record whether the best player, the player with the largest ✓i,w o na n dr e p e a tt h i s
process 100000 times. The last column in Table 3.10 reports the average number of
times the best player won. The results are also reported graphically in Figure 3.16,
which also includes conﬁdence intervals.
Table 3.10: Probability best player wins tournament for di↵erent brackets
and priors: The results in the ﬁrst ﬁve columns are copied from Glickman (2008).
The last column was found by simulation 100000 tournaments for the approximately
optimal brackets.
Prior Random Standard Cohort Reseeding BP Advances BP Wins
A 0.3341 0.3617 0.3556 0.3764 0.3764 0.3728
B 0.5152 0.5163 0.5268 0.5225 0.5261 0.5446
C 0.2771 0.3678 0.3658 0.3685 0.4027 0.4207
D 0.5852 0.5924 0.6003 0.5979 0.5972 0.5974
E 0.4710 0.4620 0.4571 0.4633 0.4781 0.4994
F 0.4692 0.4548 0.4525 0.4542 0.5064 0.5179
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Figure 3.16: Probability best player wins tournament
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Overall, the BP wins bracket is very competitive in relation to the other ﬁve
brackets, including the two adaptive brackets. In 3 of the 6 prior distributions (priors
B, C, and E), the probability the best player wins is clearly the highest for the BP
wins bracket. For prior F, the BP wins bracket also likely gives the largest probability.
These four priors are also the priors for which the BP advances bracket performs well.
Glickman (2008) noted that for these priors, the “top players’ strengths are precisely
estimated, and the bottom players are imprecisely estimated.” He also notes that
In gaming organizations, it is often the case that the best players compete
more frequently than weaker players and therefore have strengths that are
more precisely estimated, so that our pairing method would be ideal for
such a scenario.
This conclusion applies to the BP wins bracket as well. For priors A and D, many of
the brackets give similar results and the BP wins bracket is likely equal to the other
brackets.
It is somewhat surprising that the BP wins bracket gives consistently higher prob-
abilities than the BP advances bracket because the BP advances bracket is adaptive
and has greater ﬂexibility. However, as we have seen, maximizing the probability the
best player advances is not equivalent to maximizing the probability the best player
wins the tournament. The results highlight that we can achieve a higher probability
of the best player winning the tournament by using the correct utility function and a
more constrained bracket than using an incorrect utility function and a more ﬂexible
bracket.
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3.5 Other utility functions
There are many utility functions we could consider besides the best player winning
the tournament. In what follows, we consider three other utility functions. Each one
extends the focus beyond the best player. The ﬁrst utility function we consider looks
at the best two players and the next two utility functions are deﬁned in terms of all
N players. Other utility functions that might also be of interest include those related
to the “entertainment” value of the games. For instance, we might be interested
in maximizing the number of games between evenly matched players because those
games are more exciting for the audience.
3.5.1 Two best players meet in the ﬁnal
Tournament organizers often want the best players to meet in the later rounds,
when the stakes are higher. We can adjust the utility function, for instance, to
maximize the probability the two best players meet in the ﬁnal. Let the utility
function be
u(b,w,✓)=I(w(1)(✓)   R   1,w (2)(✓)   R   1). (3.32)
The expected utility is then
U(b)=
Z
⇥
p(w(1)(✓)   R   1,w (2)(✓)   R   1|✓,b)p(✓)d✓. (3.33)
We can slightly adapt the methodology developed previously to ﬁnd the optimal
bracket in this case. We return to our example when N =8a n d✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), where
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µ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21)
⌃ =0 .005 · I. (3.34)
The optimal bracket is shown in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: Optimal bracket when N =8for two best players meeting in
ﬁnal when ⌃=0 .005 · I: The probability the two best meet in the ﬁnal is 0.1224.
Note that player 2 is now matched up with player 7.
Note that when maximizing the probability the best player wins, player 2 was matched
up with player 5 in the ﬁrst round, see Figure 3.12. Now, player 2 is matched up
in the ﬁrst round against player 7, an easier match up. This is not surprising since
players 1 and 2 are most likely the two best players.
We also ﬁnd the bracket that approximately maximizes the probability the two
best players meet in the ﬁnal when N =1 6 .W el e t✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), where
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µ =( 0 .45,0.39,0.33,0.27,0.21,0.15,0.09,0.03,
  0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21, 0.27, 0.33, 0.39, 0.45)
⌃ =0 .005 · I. (3.35)
The optimal bracket is shown in Figure 3.18.
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Figure 3.18: Approximately optimal bracket when N =1 6for two best
players meeting in ﬁnal when ⌃=0 .005·I: The probability the two best players
meet in the ﬁnal is 0.1112.
3.5.2 w is a monotonic function of ✓
The tournament organizer could also be interested in the best four players meeting
in the semi-ﬁnals or the best 8 players meeting in the quarter-ﬁnals. These utility
functions can actually be combined. For instance, we can maximize the probability
that the best player wins, the best two players meet in the ﬁnal, the best four players
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meet in the semi-ﬁnals, and so on. Taken to the extreme, we could maximize the
probability that w is a monotonic function of ✓. We can also think of this as max-
imizing the probability each player wins the “correct” number of games, where by
correct number of games, we mean that the worst N/2p l a y e r sw i n0g a m e s ,t h en e x t
worst N/4p l a y e r sw i n1g a m e ,t h en e x tw o r s tN/8p l a y e r sw i nt w og a m e sa n ds oo n .
The corresponding utility function is
u(b,w,✓)=I(w(i)(✓)=R  d log2(i)e8 i), (3.36)
and the expected utility function is
U(b)=
Z
⇥
p(w(i)(✓)=R  d log2(i)e8 i|✓,b)p(✓)d✓. (3.37)
For the case when N =8a n d✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), where
µ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21)
⌃ =0 .005 · I, (3.38)
the bracket that maximizes the probability that w is a monotonic function of ✓ is
shown in Figure 3.19.
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Figure 3.19: Optimal bracket when N =8for probability w is a monotonic
function of ✓ when ⌃=0 .005 · I: The probability each player wins the correct
number of games is 0.0111.
Interestingly, this bracket gives player 2 an easier path to the ﬁnal than player 1.
Because we are maximizing the probability that w is a monotonic function of ✓,i t
appears that the easier path to the ﬁnals helps player 2 more than a slightly harder
path hurts player 1. Also, by having player 1 likely play player 3 in the second round,
we increase the probability player 3 correctly wins one game rather than two.
When N =1 6 ,ﬁ n d i n gt h eo p t i m a lb r a c k e tf o rs u c hau t i l i t yf u n c t i o nr e q u i r e s
sampling from Wb because sampling from ⇥ is ine cient. For a given bracket, say
we sample ✓ from ⇥. For that ✓,i no r d e rf o rt h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tw is a monotonic
function of ✓ not to be 0, none of the N/2b e s tp l a y e r sc a np l a ye a c ho t h e ri nt h e
ﬁrst round, none of the N/4b e s tp l a y e r sc a np l a ye a c ho t h e ri nt h es e c o n dr o u n d ,
and so on. In general, this is unlikely for a random ✓ draw. This is not an issue
when sampling from Wb but sampling from Wb is much slower. Finding the optimal
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bracket would take several days on a standard personal computer and consequently,
we leave the implementation of this method for future work. It is also possible that
related utility functions, such as the rank correlation between w and ✓,c o u l db e
more manageable computationally but result in the same or nearly the same optimal
bracket. We also leave this for future work.
3.5.3 Standard seeding
The idea that w is a monotonic function of ✓ is closely related to the standard
seeding. In the standard seeding, if the better teams always wins, the worst N/2
players win 0 games, the next worst N/4p l a y e r sw i n1g a m e ,t h en e x tw o r s tN/8
players win two games and so on. The standard seeding also has the appealing prop-
erty that, in general, the better the team, the easier the path to win the tournament.
Another possible utility function is maximizing the probability that the bracket fol-
lows the standard seeding. This is potentially useful to tournament organizers who
are understandably attached to the familiar standard seeding and want to account
for uncertainty in player strength.
When the prior variances for each player are the same, there is a natural ordering
of the competitors and applying the standard seeding is straightforward. However,
when the prior variances are di↵erent, there is not a natural ordering of the players.
As we have seen, the player with the largest prior mean can also have the largest
variance, in which case, that player can both have the largest probability of being
the best player and the largest probability of being the worst player. Tournament
organizers may be hesitant to assign such a player the top seed in the tournament.
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We return to one of our examples where N =4 .L e t
0
B B B B B
B B B
@
✓1
✓2
✓3
✓4
1
C C C C C
C C C
A
⇠ N
0
B B B B B
B B B
@
0
B B B B B
B B B
@
0.09
0.03
 0.03
 0.09
1
C C C C C
C C C
A
,
0
B B B B B
B B B
@
1.00 0 0
01 .000
00 0 .01 0
00 0 0 .01
1
C C C C C
C C C
A
1
C C C C C
C C C
A
. (3.39)
In each of the following eight orderings of the 4 players, the bracket ((1,2),(3,4))
follows the standard seeding.
✓1 >✓ 3 >✓ 4 >✓ 2
✓1 >✓ 4 >✓ 3 >✓ 2
✓2 >✓ 3 >✓ 4 >✓ 1
✓2 >✓ 4 >✓ 3 >✓ 1
✓3 >✓ 1 >✓ 2 >✓ 4
✓3 >✓ 2 >✓ 1 >✓ 4
✓4 >✓ 1 >✓ 2 >✓ 3
✓4 >✓ 2 >✓ 1 >✓ 3 (3.40)
We let Sb ⇢ ⇥b et h es e to f✓ values that satisfy the standard seeding for bracket b.
Each ✓ 2 Sb satisﬁes one of the orderings. The sets {Sb : b 2 B} partition ⇥ since
every ✓ follows the standard seeding for exactly one bracket. We then let the utility
function be
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u(b,w,✓)=I(✓ 2 Sb). (3.41)
and the expected utility is
U(b)=
Z
⇥
X
w2Wb
u(b,w,✓)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓ (3.42)
=
Z
⇥
X
w2Wb
I(✓ 2 Sb)p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓
=
Z
⇥
I(✓ 2 Sb)
X
w2Wb
p(w|✓,b)p(✓)d✓
=
Z
⇥
I(✓ 2 Sb)p(✓)d✓
=
Z
Sb
p(✓)d✓
=P r ( ✓ 2 Sb)( 3 . 4 3 )
Note that this utility function does not involve w because in this case, the utility
function is not related to the outcome of the tournament. The expected utility is
then an integral of p(✓)o v e rSb. However, it is easier to carry out the integral by
separately integrating over the ✓ values that satisfy each order. For instance, for the
4-player bracket ((1,2),(3,4)), we sum the integrals of p(✓)o v e rt h e8o r d e r s ,s u c h
that
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Z
Sb
p(✓)d✓ =
Z
✓1>✓3>✓4>✓2
p(✓)d✓ +
Z
✓1>✓4>✓3>✓2
p(✓)d✓
+
Z
✓2>✓3>✓4>✓1
p(✓)d✓ +
Z
✓2>✓4>✓3>✓1
p(✓)d✓
+
Z
✓3>✓1>✓2>✓4
p(✓)d✓ +
Z
✓3>✓2>✓1>✓4
p(✓)d✓
+
Z
✓4>✓1>✓2>✓3
p(✓)d✓ +
Z
✓4>✓2>✓1>✓3
p(✓)d✓. (3.44)
For each bracket, b,t h e r ea r eN!
k =2 N 1 orderings that satisfy the standard
seeding and the sum of these probabilities equals Pr(✓ 2 Sb). To calculate U(b)f o r
each bracket in the 4-player case, we have to carry out 4! = 24 integrals, 8 integrals
per bracket. The probability of the standard seeding for each of the three brackets is
reported in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11: Probability of standard seeding for 3 brackets: Bracket
((1,2),(3,4)) has the highest probability of satisfying the standard seeding.
Prob. of
Bracket standard seeding
((1,2),(3,4)) 0.4512
((1,3),(2,4)) 0.2723
((1,4),(2,3)) 0.2763
Bracket ((1,2),(3,4)) maximizes the probability of the standard seeding. Note that
players 1 and 2 have both the highest probability of being the best and the highest
probability of being the worst. Thus, matching them up in the ﬁrst round maximizes
the probability that the best player plays the worst player in the ﬁrst round, which
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is required by the standard seeding.
We also consider an example where N =8a n d✓ ⇠ N(µ,⌃), where
µ =( 0 .21,0.15,0.09,0.03, 0.03, 0.09, 0.15, 0.21)
⌃ =d i a g ( 1 .0,1.0,0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01). (3.45)
When N =8 ,w eh a v et oc a r r yo u t8 !=4 0 3 2 0i n t e g r a l s ,1 2 8i n t e g r a l sp e rb r a c k e t .
These 40320 integrals took approximately 6 minutes on a 3.2GHz quad-core CPU.
The optimal bracket is shown in Figure 3.20.
1"
2"
6"
8"
3"
4 ""
7"
5"
Figure 3.20: Optimal 8-player bracket for standard seeding: The probability
of the standard seeding is 0.0088.
We see a similar result when N =8 . T h eo p t i m a lb r a c k e ta l s om a t c h e su pt h et w o
players with the largest variance because this matchup has the best chance of being
between the best team and the worst team.
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When N =1 6 ,t h e r ea r e1 6 !⇡ 2 · 1013 total orderings and 32768 orderings per
bracket. We again turn to our simulated annealing approach. Calculating U(b)f o ra
single bracket requires carrying out 32768 16-dimensional integrals and takes approxi-
mately 30 minutes. Consequently, we must estimate U(b)a n do n en a t u r a le s t i m a t i o n
approach is, for each bracket b, to draw a random sample of L orderings from the
total number of 2N 1 orderings that satisfy the standard seeding. Generating these
orderings can be done by generating brackets like the one in Figure 3.21(a), where
the player labels refer to the rank of the players, not the player indices. Although
written in an unusual form, this is an example of a bracket that follows the standard
seeding. We can combine it with a bracket, such as the one in Figure 3.21(b), where
the labels refer to the player indices. For instance, the two brackets in Figure 3.21,
imply that an ordering of
✓7 >✓ 2 >✓ 5 >✓ 16 >✓ 14 >✓ 10 >✓ 12 >✓ 8 >✓ 9 >✓ 11 >✓ 3 >✓ 13 >✓ 1 >✓ 4 >✓ 15 >✓ 6
(3.46)
would satisfy the standard seeding for the bracket in 3.21(b).
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13#
4#
12#
5#
16#
1#
8#
9#
2#
15#
10#
7#
11#
6#
14#
3#
(a) Labels correspond to player ranks
1"
16"
13"
14"
6"
7"
8"
9"
2"
15"
11"
12"
3"
10"
4"
5"
(b) Labels correspond to player indices
Figure 3.21: How to ﬁnd orderings that satisfy the standard seeding: The two
brackets can be combined to generate an ordering that follows the standard seeding
for the bracket in (b).
Brackets like the one in Figure 3.21(a) can be randomly generated by swapping play-
ers, games, and sets of games in such a way as to preserve the standard seeding. We
generate a series of such brackets and then thin the series to reduce autocorrelation.
We then take the mean of the l probabilities associated with each ordering and mul-
tiply the result by 2N 1 to estimate Pr(✓ 2 Sb). However, even carrying out 1000
integrals takes approximately 1 minute and a sample of 1000 draws does not provide
enough precision. We leave speeding up this calculation for future work.
3.6 Conclusion
We have presented a methodology for ﬁnding optimal ﬁxed knockout tournament
brackets when player strengths follow a prior distribution. This work extends Glick-
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man (2008) by considering utility functions that apply to players’ tournament results
rather than just one game. We focused on maximizing the probability that the best
player wins the tournament, a historically important objective that is especially rele-
vant when we are uncertain which player is the best. We found that the approximately
optimal bracket outperforms many of its competitors, including the adaptive brack-
ets. Finally, we considered alternative utility functions that may be appealing to
some tournament organizers.
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Inference for causal e↵ects in 22
factorial experiments with
non-compliance
4.1 Introduction
Factorial experiments are among the most popular experimental designs because
they allow for the e↵ects of multiple treatment factors and the interactions between
them to be estimated simultaneously and in an e cient manner. They were originally
developed in the context of agricultural experiments (Yates, 1937; Fisher, 1935) and,
at the time, the ability to estimate multiple e↵ects simultaneously was not generally
accepted. To quote Fisher (1926),
No aphorism is more frequently repeated in connection with ﬁeld trials,
than that we must ask Nature few questions, or, ideally, one question, at
at i m e .T h ew r i t e ri sc o n v i n c e dt h a tt h i sv i e wi sw h o l l ym i s t a k e n .
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History has proved Fisher correct and factorial experiments are now used extensively
in industrial and medical experiments.
Each factor in a factorial experiments has a certain number of levels. The number
of levels is typically two although any number is possible. For example, in a medical
trial, one of the factors could be aspirin use and the two levels could be taking aspirin
(level 1) or not taking aspirin (level 0). In a factorial experiment, every possible
treatment combination, a combination of the factor levels, is tested at least once. If
there are k factors and each factor has two levels, then all 2k treatment combinations
are tested and the experiment is said to follow a 2k factorial design. Say there are
k =2f a c t o r sa n dt h a tt h et w of a c t o r sa r ea s p i r i nu s ea n db e t a - c a r o t e n eu s e . T h e n
the 22 = 4 treatment combinations are (no aspirin, no beta-carotene), (no aspirin,
beta-carotene), (aspirin, no beta-carotene), and (aspirin, beta-carotene) (Stampfer
et al., 1985).
Factorial designs have been widely applied in agricultural, industrial, and medical
contexts and this project was motivated by an experiment in education. The New
York City Department of Education was interested in simultaneously evaluating the
e↵ect of multiple school initiatives on student performance. The initiatives included
linking teacher bonuses to student performance and a new web-based student tracking
system called ARIS. Schools would be randomly assigned to one of the treatment com-
binations and student performance would be measured at the end of the year. While
the experiment never moved beyond the design stage, it raised important questions.
For instance, one of the complications of the design was that the Department of Ed-
ucation did not want to force a subset of schools to adopt the ARIS system. As a
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result, a school could be randomly assigned to use the ARIS system but choose not
to use it. If we are interested in the e↵ect of actually using the ARIS system, this
is a problem because the non-compliance breaks the randomization. Randomization
ensures that, on average, the schools assigned to use the ARIS system are identical to
the schools assigned not to use the ARIS system and thus, these two sets of schools
allow for a fair comparison. However, if schools are not forced to comply with their
assignment, there is no guarantee that the schools that use the system are similar to
the schools that do not. This can also be viewed as an example of an encouragement
design (Hirano et al., 2000). In this chapter, we will focus on estimating factorial
e↵ects in the presence of such non-compliance.
Non-compliance is a well known problem in experimental design and more gener-
ally. Steiner (2012) estimates that “fewer than 50% of individuals prescribed a new
medication for diabetes, hypertension, or hyperlipidemia continue the drug for even
a year.” Non-compliance has also been extensively studied in the statistics litera-
ture (Angrist et al., 1996; Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Cheng and Small, 2006; Jin and
Rubin, 2008; Roy et al., 2008; Little et al., 2009; Long et al., 2010). The principal
stratiﬁcation approach, introduced by Frangakis and Rubin (2002), has been espe-
cially e↵ective for such problems. In principal stratiﬁcation, each unit belongs to a
single strata and because this strata is determined before treatment assignment, it is
a proper covariate. The goal is to compute causal e↵ects within each strata. How-
ever, the strata identiﬁers are unknown variables and we have to use the observed
compliance behavior and outcomes to infer which unit belongs to which strata. In a
non-compliance setting, the strata are typically whether or not the units are compli-
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ers, never-takers, always-takers, or deﬁers, terms that will be deﬁned more formally
in the next section. Most of the literature has focused on experiments with a single
factor with two levels. While Cheng and Small (2006), Roy et al. (2008) and Long
et al. (2010) extended the principal stratiﬁcation framework to single factor experi-
ments with three levels, there has been limited work on how to apply the framework
to factorial experiments.
We focus primarily on the 22 experiment and, given certain assumptions, the
framework enables the estimation of both factorial main e↵ects and the interaction.
The work can be viewed as a combination of the potential outcomes framework for
factorial experiments presented in Dasgupta et al. (2012) and principal stratiﬁcation.
In Section 4.2, we state the problem of non-compliance in factorial experiments
more formally and lay out the key assumptions. In Section 4.3, we present the princi-
pal stratiﬁcation estimation strategy and in Section 4.4, present simulation results. In
Section 4.5, we present two extensions and in Section 4.6 we summarize our ﬁndings.
4.2 The problem
Let F1 and F2 be two two-level treatment factors in a 22 factorial design. Addi-
tionally, let N be the total number of units, where N/4u n i t sa r er a n d o m l ya s s i g n e dt o
each treatment combination. As an illustrative example, we consider the factors from
Bhasin et al. (1996). In this study, F1 was a standardized weight lifting program to be
performed three times a week and F2 was a weekly steroid injection. The goal of the
10-week study was to assess the e↵ects of the weight lifting program, the steroids, and
the interaction between them on strength, as measured by muscle size and bench-press
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weight. In what follows, we assume that the subjects either comply fully with their
assignment or not at all (i.e. all-or-nothing compliance). For instance, the subjects
either completely follow the standardized weight lifting program or completely ignore
it. Whether or not this is a realistic simplifying assumption depends on the context
and if it is more appropriate, we could re-deﬁne compliance to be attending at least
80% of the weight lifting sessions. Also, see Jin and Rubin (2008) for an example of
how partial compliance can he handled in the principal stratiﬁcation framework. We
next deﬁne the principal strata, assumptions, estimands, and observed data.
4.2.1 Principal strata
Let Z1 be the assigned level of factor F1 and let Z2 be the assigned level of factor
F2.L e tZ1 =1d e n o t et h ea c t i v el e v e lo ff a c t o rF1 and let Z1 =0d e n o t et h ec o n t r o l
level. For instance, if F1 refers to the weight lifting program, Z1 =1r e f e r st ob e i n g
assigned to the program and Z1 =0r e f e r st on o tb e i n ga s s i g n e dt ot h ep r o g r a m .
Then let Z =( Z1,Z 2) denote the assigned treatment combination. Let F be the set
of treatment combinations,
F = {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)}. (4.1)
Let Wi(Z)=Wi(Z1,Z 2)=( Wi1(Z1,Z 2),W i2(Z1,Z 2)) be the received treatment com-
bination for the ith unit when assigned to treatment combination Z. Wi1(Z1,Z 2) is
the received level of F1 and Wi2(Z1,Z 2)i st h er e c e i v e dl e v e lo fF2. Note that Wi(·)i s
af u n c t i o nf r o mF to F, Wi(·):F ! F.L e t
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W i =( Wi(Z))Z2F
=( Wi(0,0),W i(0,1),W i(1,0),W i(1,1)) (4.2)
be the vector of received treatment combinations for the ith unit. The vector of re-
ceived treatment combinations, W i,d e ﬁ n e st h ef u n c t i o nWi(·) and the compliance
behavior for the ith unit. We implicitly make the stable unit treatment value assump-
tion (SUTVA (Rubin, 1980)), which implies that the received treatment combination
for unit i only depends on the assigned treatment combination for unit i.L e tW be
the N ⇥ 4m a t r i xo fr e c e i v e dt r e a t m e n tc o m b i n a t i o n sw h e r et h eith row is W i.
In this context, a principal strata is a subset of the N units with the same value of
W i.I nt h e2 2 design, |F| =4a n dt h u sW i take on one of 44 =2 5 6p o s s i b l ev a l u e s .
There are then 256 principal strata in a 22 design and (2k)(2k) principal strata in a 2k
design.
4.2.2 Assumptions
In order to make estimation feasible, we reduce the number of principal strata
through a series of four assumptions.
1. No compliance interaction: We assume there are no interactions among
factors with respect to compliance behavior. This implies that Wi1(Z1,1) =
Wi1(Z1,0) and Wi2(1,Z 2)=Wi1(0,Z 2). Thus, the received level of factor F1
only depends on Z1,a n dw ew r i t eWi1(Z1,Z 2)a sWi1(Z1). Similarly, we write
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the received level for F2 as Wi2(Z2). Under this assumption, with respect to
Fj,au n i tc a nb ee i t h e rac o m p l i e r( Wij(Zj)=Zj), never-taker (Wij(Zj)=0 ) ,
always-taker (Wij(Zj)=1 ) ,o rd e ﬁ e r( Wij(Zj)=1 Zj). Thus, for a 22 design,
there are then 42 = 16 principal strata and for a 2k design, there are 4k principal
strata.
2. Monotonicity: We assume for each factor that the received level is no less
than the assigned level.
F1 : Wi(1,Z 2)   Wi(0,Z 2) 8Z2
F2 : Wi(Z1,1)   Wi(Z1,0) 8Z1 (4.3)
This rules out the deﬁers, who always receive the opposite of their assinged
level, and reduces the number of principal strata to 32 =9f o ra2 2 design and
3k for a 2k design.
3. Strict compliance for F2: We assume that units always comply with the
assignment of F2.I nt h es t e r o i de x a m p l e ,t h i si m p l i e st h a ta l ls u b j e c t sc o m p l y
with their assignment either to receive a weekly steroid injection or to not
receive the injection. This further reduces the number of principal strata to 3.
In general, if there are k factors and strict-compliance holds for m factors, then
given the other two assumptions, there are 3k m principal strata.
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With these three assumptions, we have dramatially reduced the number of prin-
cipal strata from 256 to 3, compliers, never-takers, and always-takers with respect to
F1.L e t Ci = c if unit i is a complier, let Ci = n if unit i is a never-taker, and let
Ci = a if the unit i is an always-taker. Let C =( C1,...,C N)a n dl e tC(t)={i|Ci = t}
for t 2{ c,n,a} be the collection of units in principal strata t.L e t Nt = |C(t)| be
number of units in principal strata t and let pt = Nt/N be the proportion of units in
principal strata t.
We next introduce notation for the outcome of interest, Y .I nt h es t e r o i de x a m p l e ,
Y would be muscle mass. Similar to how Wi(Z)i st h er e c e i v e dt r e a t m e n tc o m b i n a t i o n
for treatment assignment Z,l e tYi(Z,Wi(Z)) be the potential outcome for treatment
assignment Z.S i n c e Wi(Z)i saf u n c t i o no fZ,w ec o u l dw r i t eYi(Z,Wi(Z)) as a
function of only Z but we include Wi(Z)f o rn o t a t i o n a lc o n v e n i e n c e .I nt h es a m ew a y
that W i =( Wi(0,0),W i(0,1),W i(1,0),W i(1,1)) is the vector of received treatment
combinations for the possible treatment assignments, let
Y i =
  
Yi(Z,Wi(Z))
  
Z2F
=( Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)),Y i((0,1),W i(0,1)),Y i((1,0),W i(1,0)),Y i((1,1),W i(1,1))
(4.4)
be the vector of the potential outcomes for the possible treatment assignments. Let
Y be the N ⇥4m a t r i xo fp o t e n t i a lo u t c o m e sw h e r et h eith row is Y i.W em a k eo n e
more assumption before deﬁning the estimands.
4. Weak exclusion restriction: We assume that for never-takers and always
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takers, the assigned treatment for F1 is unrelated to the potential outcomes for
Y .T h a ti sf o ri 2C (n)a n di 2C (a)
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((1,0),W i(1,0))
Yi((0,1),W i(0,1)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)). (4.5)
The weak exclusion restriction says that for never-takers and always-takers the po-
tential outcomes only depend on the received treatment combination. Since the as-
signed treatment combination and the received treatment combination are the same
for compliers, this implies that under the weak exclusion restriction, we can write
Yi(Z,Wi(Z)) as Yi(Wi(Z)).
4.2.3 Estimands
The unit-level Intention-To-Treat (ITT) factorial e↵ects are deﬁned as follows.
Let ✓ITT
ij be the ITT e↵ect for unit i and and factorial e↵ect j.I n a 2 k factorial
design, there 2k   1f a c t o r i a le ↵ e c t s .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i na2 2 factorial design there are
three factorial e↵ects, the two main e↵ects for the two factors and the interaction.
Let
✓
ITT
ij =
1
2
g
0
jY i (4.6)
where
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g1 =
0
B B
B B B B B B
@
 1
 1
1
1
1
C C C
C C C C C
A
g2 =
0
B B B
B B B B B
@
 1
1
 1
1
1
C C C
C C C C C
A
g3 =
0
B B B
B B B B B
@
1
 1
 1
1
1
C C C
C C C C C
A
. (4.7)
Note that the main e↵ect for F1 corresponds to j =1 ,t h em a i ne ↵ e c tf o rF2 cor-
responds to j =2 ,a n dt h ei n t e r a c t i o nb e t w e e nF1 and F2 corresponds to j =3 .
Thus, ✓ITT
i1 measures the causal e↵ect of assigning unit i to level 1 of F1 averaged over
the di↵erent assigned levels of F2.T h ep o p u l a t i o n - l e v e lI T Tf a c t o r i a le ↵ e c t sa r et h e
average of the unit-level ITT factorial e↵ects,
✓
ITT
1 =
1
N
N X
i=1
✓
ITT
i1
✓
ITT
2 =
1
N
N X
i=1
✓
ITT
i2
✓
ITT
3 =
1
N
N X
i=1
✓
ITT
i3 . (4.8)
We can further decompose the population-level ITT factorial e↵ects by the principal
strata,
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✓
ITT
1 = pc✓
ITT,(c)
1 + pn✓
ITT,(n)
1 + pa✓
ITT,(a)
1
✓
ITT
2 = pc✓
ITT,(c)
2 + pn✓
ITT,(n)
2 + pa✓
ITT,(a)
2
✓
ITT
12 = pc✓
ITT,(c)
3 + pn✓
ITT,(n)
3 + pa✓
ITT,(a)
3 , (4.9)
where
✓
ITT,(t)
1 =
1
Nt
X
i2C(t)
✓
ITT
i1
✓
ITT,(t)
2 =
1
Nt
X
i2C(t)
✓
ITT
i2
✓
ITT,(t)
3 =
1
Nt
X
i2C(t)
✓
ITT
i3 . (4.10)
The objective is to estimate the factorial ITT e↵ects in each principal strata. The fac-
torial ITT e↵ects for compliers are of primary interest because the assigned treatment
combination agrees with the received treatment combination. Consequently, ✓
ITT,(c)
1 ,
often called the complier average causal e↵ect (CACE) for F1,c a nb ei n t e r p r e t e da s
measuring the e↵ect of receiving level 1 of F1 averaged over the di↵erent levels of
F2. This interpretation can be made more compelling by, for instance, blinding the
subjects so that e↵ect of assignment is minimized. If unit i is a complier, in order to
say that the di↵erence Yi((1,1),(1,1))   Yi((0,1),(0,1)) is due entirely to receiving
level 1 of factor F1,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tYi((1,1),(1,1)) = Yi((0,1),(1,1)). This
is more believable if the subjects have been blinded. However, because the potential
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outcome Yi((0,1),(1,1)) does not actually exist for compliers, this assumption cannot
be supported with data.
Finally, our primary estimands of interest are
✓
CACE, FP
1 = ✓
ITT,(c)
1
✓
CACE, FP
2 = ✓
ITT,(c)
2
✓
CACE, FP
3 = ✓
ITT,(c)
3 . (4.11)
The additional FP in the notation refers to ﬁnite-population. Finite-population refers
to the actual N units in the experiment and is di↵erent from super-population, which
we cover in Section 4.3 when we introduce the probabilistic model.
Returning to the steroid study example, ✓
CACE, FP
1 is the e↵ect on the compliers
of following the weight lifting program and ✓
CACE, FP
3 is the interaction between the
weight lifting program and the steroids, the additional muscle size added from weight
lifting when the subject receives the steroids. Because we are interested in the e↵ect of
following the weight lifting program, not simply being assigned to follow it, ✓
CACE, FP
1
and ✓
CACE, FP
3 are of greater interest than ✓ITT
1 and ✓ITT
3 . However, because all units
comply with their assignment to steroids, both ✓
CACE, FP
2 and ✓ITT
2 are of potential
interest. While ✓
CACE, FP
2 is the e↵ect of steroids on the compliers, ✓ITT
2 is the e↵ect
of steroids on all units.
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4.2.4 Observed data
Each unit is randomly assigned to one of the four treatment combinations ac-
cording to a completely randomized assignment mechanism, so that the number of
units assigned to each treatment combination is N/4. For each unit i =1 ,...,N,
we observe the observed assigned treatment combination Zi,t h er e c e i v e dt r e a t m e n t
combination W obs
i ,a n dt h eo b s e r v e dp o t e n t i a lo u t c o m eY obs
i ,w h e r eW obs
i = Wi(Zi)
and Y obs
i = Yi(Zi,Wobs
i ). Let Z =( Z1,...,Z N), W
obs =( W obs
1 ,...,Wobs
N )a n d
Y
obs =( Y obs
1 ,...,Yobs
N ). Note that we only observe one element of W i and one el-
ement of Y i,t h ef u n d a m e n t a lp r o b l e mo fc a u s a li n f e r e n c e . I fw ec o u l do b s e r v ea l l
elements of the vectors, we would be able to identify the compliance behavior of all
units and directly calculate the estimands of interest.
Because the treatment assignment is completely randomized, the treatment as-
signment is unconfounded, p(Z |Y )=p ( Z). This makes the estimation of the ITT
factorial e↵ects straightforward. Following Dasgupta et al. (2012), let
¯ Y (Z)=
1
N
N X
i=1
Yi(Z,Wi(Z)) (4.12)
be the average of the potential outcomes for assinged treatment combination Z and
let ¯ Y =(¯ Y (Z))Z2F.T h e n ,w ec a nr e w r i t e✓ITT
j as
✓
ITT
j =
1
2
g
0
j ¯ Y (4.13)
and we can estimate ✓ITT
j by letting
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¯ Y
obs(Z)=
1
N/4
X
i:Zi=Z
Y
obs
i (4.14)
and ¯ Y
obs =(¯ Y obs(Z))Z2F.T h e n¯ Y
obs is an unbiased estimate of ¯ Y , E( ¯ Y
obs)= ¯ Y
and
d ✓ITT
j =
1
2
g
0
j ¯ Y
obs. (4.15)
is an unbiased estimate of ✓ITT
j .D a s g u p t ae ta l .( 2 0 1 2 )d e r i v e dt h es t a n d a r de r r o ro f
d ✓ITT
j .
Because not all units comply with their F1 assignment, the received treatment
combination is confounded, p(W
obs |Y ) 6=p ( W
obs). As a result, to estimate of
✓
CACE, FP
j we must rely on a statistical model.
4.3 Principal stratiﬁcation framework
In this section, we present the framework for estimating the estimands of interest,
✓
CACE, FP
1 , ✓
CACE, FP
2 ,a n d✓
CACE, FP
3 .T h ec h a l l e n g ei ne s t i m a t i n g✓
CACE, FP
1 , ✓
CACE, FP
2 ,
and ✓
CACE, FP
3 is that we cannot generally identify which units are the compliers from
the observed data. In order to determine if unit i is a complier, we need to observe
Wi1(Z1)w h e nb o t hZ1 =0a n dZ1 = 1, but of course, we can only assign a unit to one
value of Z1.I fw ek n o wWi(1) = 1, the unit might be a complier or an always-taker.
If we know Wi1(0) = 0, the unit might be a complier or a never-taker. We show
how to adapt the traditional principal stratiﬁcation Bayesian model from Imbens and
Rubin (1997) to estimate the estimands of interest in this setting.
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4.3.1 Bayesian model
In the Bayesian approach, we put a probability model on the quantities associated
with each unit, Zi, W i, Y i. For each unit, we observe Zi, W obs
i = Wi(Zi), and Y obs
i =
Yi(Zi,Wobs
i ), which means we observe Z =( Z1,...,Z N), W
obs =( W obs
1 ,...,Wobs
N ),
and Y
obs =( Y obs
1 ,...,Yobs
N ).
We let Z, W,a n dY be random variables which follow the probability function
f(Z,W,Y |⇡), where
f(Z,W,Y |⇡)=f(W,Y |⇡)f(Z |W,Y ,⇡)
= f(W,Y |⇡)f(Z)
=
N Y
i=1
f(W i,Y i |⇡)f(Z). (4.16)
The second line is true because we are using a completely randomized assignment
mechanism and Z does not depend on W, Y , or any parameters. Hence, Z is inde-
pendent of W and Y .W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t( W i,Y i), i =1 ,...,N,a r ei n d e p e n d e n t
conditional on ⇡ and let f(⇡)b et h ep r i o rf o r⇡. As a reference, Imbens and Rubin
(1997) justify this form of the density function and prior using deFinetti’s theorem
and exchangeability.
We focus on deriving the posterior distribution for ⇡,c o n d i t i o n a lo nt h eo b s e r v e d
data, Z, W
obs,a n dY
obs,b yc o m b i n i n gt h ep r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o no f⇡, f(⇡), with the
observed data likelihood. Once we obtain the posterior for ⇡,w ec a ni m p u t eW
mis
and Y
mis and derive the posterior distributions of the estimands of interest. Here,
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W
mis and Y
mis refer to those elements of the matrices W and Y that were not
observed.
We ﬁrst derive the probability function for the observed data by integrating out
W
mis and Y
mis. We use the probability function for the observed data to obtain
the observed data likelihood and then multiply the observed data likelihood by the
prior to obtain the posterior distribution of ⇡ conditional on the observed data. We
also drop f(Z)s i n c ei td o e sn o td e p e n do n⇡ and thus, will not a↵ect the posterior
distribution of ⇡. The density function for the observed data, W
obs and Y
obs,i s
f(W
obs,Y
obs |⇡)=
ZZ
f(W,Y |⇡)dW
misdY
mis
=
ZZ N Y
i=1
f(W i,Y i |⇡)dW
misdY
mis
=
N Y
i=1
ZZ
f(W i,Y i |⇡)dW
mis
i dY
mis
i
=
N Y
i=1
f(W
obs
i ,Y
obs
i |⇡). (4.17)
To ﬁnd f(W obs
i ,Yobs
i |⇡), we carry out the integral
RR
f(W i,Y i |⇡)dW
mis
i dY
mis
i by
ﬁrst writing f(W i,Y i |⇡)a sf(W i |⇡)f(Y i |W i,⇡). We next deﬁne f(W i |⇡)a n d
f(Y i |W i,⇡).
The probability function for the vector of received treatment combinations is de-
ﬁned using the function  (t,W i). The fuction  (t,W i)i s1i fW i is consistent with
principal strata t and 0 otherwise. For instance, if W i = c((0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)),
then unit i is a complier and  (c,W i)=1 .W et h e nl e t
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f(W i |⇡)=
Y
t2{c,n,a}
!
 (t,W i)
t , (4.18)
where !t =P r ( Ci = t) is the probability a unit belong to principal strata t,s o
!c + !n + !a =1 .
The probability function for the vector of potential outcomes conditional on the
vector of received treatment combinations, f(Y i |W i,⇡), is deﬁned similarly. Let ⌘t,z
be the parameter that controls the marginal distribution of Yi(z,Wi(z)) given that
unit i belongs to principal compliance strata t. Also, let ⌘t,assoc be the parameter that
controls the dependence between unit-level potential outcomes for units belonging to
principal compliance strata t.T h e n ,l e t
f(Y i |W i,⇡)=
Y
t2{c,n,a}
⇣
ht(Y i |⌘t,assoc)
Y
z2F
bt,z(Yi(z,Wi(z))|⌘t,z)
⌘ (t,W i)
, (4.19)
where bt,z(Yi(z,Wi(z))|⌘t,z)=f(Yi(z,Wi(z))|Ci = t,⌘t,z)i st h em a r g i n a ld i s t r i b u t i o n
of the potential outcome Yi(z,Wi(z)) given that unit i belongs to principal compli-
ance strata t. Also, ht(Y i |⌘t,assoc)c a p t u r e st h ed e p e n d e n c eb e t w e e nt h ep o t e n t i a l
outcomes. It is deﬁned such that the product of the marginal distributions and
ht(Y i |⌘t,assoc)i st h ej o i n td i s t r i b u t i o no fY i |W i,⇡.T h e r ea r et h e n1 8p a r a m e t e r s ,
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⇡ =( !c,! n,! a,
⌘c,(0,0),⌘ c,(0,1),⌘ c,(1,0),⌘ c,(1,1),⌘ c,assoc,
⌘n,(0,0),⌘ n,(0,1),⌘ n,(1,0),⌘ n,(1,1),⌘ n,assoc,
⌘a,(0,0),⌘ a,(0,1),⌘ a,(1,0),⌘ a,(1,1),⌘ a,assoc). (4.20)
The weak exclusion restriction actually allows us to reduce the number of parameters
to 16 because ⌘t,(0,0) = ⌘t,(1,0) and ⌘t,(0,1) = ⌘t,(1,1) for t 2{ n,a}.
The observed data likelihood for a single unit is the probability function of the
observed data, f(W obs
i ,Yobs
i |⇡), evaluated at the observed data. The likelihood de-
pends on the assigned treatment combination, the received treatment combination,
and the observed potential outcome. The observed data likelihood is derived by inte-
grating out the missing data, which is equivalent to summing over the probabilities of
the principal strata consistent with Zi and W obs
i and multiplying each probability by
the conditional density of the observed potential outcome given the principal strata.
For example, say we observe Zi =( 0 ,0), W obs
i =( 0 ,0) and Y obs
i = yobs
i .W e k n o w
unit i is either a complier or never-taker and the observed data likelihood is then
f(Wobs,i,Y obs,i|⇡)=!cb
i
c,(0,0) + !nb
i
n,(0,0), (4.21)
where bi
t,(0,0) = bt,(0,0)(yobs
i |⌘t,(0,0)). We group the units according to the 8 possible
combinations of Zi and Wi(Zi), such that if i 2 S(z,w), then Zi = z and Wi(Zi)=w.
The 8 sets are
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S((0,0),(0,0)), S((0,0),(1,0)), S((1,0),(1,0)), S((1,0),(0,0))
S((0,1),(0,1)), S((0,1),(1,1)), S((1,1),(1,1)), S((1,1),(0,1)). (4.22)
Then the observed data likelihood is
f(W
obs,Y
obs |⇡)=
N Y
i=1
f(W
obs
i ,Y
obs
i |⇡)
=
Y
i2S((0,0),(0,0))
(!cb
i
c,(0,0) + !nb
i
n,(0,0)) ⇥
Y
i2S((0,0),(1,0))
!ab
i
a(0,0)
⇥
Y
i2S(1,0),(1,0))
(!cb
i
c,(1,0) + !nb
i
a,(1,0)) ⇥
Y
i2S(1,0),(0,0))
!nb
i
n,(1,0)
⇥
Y
i2S((0,1),(0,1))
(!cb
i
c,(0,1) + !nb
i
n,(0,1)) ⇥
Y
i2S((0,1),(1,1))
!ab
i
a,(0,1)
⇥
Y
i2S((1,1),(1,1))
(!cb
i
c,(1,1) + !ab
i
a,(1,1)) ⇥
Y
i2S((1,1),(0,1))
!nb
i
n,(1,1).
(4.23)
Note that ⌘t,assoc is not present in the observed data likelihood. Thus if ⌘t,assoc is a
priori independent of the other parameters, the posterior distribution for ⌘t,assoc will
be the same as the prior distribution and the ⌘t,assoc will still be independent of the
other parameters.
We visualize the principal strata associated with each set in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Visualizing principal strata and assigned and received treatment
combination: The rows refer to the assigned treatment combination and the columns
to the received treatment combination. Within each cell, we list the principal strata
consistent with the assigned and received treatment combination. For instance, the
units in S((0,0),(0,0)) are either compliers (c)o rn e v e r - t a k e r s( n).
w
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
z
(0,0) c, n a
(0,1) c, n a
(1,0) n c, a
(1,1) n c, a
Table 4.1 also provides some intuition into how the model parameters are estimated.
Take the ﬁrst column of Table 4.1, we know that all units in set S((1,0),(0,0)) are
never-takers. We can then use those units to estimate the parameters ⌘n,(1,0). Just
mentioned earlier, under the weak exclusion restriction, we know that ⌘n,(1,0) = ⌘n,(0,0).
We can then use the estimate of ⌘n,(0,0) to predict which units in S((0,0),(0,0)), the
mixture of compliers and never-takers, are likely never-takers and consequently, which
are most likely compliers. Knowing which units are likely never-takers and compliers,
then allows us to estimate !c, !n, !a,a n d⌘c,(0,0).T h i sp r o c e s si ss i m i l a r l yr e p e a t e d
within the other columns.
Once we have derived the posterior distribution of ⇡,
f(⇡ |W
obs,Y
obs) / f(W
obs,Y
obs |⇡)f(⇡), (4.24)
144Chapter 4: Inference for causal e↵ects in 22 factorial experiments with
non-compliance
we can use the fact that the posterior distribution of ✓
CACE, FP
j is
f(✓
CACE, FP
j |W
obs,Y
obs)=
ZZ
f(✓
CACE, FP
j |W,Y )f(W
mis,Y
mis |W
obs,Y
obs)dW
mis dY
mis
=
ZZ
f(✓
CACE, FP
j |W,Y )
Z
f(W
mis,Y
mis |⇡,W
obs,Y
obs)
f(⇡ |W
obs,Y
obs)d⇡ dW
mis dY
mis
=
ZZZ
f(✓
CACE, FP
j |W,Y )f(W
mis,Y
mis |⇡,W
obs,Y
obs)
f(⇡ |W
obs,Y
obs)d⇡ dW
mis dY
mis. (4.25)
We return to this equation shortly and show that it yields a simple sampling scheme.
Up to this point, we have only focused on the ﬁnite-population parameters ✓
CACE, FP
j ,
j =1 ,2,3. The super-population parameters might also be of interest and these are
deﬁned using the model parameters, ⌘t,z. For instance, in the case where the potential
outcomes follow a normal distribution, ⌘t,z =( µt,z, 2
t,z). Let
µt =( µt,(0,0),µ t,(0,1),µ t,(1,0),µ t,(1,1))( 4 . 2 6 )
and then the super-population parameters of interest are
✓
CACE, SP
j =
1
2
g
0
jµc (4.27)
for j =1 ,2,3.
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4.3.2 Computation
We next review how to derive the posterior distributions for the ﬁnite-population
estimands and super-population estimands. We ﬁrst obtain an approximation to the
posterior distribution of ⇡,u s i n ge i t h e rt h eG i b b ss a m p l e ro rt h eE Ma l g o r i t h m .T h e
Gibbs sampler provides posterior draws of ⇡ while the EM algorithm provides a large-
sample approximation of the posterior distribution by ﬁnding the maximum likelihood
estimate (MLE) of ⇡.I nb o t ht h eG i b b sa n dE Mc a s e s ,o n c ew eh a v et h ep o s t e r i o r
distribution of ⇡,w ec a nc o m p u t et h ep o s t e r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o n so ft h ee s t i m a n d s .
Gibbs sampler and data augmentation
We can draw from the posterior distribution of ⇡, f(⇡ |Z,W
obs,Y
obs), using the
Gibbs sampler. Those draws are then used to directly derive the posterior distribu-
tions of the super-population estimands and to impute the missing potential outcomes,
which allows for the derivation of the posterior distributions of the ﬁnite-population
estimands.
We take a data augmentation approach to sampling from f(⇡ |Z,W
obs,Y
obs).
We treat C, the vector of principal strata, as the unobserved data and sample from
the joint distribution of ⇡ and C, f(⇡,C |Z,W
obs,Y
obs). The complete data for the
Gibbs sampler is thus C, Z, W
obs,a n dY
obs.T h e G i b b s s a m p l e r b e g i n s w i t h a n
initial draw of ⇡, ⇡(1).A tt h eith step, we draw from the posterior of C conditional
on ⇡ = ⇡(i), f(C |⇡(i),Z,W
obs,Y
obs). Let C
(i) be the draw. Next, we draw from the
posterior of ⇡ conditional on C = C
(i), f(⇡ |C
(i),Z,W
obs,Y
obs). Let ⇡(i+1) be the
draw. This is repeated for i =1 ,...,L.
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We ﬁrst derive f(C |⇡,Z,W
obs,Y
obs)b yn o t i n gt h a t
f(C |⇡,Z,W
obs,Y
obs)=
N Y
i=1
f(Ci |⇡,W
obs
i ,Y
obs
i ). (4.28)
Here, f(Ci = t|⇡,Wobs
i ,Yobs
i )g i v e st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tu n i ti belongs to principal
strata t.I ns o m ec a s e s ,w ek n o ww h i c hp r i n c i p a ls t r a t au n i ti belongs to. For instance,
if i 2 S((0,0),(1,0)), then unit i is an always-taker and f(Ci = a|⇡,Wobs
i ,Yobs
i )=1 .
As before, each of the 8 patterns has its own form. Rather than writing out the
probability for each set, we note that if i 2 S((0,0),(0,0)), then
f(Ci = c|⇡,W
obs
i ,Y
obs
i )=
!cbi
c,(0,0)
!cbi
c,(0,0) + !nbi
n,(0,0)
. (4.29)
The other patterns follow a similar form and once these probabilities are calculated
for each unit, it is straightforward to sample C.
The next step is to draw from the conditional posterior distribution of ⇡.W e
assume that C and W
obs are consistent and use the fact that
f(⇡ |C,Z,W
obs,Y
obs) / f(⇡)f(C,Z,W
obs,Y
obs |⇡)
/ f(⇡)f(C,Y
obs |⇡)
/ f(⇡)
N Y
i=1
f(Ci,Y
obs
i |⇡)
/ f(⇡)
Y
z2F
Y
t2{c,n,a}
Y
i2(C(t)\S(z,·))
!t b
i
t,z. (4.30)
If we assume
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(!c,! n,! a),
⌘c,(0,0),⌘ c,(0,1),⌘ c,(1,0),⌘ c,(1,1),
⌘n,(0,0),⌘ n,(0,1),⌘ n,(1,0),⌘ n,(1,1),
⌘a,(0,0),⌘ a,(0,1),⌘ a,(1,0),⌘ a,(1,1),
are apriori independent, then the posterior factors into 13 components. This implies
that
f(!c,! n,! a |C,Z,W
obs,Y
obs) / f(!c,! n,! a)!
Nc
c !
Nn
n !
Na
a
f(⌘t,z |C,Z,W
obs,Y
obs) / f(⌘tz)
Y
i2(C(t)\S(z,·))
b
i
t,z. (4.31)
Conjugate priors do exist for this conditional problem. For instance, if f(!c,! n,! a)
is a Dirichlet distribution, then the conditional posterior distibution,
f(!c,! n,! a |C,Z,W
obs,Y
obs),
is also a Dirichlet distribution. Similarly if we assume the potential outcomes are
normally distributed, ⌘t,z is the mean and variance for the normal distribution,
and f(⌘t,z)i sn o r m a l - i n v e r s eg a m m a ,t h e nt h ec o n d i t i o n a lp o s t e r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o n ,
f(⌘t,z |C,Z,W
obs,Y
obs), is normal-inverse gamma.
These draws of ⇡ can be directly converted into draws of the super-population
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estimands. They can also be used to sample from f(✓
CACE, FP
j |W
obs,Y
obs). With
the posterior draw of ⇡,w ec a ni m p u t eW
mis and Y
mis by drawing from the posterior
predictive distribution, f(W
mis,Y
mis |⇡,W
obs,Y
obs). We then calculate ✓
CACE, FP
j
based on the complete matrices W and Y .I no r d e rt oi m p u t eY
mis,w ed on e e dt o
consider the correlation between the potential outcomes, controlled by ht(Y i |⌘t,assoc).
For simplicity, we assume that the potential outcomes within a unit are independent,
ht(Y i |⌘t,assoc)=1 ,f o ra l lp r i n c i p a ls t r a t at.I nf u t u r ew o r k ,w ei n t e n dt or e l a xt h i s
assumption.
EM algorithm
We can obtain a large-sample approximation of the posterior distribution of ⇡
by ﬁnding the MLE using the EM algorithm. We then use the information matrix
calculated at the MLE to approximate the covariance matrix and assume ⇡ follows a
multivariate normal distribution. Because this is a large-sample approximation and
we are assuming the data overwhelms the prior, we can ignore the prior distribution,
f(⇡). As in the Gibbs sampler, the complete data is C, Z, W
obs,a n dY
obs,w h e r e
C is unobserved. In the E-step, we take the expectation of the complete data log-
likelihood using the current estimates of the parameters. The log-likelihood, `(⇡), is
derived from the likelihood, L(⇡), and is
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`(⇡)=l o gL(⇡)
=l o g
⇣ Y
z2F
Y
t2{c,n,a}
Y
i2S(z,·)
(!tb
i
t,z)
1Ci=t
⌘
=
X
z2F
X
t2{c,n,a}
X
i2S(z,·)
1Ci=t · (log!t +l o gb
i
t,z). (4.32)
In the E-step, we simply replace 1Ci=t with E(1Ci=t |⇡,Z,W
obs,Y
obs), where
E(1Ci=t |⇡,Z,W
obs,Y
obs)=f(Ci = t|⇡,W
obs
i ,Y
obs
i ). (4.33)
In the M-step, we ﬁnd the parameter values that maximize the expected log-
likelihood. Because the parameters in the log-likelihood are easily separable, the
maximization is straightforward. Once we have our large-sample approximation, we
can derive posterior distributions of the ﬁnite-population and super-populations esti-
mands as before.
4.4 Simulation
Following Imbens and Rubin (1997), we ﬁt the model to simulated data with
continuous normally distributed outcomes. We ﬁt the model using both the Gibbs
sampler and EM algorithm and compare the frequency properties of both estimates
for the ﬁnite-population and super-population estimands.
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4.4.1 Set-up
We simulate the complete data matrices, W and Y ,f o rN =4 0 0u n i t sb yﬁ r s t
independently drawing Ci,w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n tt oW i,f o re a c hu n i t ,w h e r e!c =0 .25,
!n =0 .45, and !a =0 .3. Given unit i’s principal strata, Ci,w ed r a wY i from the
distributions in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Potential outcomes distributions: The last four columns give the
distributions of the potential outcomes under di↵erent principal strata (the rows)
and di↵erent assigned treatment combinations (the columns).
Y |C = t
t P(Ci = t) Z =( 0 ,0) Z =( 0 ,1) Z =( 1 ,0) Z =( 1 ,1)
c !c =0 .25 N( 0.1,0.16) N(0.2,0.25) N(0.4,0.49) N(1.0,0.55)
n !n =0 .45 N( 0.7,0.25) N( 0.1,0.33) N( 0.7,0.25) N( 0.1,0.33)
a !a =0 .3 N(1.0,0.20) N(1.2,0.25) N(1.0,0.20) N(1.2,0.25)
Note that because of the weak exclusion restriction, the potential outcomes dis-
tributions for never-takers and always-takers are the same when Z =( 0 ,Z 2)a n d
Z =( 1 ,Z 2). We visualize the the potenial outcomes distributions in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Potential outcomes distributions: The distributions are shown for
compliers, c,n e v e r - t a k e r s ,n,a n da l w a y s - t a k e r s ,a,w h e nZ2 =0( a )a n dw h e nZ2 =1
(b). The distribution for compliers changes with the value of Z1 (solid black line
is Z1 =0a n dd a s h e db l a c kl i n ei sZ1 =1 ) . T h e r ei so n l yo n ep o t e n t i a lo u t c o m e
distribution for never-takers when Z2 =0( s o l i dr e dl i n e )a n do n l yo n ef o ra l w a y s -
takers when Z2 =0 .
From Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1, we can derive the super-population causal e↵ects,
✓
CACE, SP
j , j =1 ,2,3. Using the fact that µc =(  0.1,0.2,0.4,1.0),
✓
CACE, SP
1 =
1
2
g
0
1µc =0 .65
✓
CACE, SP
2 =
1
2
g
0
2µc =0 .45
✓
CACE, SP
3 =
1
2
g
0
3µc =0 .15. (4.34)
F1 has a positive e↵ect on compliers both when Z2 =0a n dw h e nZ2 =1a n dt h u s
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✓
CACE, SP
1 > 0. The e↵ect of F1 increases when Z2 =1a n dt h u s✓
CACE, SP
3 > 0. In our
steroid example, this would imply that weight lifting increases average muscle size
when the compliers are not taking steroids and it increases average muscle size even
more when the compliers are taking steroids. We also know that F2 has a positive
e↵ect both when Z1 =0a n dw h e nZ1 =1a n dt h u s✓
CACE, SP
2 > 0.
We simulate the observed data by randomly assigning each of the 400 units to one
of the four treatment combinations, following a completely randomized assignment
mechanism. Using the observed data, we then derive the posterior distributions for
the ﬁnite-population and super-population estimands using the Gibbs sampler and
the EM algorithm. We evaluate the repeated operating characteristics by recording
the bias of the posterior mean, the RMSE of the posterior mean, how often the
central 95% probability interval covers the true estimand, and the width of the 95%
probability interval.
For the prior, we assume (!c,! n,! a)a n d⌘t,z are independent. We assume a
non-informative Dirichlet prior distribution on (!c,! n,! a)s u c ht h a tf(!c,! n,! a)=
Dirichlet(1,1,1). We also assume a non-informative prior distribution on (µt,z, 2
t,z),
f(µt,z, 2
t,z) / 1/ 2
t,z. Note that this is not a proper prio.
4.4.2 Results
We begin with the results of a single simulated data set. In Figure 4.2, we present
histograms for the poterior distributions of the ﬁnite populations estimands, derived
using both the Gibbs sampler and EM algorithm. For instance, in Figure 4.2(a),
the vertical dashed blue line represents the true value of ✓
CACE, FP
1 and the black
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histogram represents the posterior distribution derived from the Gibbs sampler. The
black vertical line is the corresponding posterior mean. The red histogram represent
the posterior distribution derived from the large-sample approximation. The red
vertical line is the corresponding posterior mean. The posterior distribution derived
from the large-sample approximation tends to be much narrowed than the distribution
derived from the Gibbs sampler. For example, the 95% interval (0.67, 0.91) from the
large sample approximation covers only 66% of the distribution derived from the
Gibbs sampler and fails to include the true value of ✓
CACE, FP
1 .T h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s
from the large sample approximation for the other two ﬁnite-population estimands,
✓
CACE, FP
2 and ✓
CACE, FP
3 ,a r ea l s om u c hn a r r o w e r .
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Figure 4.2: Estimates of ﬁnite-population estimands
In Figure 4.3, we report the posterior distributions of the super-population esti-
mands and the results are similar. The posterior distributions based on the large-
sample approximations are much narrower and fail to capture the tail behavior in the
distribution derived using the Gibbs sampler.
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Figure 4.3: Estimates of super-population estimands
We study the repeated operating characteristics of these two methods by repeating
this analysis 1000 times. In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we report the bias of the posterior
mean, the RMSE of the posterior mean, how often the central 95% probability interval
covers the true estimand, and the width of the 95% probability interval. We see that
over many simulations the probability interval from the large-sample approximation
fails to cover the true estimand at the nominal 95% level and actually never covers
the true value even 80% of the time. We also see that the interval width using the
large-sample approximation is much smaller than the interval width using the Gibbs
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sampler. Again, this is because the large sample approximation yields a distribution
that is too narrow. The repeated-sampling bias and RMSE of the two methods are
similar.
Table 4.3: Simulation results for ﬁnite-population estimands
Cov. Mean
Bias RMSE Rate Width
Gibbs -0.007 0.117 0.948 0.482
EM -0.026 0.120 0.721 0.261
(a) ✓
CACE, FP
1
Cov. Mean
Bias RMSE Rate Width
Gibbs -0.009 0.107 0.951 0.439
EM -0.014 0.110 0.783 0.261
(b) ✓
CACE, FP
2
Cov. Mean
Bias RMSE Rate Width
Gibbs 0.021 0.107 0.974 0.922
EM 0.012 0.108 0.770 0.261
(c) ✓
CACE, FP
12
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Table 4.4: Simulation results for super-population estimands
Cov. Mean
Bias RMSE Rate Width
Gibbs -0.006 0.124 0.956 0.509
EM 0.027 0.126 0.727 0.272
(a) ✓
CACE, SP
1 =0 .65
Cov. Mean
Bias RMSE Rate Width
Gibbs -0.010 0.115 0.941 0.469
EM -0.016 0.118 0.766 0.273
(b) ✓
CACE, SP
2 =0 .45
Cov. Mean
Bias RMSE Rate Width
Gibbs 0.019 0.115 0.962 0.472
EM 0.010 0.115 0.746 0.273
(c) ✓
CACE, SP
12 =0 .15
The simulation conﬁrms that we can successfully estimate the ﬁnite-population
and super-population estimands and that the Gibbs sampler performs much better
than the EM algorithm in terms of approximating the posterior distribution.
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4.5 Extensions
We consider two future extensions of the principal stratiﬁcation framework, al-
lowing non-compliance for both factors and allowing compliance interactions. Both
extensions relax one of the earlier assumptions. In this section, we focus on the
conceptual issues and leave ﬁtting the models for future work.
4.5.1 Allowing non-compliance for both factors
Up to this point, we have assumed that Wi(Z2)=Z2,b u tw ec o u l da l l o wu n i t st o
be either compliers, never-takers, or always-takers with respect to F2 as well. In the
steroid example, this means that units can also fail to comply with their assignment
to receive or not to receive the weekly steroid injections. This increases the number
of principal strata to 32 =9 .L e t
Ci 2{ (c,c),(c,n),(c,a),(n,c),(n,n),(n,a),(a,c),(a,n),(a,a)} (4.35)
be the principal strata for the ith unit and, if Ci =( c,a), then unit i is a complier
with respect to F1 and an always-taker with respect to F2. Also, let C(t1,t 2)b et h e
collection of units in principal strata (t1,t 2). The focus is now to estimate the main
e↵ects and interaction for the units in C(c,c), the units who always comply. Although
the number of strata increases when we allow non-compliance for multiple factors,
we can still derive the posterior distributions of the estimands. We ﬁrst modify the
exclusion restriction as follows.
4. Weak exclusion restriction, non-compliance for both factors: We as-
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sume that for units in C(n,n), C(n,a), C(a,n), and C(a,a), the four potential
outcomes are the same. That is,
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((0,1),W i(0,1)) = Yi((1,0),W i(1,0)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)).
(4.36)
Also, for units in C(n,c)o rC(a,c), the potential outcomes follow the previous
exclusion restriction,
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((1,0),W i(1,0))
Yi((0,1),W i(0,1)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)). (4.37)
Finally, for units in C(c,n)o rC(c,a), the potential outcomes are such that
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((0,1),W i(0,1))
Yi((1,0),W i(1,0)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)). (4.38)
In Table 4.5, we again visualize the principal strata associated with each assigned and
received treatment combination.
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Table 4.5: Visualizing principal strata and assigned and received treatment
combination when allowing non-compliance for both factors
this means that units can also fail to comply with their assignment to receive or not to receive
steroid injections. This increases the number of principal strata to 32 =9 .L e t
Ci 2 {(c,c),(c,n),(c,a),(n,c),(n,n),(n,a),(a,c),(a,n),(a,a)} (35)
be the principal strata for the ith unit. If Ci =( c,a), then unit i is a complier with respect
to F1 and an always-taker with respect to F2. Also, let C(t1,t 2) be the collection of units
in principal strata (t1,t 2). The focus is now to estimate the main e↵ects and interaction for
the units in C(c,c), the units who always comply. Although the number of strata increases
when we allow non-compliance for multiple factors, given the other assumptions, the model
can still be ﬁt using the Bayesian principal stratiﬁcation model and we can still derive the
posterior distributions for the estimands of interest.
We ﬁrst modify the exclusion restriction as follows.
4. Weak exclusion restriction for non-compliance for F1 and F2: We assume that
for units in C(n,n), C(n,a), C(a,n), and C(a,a), the four potential outcomes are the
same. That is,
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((0,1),W i(0,1)) = Yi((1,0),W i(1,0)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)). (36)
Also, for units in C(n,c)o rC(a,c), the potential outcomes follow the previous exclusion
restriction,
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((1,0),W i(1,0))
Yi((0,1),W i(0,1)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)). (37)
Finally, for units in C(c,n)o rC(c,a), the potential outcomes are such that
Yi((0,0),W i(0,0)) = Yi((0,1),W i(0,1))
Yi((1,0),W i(1,0)) = Yi((1,1),W i(1,1)). (38)
In Table 6, we again visualize the principal strata associated with each assigned and received
treatment combination.
Table 6: Visualizing principal strata and assigned and received treatment combi-
nation when allowing non-compliance for F2
w
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
z
(0,0) (c,c), (c,n), (n,c), (n,n) (c,a), (n,a) (a,c), (a,n) (a,a)
(0,1) (c,n), (n,n) (c,c), (c,a), (n,c), (n,a) (a,n) (a,c), (a,a)
(1,0) (n,c), (n,n) (n,a) (c,c), (c,n), (a,c), (a,n) (c,a), (a,a)
(1,1) (n,n) (n,c), (n,a) (c,n), (a,n) (c,c), (c,a), (a,c), (a,a)
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As before, the table provides some intuition for how the model parameters are esti-
mated. Again, focusing on the ﬁrst column, we know that the units in S((1,1),(0,0))
all belong to C(n,n)a n da r en e v e r - t a k e r sw i t hr e s p e c tt ob o t hF1 and F2.T h u s ,w e
can estimate the parameter ⌘(n,n). Note that according to the modiﬁed weak exclusion
restriction, all the potential outcomes for units in C(n,n)f o l l o wt h es a m ed i s t r i b u t i o n .
We can use our estimate of ⌘(n,n) to distinguish the (n,n)u n i t si nS((1,0),(0,0))
from the (n,c)u n i t sa n dt h u se s t i m a t e⌘(n,c),(1,0). Applying the same logic to the
units in S((0,1),(0,0)), we can also estimate ⌘(c,n),(0,1).T h ew e a ke x l c u s i o nr e s t r i c -
tion also implies that ⌘(n,c),(1,0) = ⌘(n,c),(0,0) and that ⌘(c,n),(0,1) = ⌘(c,n),(0,0).T h u s ,w e
can apply the estimates of ⌘(n,n), ⌘(n,c),(0,0),a n d⌘(c,n),(0,0) to identify the (c,c)u n i t si n
S((0,0),(0,0)) and estimate ⌘(c,c),(0,0). This same logic can be applied to the other
three columns, which means that we can estimate the main e↵ects and interaction for
the units in C(c,c). We leave extending this formulation to experiments with more
than two factors to future work.
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4.5.2 Allowing compliance interactions
Returning to the case with strict compliance for F2,w ea l l o wt h ea s s i g n e dl e v e l
of F2, Zi2,t oa ↵ e c tu n i ti’s compliance behavior regarding F1.O n ee x a m p l eo fs u c h
an interaction is treatment burden, which occurs when subjects become overwhelmed
by the requirements of the di↵erent treatment assignments and stop complying. As
a simple example, suppose in the steroid experiment that a subject complies with his
assignment to the weight lifting program if he was not assigned to receive the weekly
steroid injections. However, if he was assigned to receive the weekly steroid injections,
then he does not follow the weight lifting program because driving to the hospital
for the steroid injections takes up too much time. Whether or not such behavior
is realistic depends on the context but it can be assessed empirically. For instance,
treatment burden implies that the proportion of never-takers is signiﬁcantly higher
for units with Zi2 =1t h a nf o ru n i t sw i t hZi2 =0 .
We explore a treatment burden example in a simpliﬁed setting. We assume non-
compliance is one-sided, so that if a unit is assigned to the inactive level of F1,t h e r ei s
no way to receive the active level. This means that the regardless of whether Zi2 =1
or 0, the unit cannot be an always-taker. We also rule out the possibility that unit
i can be a never-taker when Zi2 =0b u tac o m p l i e rw h e nZi2 =1 .T h ei d e ai st h a t
treatment burden cannot make a unit more compliant. There are therefore three
principal strata, (c,c), (c,n), and (n,n). If Ci =( c,n), equivalently i 2C (c,n), then
unit i is a complier when Zi2 =0a n dan e v e r - t a k e rw h e nZi2 =1 ,w h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n t
with our treatment burden example. The estimands of interest are the main e↵ects
and interaction for those units in C(c,c).
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Even in this simple example, allowing compliance interactions turns out to be more
complicated than allowing non-compliance for both factors. In Table 4.6, we again
present the principal strata consistent with each assigned and received treatment
combination.
Table 4.6: Visualizing principal strata and assigned and received treatment
combination when allowing compliance interactions
w
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
z
(0,0) (c,c), (c,n), (n,n)
(0,1) (c,c), (c,n), (n,n)
(1,0) (n,n) (c,c), (c,n)
(1,1) (c,n), (n,n) (c,c)
The reason for the complication can be most clearly seen in the third column. The
units in S((1,0),(1,0)) are either in C(c,c)o ri nC(c,n)b u tb e c a u s en oo t h e ru n i t s
receive treatment combination (1,0), it is more di cult to discern which unit is in
which strata. The parameters ⌘(c,c),(1,0) and ⌘(c,n),(1,0) are still technically identiﬁed
because of the information regarding the proportion of units that belong to each
strata. For instance, from the units assigned to treatment combination (1,0), we can
estimate the propotion of units in C(n,n)a n d ,f r o mt h eu n i t sa s s i g n e dt ot r e a t m e n t
combination (1,1), we can estimate the proportion of units assigned to C(c,c). Since
there are only three strata, we can then also estimate the proportion of units assigned
to C(c,n). We could then use those proportions to determine which of the two com-
ponent distributions in the S((1,0),(1,0)) mixture distribution corresponds to the
the (c,c)u n i t s .T h i sp r o p o r t i o ni n f o r m a t i o ni sc l e a r l yp a r to ft h el i k e l i h o o df u n c t i o n
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and is critical in identifying the estimands. However, in this setting, the posterior
distribution of the estimands of interest are multimodal and computation is more
di cult.
There are four potential solutions to the computational problem. First, we could
collect more data. Second, we could use an informative prior. Up to this point, we
have been using improper prior distributions. The computations would remain the
same with a proper informative prior but subject matter knowledge would be needed
to choose the prior e↵ectively. Third, we could collect covariates that are predictive
of compliance behavior. Such covariates could help distinguish the units in C(c,c)
from the units in C(c,n). Finally, we could consider di↵erent Monte Carlo sampling
schemes.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we showed how to apply a Bayesian principal stratiﬁcation model
to a 22 factorial experiment in the presence of non-compliance. We believe this is
an important application of principal stratiﬁcation given the prominence of factorial
experiments in ﬁelds like medicine and education, where the experimental units are
often prone to non-compliance. We introduced original notation and assumptions
to deﬁne the principal strata and identify the model parameters and, in deﬁning
the estimands for each principal strata, extended the causal inference framework
presented in Dasgupta et al. (2012). Following Imbens and Rubin (1997), we laid
out the Bayesian model and associated computational methods and we evaluated the
repeated operating characteristics of the posterior means and probability intervals.
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We also considered the consequences of allowing subjects to fail to comply with both
factor assignments and allowing the compliance behavior of one factor to be inﬂuenced
by the other factor.
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